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13 DECEMBER 1986

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INDONESIA

CUT IN FINANCIAL AID TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 28 Oct 86 pp 1, 12

[Text] The cutback in budgetary aid to sociopolitical organizations that participate in general elections is consistent with financial conditions and does not violate the law. Legislation and regulations require that sociopolitical organizations become self-sufficient, and they are not to depend on others.

Drs Feisal Tamin, spokesman for the Department of Home Affairs, made these comments in his office yesterday during an interview with a KOMPAS reporter on the subject of government aid for sociopolitical organizations. Some first-level regions have received no aid for sociopolitical organizations in the 1986-87 fiscal year.

The promotion and development of sociopolitical organizations in first-level regions has been assisted by both the national government and regional governments in past fiscal years. Aid is allocated from the national government in the national budget and from regional governments in regional budgets.

Funds from the national budget are allocated for the promotion, development and operations of sociopolitical organizations and are disbursed through the Social and Political Affairs Directorate, while other funds are provided in the form of financial awards. Regional governments set aside funds in their budgets for the promotion of social and political matters in their respective regions.

Different Amounts

The Social and Political Affairs Directorate does not budget the same amount of funds for each first-level region. North Sumatra, for example, has an allocation of about 16 million rupiah, while about 18 million rupiah is allocated to the second-level regions under its jurisdiction. The allocation for East Java is set at 25 million rupiah and about 38 million rupiah goes to its second-level regions. Central Kalimantan receives about 8 million rupiah and its second-level regions about 15 million rupiah.

Feisal Tamin said that some regional governments have not provided aid to sociopolitical organizations in fiscal 1986-87. Aid was provided in prior years, although not in large amounts. He said this change in policy occurred because funds are limited. Funds that are available are being used to support the operations of the Social and Political Affairs Directorate in the regions.

High Productivity

Feisal said that all government policy is now oriented in this direction, meaning that efficient and productive use is being made of budgeted funds. "For we cannot be immobilized by this. Our desire is to achieve high productivity with a limited budget," he said.

Every sociopolitical organization must understand the government's policy. "The present momentum is an indicator to sociopolitical organizations that they must really be self-sufficient," he added.

Law No 3 of 1975 on political parties and functional groups, as amended by Law No 3 of 1985 and other legislation, states that these organizations obtain their funds from membership dues, nonbinding contributions, legitimate activities and aid from the state/government.

Feisal said that there is no question that this can be done by every sociopolitical organization. "These determinations can be carried out and the effort must begin at the lowest level. Unlike times past, sociopolitical organizations must not place too much hope in receiving aid or contributions," he said.

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CSO: 4213/16

INDONESIA

LEGAL AID INSTITUTE SEEKS GOVERNMENT FUNDS

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 28 Oct 86 pp 1, 3

[Text] Adnan Buyung Nasution, SH feels that it is natural that the Legal Aid Institute (LBH, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) and the government should have differences of opinion, even though they are partners in the New Order. And, within certain limits, these differences should be given more exposure as part of the effort to develop the law and respect for fundamental human rights, he said.

In an interview with a PELITA correspondent the LBH founder said that it is only right for the organization to be grateful to the government, for it has grown rapidly in its 16 years of existence and now has 13 offices and tens of posts throughout Indonesia.

But he still is appealing to the government for financial assistance. "Cooperation was praiseworthy in the past, so why not improve it even further both now and in the future?" he asked.

Young People

Adnan Buyung Nasution takes pride in the fact that while many of the people who handle the work of the LBH are young, they are able to maintain the nature and mission of the organization. "I am optimistic about the LBH's future development, both as an organization and in its concepts," the prominent attorney said.

He said that the LBH does not just take pride in the development of the organization, for its concepts and ideas also have developed, paralleling the developments of the times. He noted that sometimes the growth of ideas and perceptions have led to internal unrest.

"The LBH, it seems, cannot escape from this sort of unrest, nor can the unrest be separated from the growth of the LBH. The problem is that the activities of the LBH are closely tied to efforts for legislative reform and for the development of democracy," he said.

The former public prosecutor does not feel that the recruiting system used by the LBH can endanger its struggle mission. Rather, the association of personnel with different educational backgrounds, such as sociologists and criminologists, should be welcomed, "for in this way there will be a more realistic understanding of the law in society."

Process of Democratization

Adnan Buyung Nasution believes that when a serious difference of opinion occurs between the LBH and the government it should be thought of as part of the process of democratization. "In any case, a democracy definitely needs a continuing and constructive dialogue," he said.

Buyung does not deny that some government officials harbor misunderstandings about the LBH, particularly in areas outside Jakarta. However, he feels these misunderstandings can be gradually reduced. "It now depends on the LBH, on whether it is able to show that it really is a partner that can be counted on," he said.

Buyung said that in any case the need for the LBH will increase as development progresses. Excesses accompany development and "the LBH will try to take part in reducing these excesses," he declared.

Buyung asks the government to return to the attitude it held in the past, an attitude of being responsive and not distrustful. He said that it is clear that the LBH is working within the framework of social development and in accordance with constitutional goals, and "therefore it would not be wrong for the government to allocate funds to the LBH."

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CSO: 4213/16

INDONESIA

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

[The following information has been extracted from Indonesian-language sources published in Jakarta.]

H. Mochammad Amin Iskandar

Died of heart disease at Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital on 23 October following a long illness. He was admitted to the hospital on 23 September. Born in Cirebon on 24 December 1921, he was a member of Parliament from the United Development Party (PPP). He was elected to Parliament as a representative of West Java in the 1955, 1971, 1977 and 1982 general elections. At the time of his death he was deputy chairman of the Interparliamentary Cooperation Board and a member of Parliamentary Commission I. [Jakarta PELITA 23 Oct 86 p 1]

Drs Atar Sibero

Appointed director general for general administration and regional autonomy of the Department of Home Affairs by Home Affairs Minister Soepardjo Rustam on 29 October. He replaces Drs Tojiman Sidikprawiro, who is retiring. Atar Sibero was born in Karo kabupaten [North Sumatra] on 2 May 1931. He began his career as head of Division V in the Directorate General of General Administration and Regional Autonomy and subsequently served as head of the Budget Management Directorate, head of the Regional Development and Economy Directorate and director of the Regional Development Directorate, all in the same directorate general. In 1980 the Regional Development Directorate became a directorate general and Atar Sibero was appointed its first director general. [Jakarta KOMPAS 30 Oct 86 pp 1, 12]

Eng Piek Mulyadi Adikusumo

Appointed director general for regional development of the Department of Home Affairs by Home Affairs Minister Soepardjo Rustam on 29 October. He replaces Atar Sibero, who has been appointed director general for general administration and regional autonomy. Piek Mulyadi Adikusumo was born in Surabaya on 20 April 1930. He began his career in 1958 as an assistant at the Department of Architecture, Bandung Institute of Technology. Subsequently he was employed by Bank Industri Negara, served as an advisor on development engineering, as a coordinator for the organization of a master

plan for the Jakarta Public Works Service, as head of the Development Directorate of the Jakarta regional government, as chairman of the Regional Development Planning Board (Bappeda) and as deputy governor of Jakarta. Just prior to his current assignment he was a member of the minister of home affairs' expert staff for the development sector. [Jakarta KOMPAS 30 Oct 86 pp 1, 12]

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CSO: 4213/16

INDONESIA

BRIEFS

GOLKAR FOR RE-ELECTION OF SUHARTO--GOLKAR is determined to struggle for the re-election of General Suharto, retired, the chairman of GOLKAR's Advisory Council, as president of the Republic of Indonesia and mandatar of the People's Consultative Congress (MPR) for the 1988-1993 term, and it will carry out this struggle in the 1988 general session of the MPR. At a ceremony held last night in the Senayan Conference Building to mark the 22nd anniversary of GOLKAR, G.P.H. Haji Mangkubumi, chairman of the Yogyakarta Regional Executive Council of GOLKAR, read a political statement produced by the Second GOLKAR Leadership Meeting during its 18-20 October session. President Suharto, the participants in the leadership meeting and thousands of GOLKAR members were present at the ceremony. The statement affirmed that the people are united in their resolve to have President Suharto continue his leadership during the next presidential term of office and that this resolve is echoed throughout the country. [Text] [Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 21 Oct 86 p 1]

FOREIGN TRAVEL BAN ON MULYA LUBIS--T. Mulya Lubis, SH, the director of the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI), is numbered among the Indonesian citizens who are prohibited from leaving the country. This matter came to light on Thursday when Minister of Justice Ismail Saleh, SH dedicated some computer equipment that is being used by immigration officials at Sukarno-Hatta Airport. Following the dedication ceremony the minister watched a demonstration of the new equipment. "How do we know that a certain person cannot enter or leave Indonesia?" he asked a computer operator. The operator responded hesitantly while pressing the keys on the computer before him. Luckily, an employee of the company supplying the equipment was there. "That information is available in the processor, sir," he said, pointing to a back room. Ismail Saleh went to the room and there, as is his custom, asked many questions. Fortunately, the unit chief who met him was able to answer the questions. But Ismail Saleh would not have been himself if he had not found something "out of the ordinary." "Try programming some of the people who are forbidden to enter or leave Indonesia," he said. The unit chief worked the keys of the computer and provided the requested information. "Now try Mulya Lubis," the minister said, to the amusement of those present. Data on T. Mulya Lubis quickly was brought up on the computer screen. It included the notation that he is prohibited from leaving the country for political reasons. [Excerpts] [Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 31 Oct 86 pp 1, 3]

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CSO: 4213/16

LAOS

COMMENTARY STRESSES NEED TO ELIMINATE POL POT

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 25 Sep 86 p 4

["World News" column: "The Right of the People of Kampuchea to a Regular Administration"]

[Excerpt] Recently Mr Houn Sen, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea and foreign minister of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, sent a letter to the United Nations emphasizing the right of the people of Kampuchea to a real representative and to have only one in the United States, and he insisted at the end of the letter that the criminal, genocidal Pol Pot group be eliminated from the United Nations.

His subject here concerned the right of the Kampuchean people to be dealt with correctly because as everyone knows now the people of the world understand very well that the criminal, genocidal Pol Pot group has committed unbelievable crimes against the people of Kampuchea as well as all humanity. Is there anyone now who thinks that the Pol Pot group is not definitely guilty? This indicates clearly that recognizing the genocidal Pol Pot group is an inhuman act. Many countries agree with this, including the United States of America. In the past various international meetings, for example the Eighth Conference of Non-aligned Countries held recently in the capital of Zimbabwe, Harare, have left the seat for Kampuchea empty. All that has been said brings us to the conclusion that there is only one big obstacle to a peaceful solution to the problem of Kampuchea and that is the criminal, genocidal Pol Pot group. If one wants to solve the problem of Kampuchea peacefully, one must eliminate the Pol Pot group and its partisans as was announced in the report of the 13th conference of the foreign ministers of the three countries of Indochina recently. For more than 7 years now the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea has run the country and its administration very well, and no enemy has been able to violate the sovereignty or any of the territory of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The people of Kampuchea under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea and the revolutionary administration of Kampuchea have struggled for the construction of their cherished nation and as a result, the People's Republic of Kampuchea has steadily developed and gotten stronger in every area, for example in national defense, as was clearly shown when part of the volunteer force of Vietnam was withdrawn from Kampuchea; this has been done on five occasions and will be completed in

1990. For this reason it is clear that the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea is the only legal representative of the people of Kampuchea. This is true and always will be true. Nevertheless, international reactionaries and other reactionaries stubbornly ignore the truth and hope to keep on supporting the criminal, genocidal Pol Pot group. This not only provokes the Kampuchean people and disregards the compassion of the people of the world but also blocks a solution to the problem of Southeast Asia as well as a peaceful solution to the problem of Kampuchea.

The people of Laos believe firmly that this is the truth and will always be the truth and that the Kampuchean people must one day practice their rights. The people of Laos, the people of Vietnam, and the progressive, justice-loving people of the world support completely the demands of the People's Republic of Kampuchea as announced in the letter Mr Houn Sen sent to the 41st Assembly of the United Nations. This was another occasion in which the people of Laos insisted that they would do their utmost to help bring about a peaceful solution to the problem of Kampuchea and the urgent problems of Southeast Asia in order to bring peace, stability, and cooperation to this area and the world.

8149/9716

CSO: 4206/15

LAOS

BRIEFS

KHAMMOUAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT--In the evening of 14 August 1986 the intelligence section affiliated with the military headquarters of Khammouan Province officially ended its military training. Joining in the ceremony marking the completion of this military training were members of the headquarters committee, the head of the military headquarters of the province, all the cadres of all three offices of the headquarters, the instructors, and the students. The local administration joined in also. During this ceremony the deputy head of the intelligence section read a summary of the 1-month training course. In his summary he emphasized the knowledge and grasp of military methods and tactics taught the students by the instructors. The average grade for the entire unit was 85 percent. There were 6 students who were rated very good and 10 who were rated good. Then he read the list of outstanding students in the class: there were 6 of the first category and 10 of the second category. The members of the headquarters committee, the head of the headquarters office, and the head of the policy section took turns presenting gifts to those being honored. Then the members of the headquarters committee and the head of the headquarters office gave some words of advice to the instructors and students. [Text] Vientiane KONGTHAP PASASON LAO in Lao 11 Sep 86 p 1] 8149

VALUE OF RICE EXCHANGED--From the beginning of May to the end of August the cadres and workers of the requisitioning and bartering unit of the cereals corporation of Vientiane City carried out operations to requisition and barter goods from the people of the seven districts of Vientiane City. They brought industrial goods, handicrafts, agricultural goods, and tools worth a total of 35,352,348 kip to use in barter and requisitions and received 2,009,487 kg of rice from the people. This included 6,325 kg for agricultural taxes. [Excerpt] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 19 Sep 86 pp 1, 4] 8149

VIENTIANE LUMBER INDUSTRY--During August 1986 the cadres and workers of the mills affiliated with the corporation to exploit and process the timber of Vientiane City strove to do their jobs diligently, and during this period they were able to exploit more than 2,310 cubic meters of various kinds of logs for production and produce more than 350 cubic meters of finished lumber. [Excerpt] [Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 20 Sep 86 pp 1, 4] 8149

ENTERPRISES LISTED FOR REFORM--At present various corporations affiliated with the Ministry of Transportation and Post are, with great spirit and mastery,

preparing to change the grassroots economic figures to the system of socialist business with fixed prices. For the first stage the Ministry of Transportation and Posts has specified 3 corporations of the 14 affiliated with it to use the business system, and these are the Lao-Soviet friendship vehicle repair shop, the Lao-Swedish friendship vehicle repair shop, and the trucking corporation. These three enterprises are in a period for organizing production figures, inspecting, fixed assets, summarizing and appraising circulating capital, and making estimates on the use of materials, machinery, etc. As for the remaining corporations they will begin changing to the business system at the end of 1986 according to Resolution 49 of the council of ministers. Proceeding with these various activities means participation in the fervent drive to achieve results to honor the upcoming Fourth Party Congress. [Text] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 23 Sep 86 p A4] 8149

CHAMPASSAK COFFEE PRODUCTION EXPANSION--During 1986 the leadership committee for coffee production of Champassak Province prepared a plan to plant coffee plants on 5,600 hectares by the middle of 1987. In addition, they will take care to renew the old coffee gardens in order to raise production efficiency from 250 kg per hectare to 500 kg per hectare. This plan was adopted by the congress of the party committee and administrative committee of Champassak Province at the beginning of September. This meeting researched the policies of the party committee and administrative committee concerning an increase in the area of coffee cultivation throughout the province, apportioned the area for cultivation, and assigned duties in detail among its affiliated districts while it maintained control and reaped the benefits in order to build a position of strength for the economy of Champassak Province to expand on and become steadily stronger. [Text] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 19 Sep 86 p A7] 8149

SAVANNAKHET DISTRICT BANK DEPOSITS--From the beginning of the year until now the people of various localities in Khanthabouli District of Savannakhet Province have deposited 991,480 kip, which they had accumulated within their families, in the bank branch of the district. Of this the Vietnam association accounted for 220,800 kip. [Excerpt] [Vientiane KHAOSAN PATHET LAO in Lao 24 Sep 86 p A1, 2] 8149

/9716
CSO: 4206/15

MALAYSIA

ARAB ENVOYS MEET ON U.S. ARMS TO IRAN

BK201459 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English 1438 GMT 20 Nov 86

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Nov 20 (OANA-BERNAMA)--The delivery of arms from the United States to Iran via Israel will benefit no one but those who have direct interest in the continuity of the Iran-Iraq war, several heads of Arab diplomatic missions here agreed.

The heads of missions who held a meeting here Wednesday further agreed the "Zionist enemy" would also benefit from the delivery.

According to a joint statement issued by them Thursday, the arrangement allowed Israel to play a key role in dissipating Arab and Islamic energy that could otherwise be harnessed to achieve the "holy and fundamental" task of liberating Palestine and the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

The statement said Zionist policies were interested only in creating centers of tension and conflict all over the Islamic world.

It added that the heads of missions expressed their deep concern over the policy of the Reagan administration which they claimed had shaken its credibility and threatened international peace and security.

Meanwhile, the secretary-general of the League of Arab nations, Shazli al-Kalaibi, said the league was greatly concerned by the news that the United States had delivered arms to Iran.

In a statement issued here, he said such an action, if true, completely contradicted that "well known" policy of neutrality the U.S. government professedly adopted towards the Iran-Iraq war, "a policy that we had considered as a great contribution to international efforts aimed at bringing that war to an end."

He also said the U.S. Government had on many occasions assured Arab states of its neutrality in the matter.

/12624
CSO: 4200/159

MALAYSIA

BRIEFS

MILK CONSIGNMENT REFUSED ENTRY--The consignment of Irish-manufactured powdered milk was refused entry into Sarawak as it was found to contain radioactive cesium-137 higher than the level allowed. Health Services Director Datuk Dr Abdul Rakhman said on 22 November the consignment arrived in Kuching port on 10 November and has been detained since. He said the Health Ministry had directed the importer to send the consignment back to its exporter in the United Kingdom. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0800 GMT 22 Nov 86 BK] /12624

MARITIME TALKS WITH USSR--Kuala Lumpur, Nov 22 (OANA-BERNAMA)--Malaysia and the Soviet Union have agreed to have further consultations on a proposed maritime transport agreement to strengthen relations and cooperation between the two countries, Transport Minister Dr Ling Liong Sik said Saturday. He said in a statement that the agreement was concluded after a five-day meeting which ended on Friday. The delegations agreed to convene another round of consultations at a date to be decided later, he said. The Malaysian delegation was headed by Transport Ministry Deputy Secretary-General (planning) Norminshah Sanirin while the Soviet Delegation was led by Foreign Relations Department Deputy Director of the Merchant Marine Ministry Eduard Borchtchevski [spelling as received]. Dr Ling said the leaders of the two delegations initialled an agreed provision of the proposed maritime transport agreement at the end of the consultations. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English 0729 GMT 22 Nov 86 BK] /12624

BANK OFFICIAL ON ECONOMY--The Malaysian economy has begun to stabilize and there are scattered signs of recovery. The deputy governor of Bank Negara [National Bank], Datuk Dr Lin See Yan, says all Malaysians are still in the midst of a bad patch and thinks the worst is behind us. Datuk Dr Lin said this at a luncheon address to the British-Malaysian Society in London. The text of his speech was released by Bank Negara in Kuala Lumpur. He said the economy was at its worst in the fourth quarter of 1985 with gross domestic product growth at minus 2.8 percent. By the first quarter of this year, Malaysia's GDP growth stabilized and by the second quarter improved by an estimated 1.5 percent. Datuk Dr Lin said for 1986 as a whole the real GDP growth is expected to recover to 0.5 percent or 1 percent. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0600 GMT 22 Nov 86 BK] /12624

SINGAPORE

PRIME MINISTER ON DEVELOPMENT OF 'HOMOGENEOUS' SOCIETY

BK250942 Singapore THE STRAITS TIMES in English 24 Nov 86 p 17

[Text] The Prime Minister yesterday warned that although the danger from communism has receded, it has not disappeared but instead threatens to emerge in new forms.

Mr Lee Kuan Yew, speaking to People's Action Party cadres at their biennial conference, saw the danger coming from those who are English-educated and who took after the British leftists and the radicals in the United States.

According to First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, who briefed the press after the conference, Mr Lee said that those who followed the Euro-communists were chasing a pipe dream if they thought that the real communists, who had built their network, would simply allow them to take charge of the Government.

The real hard-core communists, for example those on the Thai-Malaysian border, will use them as trojan horses.

Mr Lee's main message, in his speech which focused on changes in the three Cs -- colonialism, communism and communalism -- was that these three threats could always re-emerge, possibly in new forms.

While the British are not likely to make a comeback as colonialists, the problem of colonialism has not been totally resolved because some other power in the region could dominate in future, the Prime Minister said.

On communalism, Mr Lee said the problem had always been present.

To resolve the problem, Singaporeans must recognize and minimize the differences in a multi-racial, multi-religious society and must sincerely work together to build great cohesion.

The Government's policy, the Prime Minister said, was not to integrate the population because this would mean getting Singaporeans of different races and religions to inter-marry, and adopt one religion as a means of building a homogeneous Singaporean society.

It was impossible for Singapore to build a homogenous society and trying to have one was definitely not the Government's idea to solve the problems of communalism, the Prime Minister said.

WARNING AGAINST DISUNITY--The deputy prime minister, Mr Ghafar Baba, says the government will oppose any attempt to divide the people into two groups like in some other countries. It will maintain the present tradition and will strongly oppose any proposals toward dividing the people. Addressing residents of [words indistinct] in Penang, he emphasized that the people should live in a spirit of cooperation and close friendship as no one will gain if their unity is disrupted. The government will maintain the present situation and does not intend to have a military administration or do away with elections or the joint understanding as enshrined in the constitution. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur International Service in English 0600 GMT 23 Nov 86 BK] /12624

MILITARY EXERCISES WITH INDONESIA--A weeklong Malaysian and Indonesian Armed Forces joint exercise ended in Jakarta today. The exercise, codenamed "Dalsasa 2," was officially launched on the 16th of this month involving more than 250 personnel from the Armed Forces of the two countries. The Armed Forces Information Service said in a press release today that the exercise is to study, improve, and upgrade their military capabilities in joint operations in the event of any attack. Malaysian Defense Forces Chief General Tan Sri Mohamed Ghazali Che Mat and Indonesian Armed Forces Chief General Benni Murdani expressed satisfaction on the result of the exercise. [Text] [Kuala Lumpur Domestic Service in English 1130 GMT 24 Nov 86 BK] /12624

CSO: 4200/159

THAILAND

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES ECONOMICS, PARTY POLITICS, PHICHAI

Bangkok NAM THANG in Thai 15-21 Sep 86 pp 13-16

[Interview with Admiral Sitthi Sawetsila, minister of foreign affairs and chief of the Social Action Party; date and place not specified]

[Text] This government has been experiencing a raft of problems in the mere 20 days it has been running the country--one minister has even had to resign--so how will it survive? And what about the government's resolution to achieve the three goals that General Prem Tinsulanon has drawn up, that is, to solve the problems of rural poverty, unemployment, and the national debt? What is the government going to do to encourage solving these problems? NAM THANG interviewed Admiral Sitthi Sawetsila, minister of foreign affairs and head of the Social Action Party.

[Question] How are we going to reduce taxes to stimulate the economy?

[Answer] We must reduce taxes, such as the sales tax. I told Mr Suthi Singsan that the 9.9 percent sales tax must be reduced because it is an obstacle to trade and commerce and in other areas. I think that this sales tax should be reduced to as low as it was previously or lower because people still are not borrowing money even though interest rates are now down. Why would someone borrow? If they borrow to invest, the investment law is not helpful: we still tax investments, which is not right. Right now, Mr Suthi tells me he has sent me tax proposals, which we must analyze; we cannot just cancel taxes. We should think of this as making the tax structure more attractive for investments so that foreign countries like Japan will invest their money in our country more.

Anything is OK, even no tax on investments. Now we're in a period of change, so we can't do anything. We should collect taxes fixed at rates like the interest rates that Mr Suthi has announced. I told him that and he immediately announced that taxes on corporate dividends would be the same 15 percent that is collected on interest earned in banks. People can't take this. In the end, I don't want to tax at all; if it were like that, then people would want to invest.

In addition, I don't agree with estimating taxes, which is an opening for officials to corrupt. This we have to change. If nobody wants to change this, I myself want to change the laws on customs duties, revenue taxes, hotel laws, and all sorts of laws that work at cross purposes to the country's development. I don't know if these proposals for change will pass, but I must try because I have promised the people. I think that changing these tax laws is an important matter.

Another thing, we will try to reduce personal income taxes, which are rather high, very high. But right now we might not be able to do this right away this year. We will deal with these two first, the investment tax and the sales tax. When we have a way to reduce them, I will tell Mr Suthi. He has argued with me, and Mr Supachai Phanitphak also has argued with me. They have talked with me about the debt, so I have told them that I have read the World Bank report which states that government debt is virtually nothing and that the actual government debt is only 11 percent. It says that we should borrow the rest, which would reduce the debt this year, not by 1 billion or by 1.3 billion but by 1.5 billion. They say that we'll be in good shape if we reduce the developmental budget by 2.4 percent this year. I have looked at all the study's statistics. Borrowing money from the World Bank is not a waste, but borrowing from those crazy financial agencies is wasteful. The World Bank is always willing to lend money. We should carry out as many construction projects as possible in our development plan, such as road projects. Doing so will put people to work; when we increase this budget, it will be like helping create jobs in rural areas. But don't use old methods like the Rural Development Department. I don't agree with that, it's not right. At the most, approximately 30-40 percent of the Rural Development Department's funds really reach the hands of farmers--but only 20 percent as far as I know. Most of the money is routed through provincial governors, mayors, chiefs of districts and cantons or precincts, and influential people--these eat it all up. It is like sending ice through all these hands: before it actually reaches the farmers, it all melts, and only a small cube is left. If all precinct councils cannot be set up as the Social Action Party is now proposing--there are only 6,000, right?--we should at least be able to set up 1,000 because some precincts do not have any income. If a precinct has income, then we can clean it up. If we can do that, those councils can be self-governing, outside influences will be gone, and new and old people can govern together. Each precinct council would have an undersecretary. But we should not create more officials because that would use a lot of money. We might hire local kids who have bachelor's degrees as advisors to lead these councils in the right direction so that the money would be distributed. A part of the additional funding should be given to the Rural Development Department to build roads and other things, but it should be for definite projects.

Half of the government's 5 billion baht debt is domestic debt, while actual foreign debt is not that much. Most debt is private-sector debt. Here, if we were a risk, they would not loan us the money. Now, regardless of how much we reduce interest rates, people will not borrow money to invest because they are still taxed on investments. This is not right. I have argued at cabinet meetings that we should take chances. I have listened

to the technocrats for a long time and I have said that now our government listens only to the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand. However, I listen to outsiders also, so I told officials not to lecture me about estimating taxes--it's not worth all the trouble. It's totally confusing to study tax exemptions, so I say, make it simple: tax only once, tax simply, and try to limit corruption. Make it easy so that various companies will not evade taxes and will not keep two sets of books--only one set of books--and they will be willing to pay taxes. If we can do that, our tax base will get wider and revenues will increase.

Right now small shops in back alleys are all closed. Before, I saw a lot of people sitting there, but now they are closed. Jewelry stores cannot sell, and nothing sells. Why? Because people don't have the money to buy with.

[Question] I would like to change my line of questioning. Let's talk about the Social Action Party. What is the situation now?

[Answer] Right now our image has improved because we can talk to each other. In this election we got 32 new kids, new and younger-generation members. We have 35 old people left, and only 7 former members have been lost. We lost only a little bit, mostly in the south where we lost badly.

[Question] How is Professor Kukrit Pramoj now?

[Answer] I have not seen him yet. I met with him once after the election, when I informed him about what I had done. I have not met him again since then.

[Question] There are rumors that he is angry with you because you supported General Prem to be prime minister. Are these true?

[Answer] I don't know where you got these rumors from. I have informed him of my support for General Prem and he said in an interview that he understands. I don't know why he would get angry at me.

[Question] Is it true that some people approached you about being prime minister when the new government was being set up?

[Answer] Some people say that. But I saw that our party is small and that if we joined up with the Chart Thai Party, we would have to check carefully which way the wind was blowing.

[Question] Are you right for the prime ministership?

[Answer] If I have to, I can. But this job alone is a lot for me; I can barely survive it.

[Question] People were saying then that the prime minister must be elected and they were saying that it would be you.

[Answer] Yes, if that had been the case. But in reality it happened differently because of the situation. I can't deny that people actually did contact me then, but I told them we would join with the Chart Thai Party because we could bargain with them easily. Few of us were elected--we predicted that around 60 would be--but a lot of money was spent in this election.

[Question] Are you going to continue to head the Social Action Party?

[Answer] It depends whether the party still wants me; if so, then I have to. If our popularity increases, we must have an election because we will get more people into the party. But I cannot say how exhausted I'll be over the next 4 years.

[Question] There have been a lot of problems for a government that has just started. Has "Grandpa Prem" complained?

[Answer] I don't think that there has been anything serious because it's only the beginning; there have been only minor adjustments.

[Question] Such as the issue of Minister Vira?

[Answer] It depends on the Democratic Party, on what they agree to. If the party agrees not to send a member to fill that ministerial position, then it will still be open. I think the Democratic Party has problems and we don't want to get involved with them. When I joined this party, I urged every party to be united. I helped everyone that came into contact with us, except when our ideas did not agree and we had to argue. We cannot agree with everyone on everything for the good of the country.

[Question] How are your relations with Mr Phichai Rattakul?

[Answer] I have talked with Mr Phichai only in cabinet meetings. I don't talk with him off stage (loud laughter), and I never have. And we have proved that I am not moody or hot tempered because never once did I mention Mr Phichai's name during the entire campaign.

[Question] He cursed you all the time, didn't he?

[Answer] He came and cursed me out in front of the ministry, at Sanam Chai (laughter). He called me names, like "you big-nosed baldie." I complained directly to Mr Marut Bunnak that the head of his party was being very cruel to me, that's all. But the truth is, I didn't take it seriously. Seri Pramoj and Kanin Bunsuwan often attack me, but I don't care because they're a different generation of fighters. I wouldn't care if they were the same generation, either.

[Question] What is your opinion about the prime minister's request to share responsibility for the case of Minister Vira?

[Answer] This we cannot blame on the prime minister. I don't know what sort of agreement has been reached between Mr Phichai and the prime minister. Their party had 25 candidates and 16 were selected.

[Question] Would people criticize the prime minister for nominating Vira even though he knew about what happened?

[Answer] I don't know what Mr Phichai said to the prime minister. We were not there, so I cannot express my opinion about this matter. We cannot conclude that the prime minister must be responsible for this matter. This is not right because if the party knew about the situation, it should have first analyzed and reviewed it.

12587/9835
CSO: 4207/21

THAILAND

SOURCE CLOSE TO ATHIT DISCUSSES POLITICAL MOVES

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 14 Sep 86 pp 1, 16

[Excerpt] Concerning the activities of General Athit Kamlang-ek, the former supreme military commander, who became a reserve officer on 1 September, is on his way to Hawaii to visit his children there. We have learned from a senior officer, a confidant of Gen Athit Kamlang-ek's at supreme command headquarters, that General Athit is scheduled to go abroad for about 3 weeks. Right now there is no definite date of return. The important thing is that some of the military officers who are going with him must return to take their new posts on 1 October.

That senior officer told us that after Gen Athit Kamlang-ek returns, he will start working for the nation by entering politics, as he had previously decided. At least three political parties are now in contact with him. They would like him to be a senior party leader or chief advisor or perhaps change this to party head, if he wants to. However, General Athit has refused all of these parties, including the United Democratic Party, which Mr Boontheng Thongsawat heads. Political circles had formerly predicted that General Athit would join this party, with which he has very close spiritual ties. General Athit told us that he wants to work for the nation through politics with his own ideas. That means that he is determined to have his own political party where he can stipulate his own totally new policies, along with pioneering this political work himself.

As for running for congressman in the special election at Khon Kaen, right now General Athit is awaiting a constitutional judge's decision concerning the expulsion of Mr Klaeo Narapat and the loss of Mr Klaeo's membership. General Athit's military confidant told us that the general will not run, even though some persons have urged him, or that he has many supporters who want him to run for representative, "because now he only wants to be a senator."

His confidant said that General Athit should begin a full and dignified career in politics as the head of a new, major party. If he runs for representative in Khon Kaen, he must run with a party like the United Democratic Party. "Running in Khon Kaen, he has a 50-50 chance." He should run to prepare himself for his own party because there will be changes in the middle of next year or in 1988, when there should be new elections.

THAILAND

EDITORIAL: LIVING STANDARDS DROP DESPITE SOME CHANGES

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 21 Sep 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Onto the Sixth Development Plan"]

[Text] The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) has announced the Sixth National Economic Development Plan. Referring to the results of the 5 principal previous national development plans over the past 25 years, the NESDB stated that public income had increased 18 times while annual personal income had increased 10 times, from 2,150 baht per capita annually in 1961 to 20,420 baht per person. The NESDB claimed that its plans had been quite successful.

In 1961, the minimum income was 450 baht per month and the price of 1 baht of gold was 400 baht. A government clerk with a 450-baht-a-month salary could buy a gold necklace. Now 25 years later, a government clerk makes a minimum salary of 1,350 baht per month and the price of a baht of gold is 5,000-plus baht. A clerk during this Sixth Plan cannot even buy 1/4 of a baht of gold. When we look at the situation this way, we find that although salaries are higher, the cost of living is higher and people are poorer.

This is more so if we compare the public's daily standard of living between the end of the Fifth and the start of the Sixth Plans. We must admit that it has not improved, which is in direct contrast to rapid material development. The reason why material development and the standard of living have not been parallel is that development plans have not been coordinated.

Consequently, as the government enters into the period of the Sixth Development Plan, its implementers should check the gaps between material development and income development, and then link them together. If they do not, the plan will not be successful because when a nation's people are poor, it is worthless to develop materially. This is like the story of the chicken which found a precious stone: the precious stone was worthless to it.

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CSO: 4207/21

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

SPECIAL ENVOY'S ACTIVITIES IN MANAGUA REPORTED

BK120723 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0416 GMT 12 Nov 86

[Text] Phnom Penh, 12 Nov (SPK)--Arriving in Managua on 6 November to attend the celebration of the 25th founding anniversary of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in his capacity as the special envoy of President Hang Samrin, Ros Chhun was welcomed at the airport by, among others, Cdte Thomas Borge, minister of interior, and Javier Chamoro, deputy minister of foreign affairs.

The following day, Ros Chhun, also alternate member of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and secretary general of the Kampuchean United Front for national Construction and Defense National Council, was invited to a conference on the military and security situation of Nicaragua before going to lay a wreath at the tomb of Carlos Foncesca, founder of FSLN.

That afternoon he conveyed to Cdte Henry Ruiz, member of the national leadership, the message from President Heng Samrin. On this occasion, Henry Ruiz recalled his impression during his visit to Cambodia last August, on the one hand, regarding the barbarous regime of Pol Pot and, on the other, regarding the considerable efforts of the Cambodian people in national defense and reconstruction.

While reaffirming his principled support to the people's Republic of Kampuchea, Cdte Henry Ruiz of the Nicaraguan revolution said: "The struggle of the Cambodian people is the same as that being waged by the Nicaraguan people. It is continuing firmly against the enemies of all stripes of the revolution for the independence, liberty, and well-being of our people."

In conclusion, Cdte Henry Ruiz expressed on behalf of the national leadership and particularly of Cdte Daniel Ortega his sincere thanks to President Heng Samrin of the KPRP for honoring them with the presence of a special envoy at the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the FSLN, a historical and political event of great significance at a time when the Reagan administration is threatening peace in Nicaragua and the world.

Also on the occasion, the two sides expressed their desire to further strengthen and develop solidarity between the two countries.

/8918

CSO: 4219/8

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

BRIEFS

HUNGARIAN TRADE UNION DELEGATION--Phnom Penh, 14 Nov (SPK)--A delegation from the Central Council of trade unions of the Hungarian People's Republic led by its deputy general secretary, Laszlo Gal, arrived in Phnom Penh yesterday for a visit to Cambodia. It was greeted on its arrival by Heng Teav, vice chairman of the Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions; and Lajos Karsai, Hungarian ambassador to the PRK. [Text] [Phnom Penh SPK in French 0452 GMT 14 Nov 86 BK] /8918

CSO: 4219/8

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAM

VPA JOURNAL DISCUSSES MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Jul 86 pp 1-14

[Article by Trung Dung: "The Science of Organization and Military Organization"]

[Text] The issue of organization and management is a burning issue in the socialist revolution in our country, in both socialist construction and the defense of the fatherland. This issue is also being faced in the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries with, of course, different requirements and subjects compatible with the overall level of development and the specific conditions of each country.

As Lenin once said: "In the struggle for power, the proletariat has no weapon other than organization." (1) "And, when power was seized, Lenin also stressed: "The most important and difficult field in the socialist revolution is the field of organizational tasks." (2)

In military activities, organization is a force, a strength. A smaller army that is well organized and possesses strict discipline can win victory over a larger army whose organization is poor and discipline is weak.

The same applies to our people's armed forces. Organization has always been a pressing issue in the different periods of the revolution, especially at turning points in wars. In the new stage of the revolution, we must contend with a new enemy, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists. Our country, while it has many basic advantages in its favor, is also encountering large difficulties. We fought two victorious wars to defend the fatherland at either end of the country in 1979 and are now resisting the war of encroachment and occupation and the war of sabotage being waged by the enemy while maintaining our readiness to defeat a war of aggression of any size launched by them and fulfilling our international obligation on the two battlefields of Cambodia and Laos. Our country's current situation is one in which we are at peace but also at war, the degree and scope of which are limited.

Together with the important issues related to organization and management in the revolution, in general, especially in the fields of economic and social management, matters of pressing importance regarding military organization

have also arisen and continue to arise. From the size of the standing army to the organizational structure of the armed forces; from the development of the various services and branches to the scale and form of the table of organization and equipment of units; from the elementary and advanced training of cadres and soldiers to the building of the school system and the organizing of military training and political education; from the leadership and command mechanism to matters regarding procedure, policies and so forth, all these matters must be resolved in a manner consistent with the new situation and tasks.

Organization is a science. Organizational problems must be solved in a manner that complies with certain laws and is compatible with the object of each type of organization. These organizational problems must be resolved on the basis of tasks, laws of operation, the environment, support conditions and so forth. It is on the basis of organization that matters regarding cadres, the work mechanism, procedures, policies and so forth are resolved. Military organization and the buildup of the armed forces must comply with the laws of armed struggle just as the organization of production and economic organization must comply with economic laws. The political line and the military line of the party must be thoroughly implemented, implemented on the basis of the country's actual situation, on the basis of whom we are fighting and military art. There must be good coordination between the organization and personnel; between the organization and material-technical bases; between the organization and the staff, job titles, cadre standards and so forth; and between the organization and the mechanism, policies... Military organization must also be continuously developed and improved to keep pace with the development of the political and military situations and tasks during each period, with specific changes on the part of the enemy, with the development of the economy, the development of equipment and weapons, the development of military science and art... If it is consistent with laws, with life, the organization will truly possess a revolutionary character and enormous strength. Conversely, if it is rigid and mechanical or incomplete and haphazard, the organization will acquire a terrible inertia and cause major harm to efforts to complete the tasks of the revolution and missions of the army.

When solving problems related to our military organization, the most basic principles to which we must adhere are: thoroughly understanding the political line and task and the military line and task of the party in each period of the revolution and thoroughly understanding the tasks of each service and branch, of each unit and agency.

The purpose of building a military organization is to meet the political goals of the revolution. This must be done in accordance with the revolutionary line and method formulated by the party. It is precisely as a result of having a thorough understanding of the party's lines on waging a people's war and building the people's armed forces that we have been able to build an organizational structure of the armed forces that consists of three elements that serve as the nucleus of the fight waged against the enemy by all the people: main force troops, local troops and militia and self-defense forces. Since the August Revolution, all three elements have consistently been developed in a well-coordinated manner. This has not been primarily because

our equipment and weapons have been inferior and in short supply nor has it only been because of the conditions under which our armed forces have developed, namely, from having nothing to having something, from small to large, from political forces. Of course, when our equipment and weapons were still inferior and before we had seized power, we faced different requirements concerning the building of revolutionary armed forces and took different measures to build the armed forces than we have since acquiring strong equipment and weapons, seizing political power and acquiring an increasingly full body of state military law. In each period of the revolution, it is necessary to build all three elements in a well coordinated manner from the standpoint of both size and quality, of technical equipment and build them from their leadership, guidance and command agencies to the systems of schools, research agencies and so forth on the basis of the specific tasks and material-technical capabilities during each period. We cannot only attach importance to building main force troops while giving light attention to organizing local troops and militia and self-defense forces. Of course, it is both very correct and very necessary to give attention to developing main force troops into strong fists. We should not give light attention to the role played by local military work, should not consider local military agencies to be nothing more than mobilization agencies or agencies that command militia and self-defense forces, etc. These are not correct expressions of the party's line on building the people's armed forces.

Attention must also be given to the need for the structure of the three elements and of each element to be balanced and consistent with each different strategic situation and not be the same in every period. Sometimes, it is necessary to intensify the buildup of main force military corps in order to deliver large, annihilating blows that change the war situation. There are also times when it is necessary to strongly develop local armed forces and even times when it is necessary to decentralized a component of our main forces to develop the local people's war...

Even the organization of the various services and branches must be appropriately balanced with each specific situation and task. In the North during the resistance against the United States, air defense forces accounted for a large percentage of our armed forces in main force units, local forces and militia and self-defense forces while strong main force military corps of the army were organized primarily for operations in the South. We also had a large strategic transport force on the Truong Son trail. This was a rational organizational structure that was well balanced with the situation that existed during the resistance against the United States.

Together with correctly resolving problems concerning the structure of the armed forces, importance must be attached to accurately resolving problems regarding the size and quality of the three elements of the military. As part of our nation's military tradition of using small forces to win victory over large forces, using few forces to defeat many enemy forces and on the basis of the characteristics, experience and requirements of current political and military tasks, our policy is to build armed forces that are of sufficient size and high quality. As regards their size, each element has its own separate requirements. Militia and self-defense forces are the armed forces at basic units and are closely tied to production. Therefore, in terms of

their size, their development can be widespread. At the same time, we must still meet qualitative requirements and not place sole emphasis upon size. In the case of main force troops, border defense troops and local forces, which are regular forces, it is even more necessary to insure that they are of high quality, particularly main force troops. At the same time, their size must be such that they can meet the requirements involved in defending the fatherland under modern conditions. Generally speaking, in peace time, countries maintain a relatively small standing military force but have large, sufficient reserve forces so that they can deploy strategic forces during the initial period of a war and then urgently mobilize other forces to develop the army and meet the requirements of the entire war. However, within the context of a modern war, the concept of the initial period in a war is different than it once was. Therefore, the size of the standing army needed to meet the requirements of this period is also different. In view of the special characteristics of our country's situation, namely, that we stand face to face with a large enemy, we do not enjoy complete peace but are still at war to varying degrees in some border areas and we must simultaneously defend the fatherland while performing our international duty on the battlefields of Cambodia and Laos, we must have a standing army of sufficient strength to meet the above mentioned combat and combat readiness requirements. At the same time, we must have powerful reserve forces that can rapidly be mobilized to expand the army and meet the requirements of a large-scale war, should one break out. Of course, the war in which we are engaged now is not large and we still must give attention to the economic situation, to the requirements of building the country and building socialism. Therefore, we must build the people's armed forces, in general, and the People's Army, in particular, in a manner consistent with the country's current situation and with the aim of meeting the requirements of the two strategic tasks of our country's revolution and fulfilling the international obligation of our army and people, both in the immediate future and over the long-range. Our view must be that Indochina is one battlefield and we must prepare ourselves to fight alongside our allies in wars of many different degrees and scales so that we can take the initiative in each situation. It is incorrect to only see the need to defend the fatherland and demand the maintenance of a standing army that is too large or only see the need to build the economy and reduce our forces in a haphazard manner.

In view of what the size of the standing army must be to be consistent with the characteristics of our country's situation and the requirements of the two strategic tasks of the revolution today, it is even more necessary for the organization of forces to be streamlined and compact, even more necessary for us to make every effort to improve the quality of regular forces and work hard to develop and manage reserve forces well while taking positive steps to build militia and self-defense forces. Regular forces must be organized in the way that is most rational and yields the highest possible efficiency. To accomplish this, we must make very thorough and detailed calculations. Having achieved the stipulated troop strength, efforts must be focused on successfully establishing combat and combat readiness units that possess truly high fighting strength. In addition, we must build a number of units that specialize in economic work but are ready to accept a combat mission when the situation demands. Priority must be given to the front, to increasing the number of forces directly engaged in combat. An effort must be made to reduce

troop strength in the rear and at agencies. Of course, it is necessary to accumulate cadres at agencies and schools so that they can serve as the nucleus in the expansion of forces when necessary. Force organization models must be studied that combine the military obligation with the labor obligation in units that have different specific tasks and in different areas of the country to insure that our troops fulfill their combat readiness and combat missions well while participating in productive labor and economic construction in the manner that is most appropriate and is effective.

Our military organization must be based on our material conditions, on the equipment and weapons that we have or can acquire, on the economy and the geographical, terrain, climatic and weather conditions of our country.

The strength of organization is a material strength that always rests upon a given material foundation and exists within a given social and natural environment. When addressing the matter of military organization, one must talk about equipment and weapons, but equipment and weapons are dependent upon economic conditions. As Engels said: "Nothing is more dependent upon the prerequisites that are the economy than the army and the fleet. Arms, the table of organization, strategy and tactics are dependent first upon the level of production during each stage and upon roads and communications." The current equipment and weapons situation of our armed forces reflects certain characteristics of which we must be fully aware when resolving problems regarding military organization. Following the victory over the U.S. imperialist aggressors, our troops acquired much equipment of a rather highly modern nature through international aid and equipment taken from the enemy. We have continued to receive tremendous assistance from the Soviet Union in order to constantly increase the modernization of the equipment of our armed forces. However, the economy itself, our industrial base and the condition of our roads are poor. These limitations not only affect our ability to manufacture equipment for our troops, but also affect the receiving of additional international aid because we lack the support conditions needed to utilize equipment received in aid effectively. There has been a steady decline in the quality of and an increasing shortage of spare parts for the equipment and weapons taken from the United States. Many of the types of equipment and weapons produced are compatible with natural conditions different than ours and are sometimes not suited to the physical capabilities of our people. As a result, the table of organization and equipment of our units cannot be entirely the same as those of the fraternal countries. We cannot establish all the services and branches that the Soviet army has. Moreover, the organizational structure, scale and staff of each of our services, branches and units, from the military corps to the regiments and battalions, are similar in some ways but different in others from the armies of the fraternal countries. Under these conditions, how to build our military organization, build the organization of the services and branches, the organization of units is a very complex matter, one that must be thoroughly researched and sometimes tested in practice.

In the previous periods we spent building our army as well as during the period since 1975, we have encountered many questions concerning military organization that have had to be resolved in a creative manner. While having to solve problems concerning organization and staff in a manner consistent

with our equipment, we have also had to improve our equipment to be compatible with our organization, staff and personnel. We have had to resolve problems regarding the table of organization and equipment for combat units and for rear service and technical support units. Because, not only the conditions under which we have fought, but also our rear service support and technical support conditions have differed. Everything from our mobility conditions, troop messing, the processing, storage and transportation of grain and food products and the resupplying of ammunition to repair facilities, signal conditions and so forth has a very important influence upon the table of organization and equipment of units. We have the experience of having organized units whose table of organization and equipment has been unsuitable, sometimes including in this table much mobile equipment only to have the mobility of these units reduced due to a lack of necessary road conditions. On the battlefield, facts have shown that not every unit that is large achieves its full strength. Conversely, a unit whose scale of organization is not large but is well suited to its purpose is stronger.

In military activities, natural geographical conditions, the terrain, the climate and the weather have a large effect upon military organization, equipment, weapons and even military art. Terrain conditions in our country are very complex. There are mountainous forest terrain, midland terrain, delta terrain and even swampland. In many areas, roads and communication support facilities are not developed. Many regions are also fragmented by a rather high density of rivers and streams. Of course, in the process of building the material bases of socialism and building the country's system of defense lines, the terrain will gradually be improved and the infrastructure supporting the operations of the armed forces will gradually be made stronger. Generally speaking, however, the terrain and the geography of our country still control military operations and, therefore, military organization very much. They create a natural ruggedness that enable us to block and annihilate enemy forces but they also pose obstacles to military operations, particularly to mobile forces. After invading South Vietnam, the American army had to reorganize. Chinese forces have found it necessary to do the same thing in their aggression against our country. Consequently, when resolving problems related to military organization, we must keep abreast of this situation. If we organize all units the same way, units will not be well suited to the different terrain conditions that exist from one area to another. Therefore, the organization, staff and equipment of units must be appropriately based on terrain characteristics. Should we not organize several different types of military corps on battlefields that have different terrain or several different types of military corps with different equipment, such as military corps for the mountainous forests, military corps for the midlands and deltas, mechanized infantry military corps and so forth? To facilitate mobility on battlefields crisscrossed by many rivers and streams, importance must be attached to building infantry units that have much river crossing equipment. However, there is also the opinion that we must study the establishment of units that fight and operate along rivers, such as riverine units (as if we have not given our attention to organizing units of this type, but only to equipping mobile units with river crossing equipment to provide mobility on terrain crisscrossed by many rivers and streams). The same applies to the units of the local forces. Within each locality, the terrain differs and the troop strength, number of units, scale of organization of units and the

equipment of each unit on the different defense lines are not the same. Not all district or provincial local forces need to be of the same size or have the same table of organization and equipment on every line or on every type of terrain. The same applies to militia and self-defense forces. These forces are different in the countryside than they are in the cities, different in the mountainous forests than they are along the seacoast, different in cooperatives than they are at enterprises, worksites and state farms. At some places, a battalion can be organized but, at many other places, only a company or platoon can be organized. At some places, such as industrial enterprises, units of the specialized branches can be organized... During the resistance against the United States, our militia and self-defense forces in the North included strong air defense forces and had a suitable table of organization and equipment that enabled them to help maintain communications and transportation, repair the damage caused by U.S. air attacks and disarm enemy bombs, mines and underwater mines. This is an example of a flexible militia and self-defense organization that was well suited to the combat and combat support tasks that existed back then.

Of course, when talking about organizing units in different ways suited to their equipment and the terrain, we do not mean that a basic difference exists among each type of unit. Sometimes the basic organization of a type of unit or a branch is the same but the specific table of organization and equipment is appropriately adjusted.

Our military organization must meet the requirements of the military art of Vietnam's people's war, insure the implementation of the strategy of maintaining control and taking the offensive, taking the offensive and maintaining control, closely combine the local people's war with the war fought by the main force military corps and closely combine offensive, counter-offensive and defensive methods of fighting.

The immediate purpose of building our military organization is to win victory over enemy forces. To win victory over the enemy, our military organization must be built on the basis of how the enemy is deployed and the methods we employ to fight the enemy. Military art must be embodied in our military organization. Conversely, our military organization must reflect our military art and insure that it fully displays its superiority. It can be said that the relationship between military art and military organization is as close as the relationship between a shadow and its form. Whereas, in the field of military art, we must guard against being rigid in our approach, in the field of military organization, we must not follow a set pattern. Only by not following a set pattern in military organization is it possible to insure that we are creative, not rigid, in military art.

Our military art is the military art of a people's war that has reached a very high level of development in the new age and is unique and creative in many respects. This art demands that military organization--the organization that directly creates and employs military art--be built in a manner consistent with it and be highly dynamic. The building of our people's armed forces into the three elements of the military reflects the thorough implementation of the party's military line and reflects the military art of Vietnam's people's war. Only with widespread militia and self-defense forces of increasingly high

quality and increasingly regular and modern main force troops and local forces can we gain the participation of all the people in the fight against the enemy, maintain firm control, launch strong attacks and fight the enemy through the local people's war closely combined with the war fought by main force military corps.

However, the development of the armed forces into the three elements of the military does not, by itself, reflect all the unique aspects of our art of fighting the enemy. To achieve the full strength of Vietnam's military art, we also must explore different approaches and be creative in the war that we solve many specific organizational problems, such as organizing each element of the military so that its structure is suited to each different strategic situation and the different periods of development of a war (as discussed above); resolving problems regarding equipment and weapons, modern and relatively modern as well as rudimentary, in a manner compatible with each element of the military in the different situations mentioned above; organizing forces on the strategic, campaign and tactical echelons, on all battlefield fronts...

Equipment, weapons, military organization and military art are very closely interrelated and are the prerequisites of one another. The equipment and weapons we have determine how we fight the enemy and how we organize our troops. Conversely, it is on the basis of how we fight the enemy and, as a result, how we intend to organize our troops that we seek to acquire this equipment and these weapons by many different methods: through aid; through self-manufacture and production where possible; and through the improvement of equipment and weapons.

The building of the various services and branches also involves matters related to equipment, weapons, our military art and our traditional methods of fighting the enemy. There are some services (or branches) which the armies of the fraternal countries have but which we have not (or have not yet) established, such as a strategic missile force. We, on the other hand, attach very much importance to building the infantry and building the artillery, considering the artillery to be the primary firepower force of our ground forces and our army. Conversely, there are some branches which the fraternal armies do not have but we do, such as highly trained special troops (special operations troops). These troops are a special military organization of ours. They are equipped with special equipment and have a special organization. Some of their special equipment and weapons have been developed by us for the purpose of insuring that special operations troops complete their special combat missions with high efficiency and by means of their special methods of fighting. All services and branches must be built so that they are able to engage in both coordinated and independence combat operations and are skilled in fighting a war by means of the main force military corps and in close coordination with the local people's war in accordance with the requirements of the military art of a people's war under modern conditions on a strategic scope as well as in the field of campaign art and tactics.

Our campaign military corps are built in accordance with strategic intentions and campaign art. To implement the strategy of gaining control and taking the offensive, taking the offensive and gaining control, our policy is to closely

combine offensive, counter-offensive and defensive methods of fighting, our primary forms of warfare being offensive and counter-offensive operations. In campaign art, the various forms of offensive campaigns, counter-offensive campaigns and, when necessary, even defensive campaigns are employed. Our defensive operations thoroughly reflect the thinking of taking the offensive and must be closely tied to counter-offensive and offensive operations. The organization of campaign military corps must reflect this basic thinking. We must insure that every unit is skilled in offensive, counter-offensive and defensive operations and can quickly shift from the defensive to counter-offensive and offensive operations and vice versa. Even in defensive campaigns, units must still maintain a rational organization and have a full supply of materiel so that they can closely combine combat operations at their battle position, combine the tenacious defense of their battle position with counter offensive operations, counter-assaults and other offensive operations within the area of operation of the campaign.

From a tactical standpoint, the ways of organizing the units of the various services and branches are even more diverse. These ways must meet the requirements of combat operations that are coordinated among combined services and branches and the requirements of each service and branch fighting independently and coordinating with the local armed forces. Within each service and branch, the units on each echelon and within each area cannot be built in entirely the same way. The divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies of the military regions usually differ in several ways from corresponding units within the military corps of the ministry...

In the case of the local armed forces and local military agencies, there are also many problems within the field of organization that must be resolved well. Foremost among them is the need to insure, from the standpoint of military organization, that every province becomes a strategic unit of the national defense system and the people's war and every district becomes a fortress defending the fatherland. The provinces and districts on the frontline differ from the provinces and districts in the rear. The organization of militia and self-defense forces must not only be based on the population, available equipment and weapons, the terrain and production relations, but also upon the plan for the defense of the locality and the plan for combining with main force troops in different situations. Efforts must be made to avoid formalism and a desire to achieve a scale that is large but not consistent with combat capabilities and requirements.

The building of our military organization must be closely tied to the elementary and advanced training of personnel, particularly the corps of cadres. The requirements of the military organization must guide the training of cadres and soldiers and the cadres and soldiers who have been trained must be the premise upon which the military organization is built.

Organization is the product of people. At the same time, people are the object of organization. Only with good people is it possible to build a strong organization and the more these people are trained, the stronger this organization becomes. Organization and people are closely tied to each other. However, in the process of building the organization and molding these people, the purposes and requirements of the organization must determine the

standards to be met by these people and, on this basis, guide the molding of them.

Revolutionary armed forces are an instrument of violent force of the revolutionary dictatorship. They use equipment, weapons and revolutionary military art to fight and win victory over class and national enemies. Therefore, the standards set for cadres and soldiers must be very strict and must be implemented very thoroughly, particularly in the selection and training of soldiers and especially in the building of the corps of cadres. One special feature of the armed forces is their mass nature. The clearest manifestation of this feature is that the number of soldiers is very high, that the corps of soldiers is very large. However, this is no reason to induct troops in a hasty manner without checking to see that they meet all standards or even to send into the army, at some times and places, undesirable elements, the motive being to provide the full number of persons required while mistakenly thinking that these elements will be re-educated in the army!

In past years, we have selected cadres for the army in various ways, on the basis of combat and work experience, through promotions and on-the-job training and by sending persons to school for training. Today, we also recruit students and, through examinations, select persons for the army's officers schools. These new methods of selecting and training cadres are necessary. Of importance, however, are the needs to establish correct standards and select persons who meet these standards for training at each school in a manner consistent with the requirements faced in building the various services and branches and the different sectors of the army. When talking about the training and utilization of personnel, it is also necessary to discuss the promotion, appointment and assignment of cadres. All these matters are related to building the organization. If each is based on the requirements faced in building the organization and only on these requirements, negative phenomena will not arise.

In the present situation, with many negative phenomena in economic management and social management still exerting an influence within the armed forces and with more than a few negative phenomena also existing within the armed forces themselves, improper practices are also taking place in the handling of personnel affairs, in the selection, utilization, assignment, promotion, appointment and so forth of personnel, practices that are adversely affecting efforts to build the military organization. At basic units as well as within the agencies on the various echelons, leniency, acting on the basis of personal feelings and collusion have caused a situation in which the selection of personnel does not comply with standards and is unfair. Some persons who meet all standards and are of the age at which they must fulfill their military obligation have evaded this obligation and taken other jobs. Some persons who do not meet political, physical or educational standards have also been inducted into the army or have been selected for agencies of the army on the various echelons and for national defense enterprises or sometimes sent overseas to study in order to be assigned to certain agencies and units upon their return. Improper practices are also occurring in the assignment of duties to officers, specialized military personnel, manual workers and civil servants, in the assignment of jobs outside the table of organization to cadres and personnel, in retirements, in transfers from one sector to another

and so forth. The table of organization of many agencies in the rear has swollen in size and become cumbersome but the efficiency of their work is low. Meanwhile, combat units on the front lack the troop strength they need to employ the tactics of their echelon, production units lack sufficient production forces... Confusion between the policy on preferential assignments and the utilization of personnel has adversely affected the building of the organization. We have sometimes set up an organization on the basis of taking a person's desires into consideration instead of assigning persons on the basis of the requirements of the organization.

Once persons are being selected in exact accordance with standards, the two main elements in the training of persons to build the armed forces are training activities and the work of the schools. Military training and political education are the process of turning a youth who knows little about military affairs, about life in the military into a soldier who can use weapons to win over the enemy and the process of raising the standards of a soldier or cadre so that he can undertake larger jobs. Only when military training and political education are performed well can the unit acquire powerful fighting strength. Each and every person who requires training must be trained. As the number of troops trained rises and the quality of training improves, the unit's fighting strength rises. When there is much work to be done and living conditions are difficult, units easily become absorbed in production jobs or other types of labor and fail to insure that the required number of troops is trained. Sometimes, units only select a small number of persons to be trained and then hold seminars and demonstrations.

The operations of the schools within the army are, to a very large degree, related to the training of cadres and the building of the armed forces. The system of schools within the army has the task of training the corps of cadres, the nucleus of the military organization, which includes leadership cadres, command cadres, political cadres, scientific-technical cadres and specialized-professional cadres. It can be said that the school determines what the unit will be, what the military organization will be. Therefore, the schools of the army must train cadres on the basis of the requirements involved in building the armed forces and building the army and in the spirit that cadres must be trained before anyone else. Schools must maintain close contact with units, with the battlefield, so that they can see the requirements that are being and will be faced in building the armed forces and also check the results of the training they provide and continuously improve the quality of instruction and learning, thereby establishing increasingly close ties between schools and units.

In building the organization, it is necessary to have an appropriate table of organization and establish the system of job titles with standards for each. Job titles and the standardization of job titles originate in the requirements of building the organization and building the armed forces. Not establishing the system of job titles or the standards for each is an oversight that leads to the haphazard selection of persons to staff the table of organization. Of course, if the leadership and management provided are not close, mistakes can still occur when establishing the system of job titles and standards. Establishing the system of job titles and standardizing job titles are a large, complicated job of a highly scientific nature. Due to the integrated

nature of military activities, a military organization consists of very many different sectors and trades. The armed forces consists of thousands of different organizations and tens of thousands of different job titles. Each job title demands a suitable standard. Performing this work well will make positive contributions to insuring that the organization of the army is streamlined and rational, to raising the level of conventionalization and modernization of the army and to increasing the combat efficiency of units and the productivity of agencies.

In building a military organization, we must comprehensively examine the factors that combine to form an organization, from functions and tasks to equipment, organization and staff, from job titles and standards to the mechanism within which operations are conducted. We must take an overall view of the entire system, from basic units to guidance and command agencies, research agencies and schools. We must see things in their process of development and predict many different situations that might arise.

Each organization is the combination of many factors. Some of these factors might come into existence gradually but not all those factors that are of primary importance must exist before an organization can be formed. Most importantly, we must have equipment and weapons before we can establish a combat unit. In cases in which weapons have not yet been received, we must at least know what this equipment and these weapons will be before we can raise the matter and decide to establish a unit of this type. When studying the possibility of establishing an organization, all problems regarding functions, tasks, the form of organization, the staff, job titles, standards and the mechanism under which operations will be conducted must be resolved. Without defining functions and tasks it is impossible to envision what the organization will be. It can be said that functions and tasks are the reasons for building an organization, the reasons for an organization's existence. Once functions and tasks have been defined, we must examine the specific requirements, the nature and the volume of work to be performed and use these as the basis for resolving problems regarding the form of organization and staff, job titles, standards and the mechanism within which operations will be conducted. If the specific requirements, nature and volume of work are not determined, accurate estimates cannot be made of the staff that will be needed. If the staff is not determined, the system of job titles cannot be established. And, once job titles have been established, reasonable standards must be established for each so that persons with appropriate ranks and qualifications can be assigned to them.

The mechanism is also a factor of the organization, one which insures the organization's life and vitality. It defines the principles, rules, procedures and so forth under which an organization must operate. An appropriate mechanism develops the strength of the organization. An inappropriate mechanism does just the opposite. A mechanism might be suited to one military organization but not suited to another whose historic conditions and circumstances and traditions differ. A mechanism that is suitable in one stage of development might not be suited to another stage of development of the situation or task. Here, the task of organizational work is to find the mechanism that is most rational and establish the form of organization that is most scientific, that is consistent with specific

conditions and circumstances and insures the fulfillment of the organization's function and task. The fact that our party attaches very much importance to and is always working to improve the mechanism by which it leads the people's army and national defense work illustrates this very clearly.

An organization is always a system. The military organization of a nation is even more in the nature of a complete system. This complete system consists of horizontal and vertical systems, systems based on a sector and systems based on an area to insure that every component is included and is managed within a unified mechanism. A complete system must reflect balance between units and agencies, between combat units and support units, between units and schools... If there is one component too few, one component too many or if a component is weak, the entire system is disrupted and becomes irrational, even if only one small component is involved. As a result of not establishing a complete system, it sometime happens that many components are performing the same job and working at cross purposes or no one performs a job that should be done, which creates the very dangerous situation of having "many monks but no one to close the temple door." However, a system that constitutes a whole does not come into existence when components are separated from one another. Not every component or sector has a horizontal or vertical system. Some components only need an upper echelon, some only need a lower or some other echelon and some components need every echelon from the upper to the lower.

Armed struggle unfolds in a very complex and urgent manner. Consequently, a military organization must be very dynamic so that it can keep pace with the developing situation. Many different organizational plans must be formulated to correspond to the many plans for fighting a war and the many different situations that arise in the various strategic stages of a war, and sometimes even in the different types of campaigns and different battles. There are some basic forms of organization that remain in effect for a long period of time. There are also temporary forms of organization designed to meet the requirements of specific combat and combat support missions within a specified period of time. It is also necessary to possess foresight and breadth of vision, to know the enemy well and keep abreast of the new factors that arise in applying the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution in the field of military affairs while preparing the necessary material-technical bases, cadres and soldiers, particularly cadres, so that the organization can be quickly changed, the staff can be quickly reorganized and armed forces can be quickly developed when necessary.

All the above mentioned factors must be studied in a coordinated and integrated manner when resolving problems regarding military organization. These factors must be combined in accordance with an optimum plan. At the same time, we must always be aware of the development of these factors and the reciprocal impact they have upon one another so that we can change, develop and adjust the organization accordingly. Clearly, building a military organization is a wide-ranging issue. The research of military organization is a complex science. The science of military organization, which is a component of the science of organization, is also a component of military science. It is closely tied to both military art and military science and technology. As a result, it must be a tool used by many fields of military

science and must be given the full attention of leadership and command echelons through a competent staff.

Every field of activity of society is very closely related to organization. Only through organization can lines, positions, policies, views and thinking become reality. In military activities, everything from strategic activities to campaign and combat activities is carried out through wide-ranging practical organizational work. In practice, it is impossible to research and resolve the organizational problems of a sector solely on the basis of organization, rather, this effort must always be closely tied to researching and solving problems related to all the activities of this sector. Therefore, military organization is not simply the concern of one sector or echelon of the army nor is it a matter that can be resolved solely by one sector or echelon. It is mainly the responsibility of leadership and command echelons. The leader and the commander must build his own organization and create for himself a tool with which to perform each mission. Moreover, he must also organize the performance of each mission in accordance with the resolutions, orders and directives of the upper echelon. In some respects, it can be said that leaders and commanders must be organizers. Skilled leaders and commanders must also be skilled organizers. Of course, skilled leaders and commanders, skilled organizers do not do everything on their own, rather, they must know how to achieve the impact of the apparatus, utilize the organizations under his command and assign responsibilities to subordinates while reserving for himself the authority to conduct inspections. It is assigning responsibilities and conducting inspections that increase the impact of the organization that one has built.

In the field of organization as well as in the other fields, the leader and the commander always have staff agencies or staff cadres assisting them. From the standpoint of organization, the key staff agency assisting leadership and command echelons is, of course, the organizational staff. However, all staffs, not just the organizational staff, assist the leader and the commander (here, the concept of organizational staff is used in its general sense and does not refer specifically to the party organization). When researching or making proposals concerning organizational matters, the organizational staff must work closely with all related staffs. The organizational staff and cadres of the army must possess broad knowledge, not only of the science of organization, but also military science, the science of economics, the technical sciences, the science of law and so forth. They must constantly endeavor to raise their standards of organizational work and the science of organization to the level of military work and military science. Organizational cadres and organizational staffs must also display a high spirit of responsibility, cultivate revolutionary ethics, guard against and overcome negative phenomena and combat uses of the authority to assign, organize and transfer personnel that are contrary to the laws of organization and inconsistent with the military art of people's war, with the military line and political line of the party.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin: "Collected Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1963, Volume 7, p 481.
2. Lenin: "Collected Works," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1971, Volume 27, p 297.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAM

ARTICLE CALLS FOR STRONGER PARTY-BUILDING WITHIN ARMY

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Jul 86 pp 24-30

[Article by Colonel Nguyen Xuan Hoe: "Building Pure, Solid and Strong Basic Organizations of the Party Within the Army"]

[Text] Within the mechanism by which the party leads the people's army, the basic organizations of the party always occupy a very important position.

The basic organizations of the party are the cells of the party, are the basic combat units, are the places that turn the lines, positions and policies of the party and state into revolutionary actions by party members and the masses, are the places that forge party members and cadres and are the bridge that link the party and agencies of the party to the masses. The leadership ability and the fighting strength of the basic organizations of the party directly determine whether or not the political task of the basic unit is completed and directly determine the prestige of the party. The basic organizations of the party are leadership organizations as well as the central forces in building basic units that are solid and strong in every respect.

The 5th National Congress established the task of "further strengthening the party's leadership of the armed forces while fully implementing the 'one person in command' system" on all echelons of the army. The commander is given by the party and state the full authority and responsibility needed to fulfill his assigned duties. Under these conditions, it is even more necessary that the basic organizations of the party be solid and strong in order to provide a stable foundation for the commander and insure that he is able to fulfill his functions and duties. The resolution of the Political Bureau on continuing to strengthen the mechanism by which the party leads the army and national defense work states: a basic organization of the party is an organization within the system of party organizations in the Vietnam People's Army. The party committees on the various echelons have the responsibility of providing comprehensive leadership of the units under their authority within the scope of the functions and requirements set for each echelon. The basic organizations of the party must also continue to be strengthened, augmented and improved from the standpoint of their organization, tasks, authority, relationship between leader and commander and so forth in a manner consistent with the new stage of development in the

structure of the army's organization and the role and position of the basic organizations of the party.

Fully adhering to the fundamentals involved in building the basic organizations of the party within the mechanism by which the party currently leads our army and putting the activities of the party's basic organizations on a regular basis in exact accordance with their functions and tasks in each operation of the unit are one of the major jobs faced in party work, are important tasks of the party organizations and party committees on all echelons, of the political staffs throughout the party during this year and the next several years, the aims of which are to increase the fighting strength and improve the leadership ability of the party's basic organizations and fully guarantee that basic units are strong and solid in every respect, possess high fighting strength and excellently complete each mission in every situation.

The party is a leadership and a combat organization. Therefore, the basic organizations of the party must be coordinated with the basic units in all fields of social activity.

Within the Vietnam People's Army, the basic organizations of the party are established on the basis of the organizational structure of the army and operate in accordance with the provisions of party statutes and the resolutions and directives of the Political Bureau and Party Secretariat. Based on leadership requirements and the army's organizational structure, the Political Bureau has stipulated that "basic organizations of the party be established in regiments and equivalent units; in independent battalions and companies on the division level and higher; in the system of student battalions and colleges at academies and officers schools; at hospitals and national defense enterprises... Other cases will be decided by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee. Basic organizations of the party within the army are established directly by the party committee on the upper echelon in accordance with the provisions of party statutes." These stipulations are consistent with the organizational structure and operations of the basic units of the People's Army and implement the role of the party's basic organizations as leadership organizations and the key forces in the building of basic units.

On the basis of these general stipulations, each different type of basic organization of the party must be organized in a manner consistent with its specific leadership task, the number of party members and the organizational structure of each unit in order to increase the effectiveness of the leadership provided by the party's basic organizations.

Some basic organizations of the party encompass two or three echelons. For example, in regiments that consist of battalions, basic organizations of the party are established on three echelons: the regimental party committee, the battalion party committees and party chapters in the company and battalion headquarters and agencies on the regimental level. In regiments that do not consist of battalions, basic organizations of the party are established on two echelons: the regimental party committee and party chapters in the companies and various sections of the agencies on the regimental level. In regiments

that are subordinate to brigades, divisions and units on equivalent echelons or higher, a one echelon basic organization of the party is established. At academies, officers schools and schools of military administration, basic organizations of the party are established in the faculties, student battalions, offices, specialized departments and subordinate units. In faculties that have student battalions or subordinate units, basic organizations of the party are established on three echelons: a basic unit party committee, student battalion party committees and party chapters in the student companies, classrooms, work units and battalion headquarters. The party committee secretaries at basic combat units are persons who hold two positions. At national defense enterprises, the party committee secretary is a specialized cadre, which is consistent with leadership requirements at the enterprise and the position of the party secretary at the enterprises of the entire country.

The army party organization is a component of the entire party. Therefore, the basic organizations of the party within the army also perform all the fundamental tasks of a basic organization of the party as defined in party statutes. However, due to the nature and special characteristics of military activities, the tasks of the army and the tasks of basic units, the tasks of the basic organizations of the party within the army must be defined and concretized in an appropriate manner.

The tasks and authority of the basic organizations of the party within the army have been established as: in accordance with their function, the basic organizations of the party have the task of leading the cadres and soldiers of the unit in gaining a thorough understanding of and fully complying with the lines, positions and policies of the party, the laws of the state, the tasks and Code of Discipline of the army and the resolutions, directives and orders of the upper echelon and one's own echelon and leading the effort to build a unit that is solid and strong in every respect, successfully completes each combat readiness, combat, work, production and economic construction task and fulfills its international obligation.

The basic organizations of the party must constantly work to strengthen the relationship between the party and the masses. They must lead, educate and raise the standards of the masses in every field and develop the spirit of collective ownership, the activism, initiative and creativity of the masses so that they help to build the unit in every respect, build the party and successfully carry out each assigned task.

Attention must be given to building the basic organizations of the party politically, ideologically and organizationally, to strengthening party committees and party chapters and to raising their overall leadership standards so that they become deeply involved in leading the performance of the unit's basic political task. There must be strict compliance with the principle of collective leadership combined with personal accountability, with building the spirit of personal responsibility. It is necessary to regularly maintain full party activities, emphasize self-criticism and criticism and strengthen the unity, democracy and discipline within the party. It is also necessary to regularly manage, educate and train party members and accept new party members.

We must strengthen and increase the effectiveness of the "one person in command" system, which truly provides a solid foundation for the commander to fulfill his duties of coordinating and managing the unit in every respect. At the same time, importance must be attached to building the corps of basic cadres so that this corps always possesses unquestioned loyalty to the party, to the socialist fatherland and possesses both ability and knowledge in the fields of military affairs, politics, culture, technical specialties, the professions and so forth.

The basic organizations of the party within the army must lead their units in actively participating in the maintenance of political security, the maintenance of social order and safety and the performance of other social work within the locality in which troops are stationed in order to preserve and build upon the tradition of unity between the army and civilians.

On the basis of these fundamental tasks and the nature, characteristics and tasks of each type basic unit, the basic organizations of the party must delve deeply into meeting specific leadership requirements in a manner consistent with the primary political tasks of basic units, such as organizing basic organizations of the party in combat and combat readiness units; organizing basic organizations of the party at agencies; organizing basic organizations of the party at supply management, technical and rear service units supporting combat and the everyday lives of troops; organizing basic organizations of the party at hospitals; organizing basic organizations of the party at academies, schools and so forth.

The basic party committee is the highest leadership agency of the basic party organization between two congresses. It is elected by the congress and has the responsibility of leading all aspects of the unit's work within the scope of the function of each type basic unit. The foremost requirements in fulfilling this role, position and task are for the party committee to firmly adhere to leadership principles, fully maintain the schedule of activities of the basic organizations of the party and improve the quality of these activities. The basic party committee must thoroughly comply with the principles of "collective leadership and collective leadership combined with personal accountability, with building the spirit of personal responsibility" as stated in the resolution of the Political Bureau. These are the principles of a Leninist party. Straying from these principles will inevitably lead to such ills as paternalism, arbitrariness, despotism and bureaucracy, to violating the right of collective ownership of party committee members and party members and even to violating the character of the party.

The party committee must hold collective discussions to gain a thorough understanding and full grasp of the political task of the unit during each period, evaluate the unit's situation, both advantages and difficulties, and issue resolutions that clearly define the leadership policy and measures for successfully performing tasks. To improve the quality of the activities of the party committee and tap the intelligence of the party committee's collective, the secretary must notify party committee members of the agenda and time of meetings in advance so that they are able to make preparations. During debates and discussions, each person must clearly state his views. Differing opinions must be democratically discussed in order to shed light on

the question at hand and distinguish between right and wrong. However, once a conclusion has been reached and this conclusion has taken the form of a resolution of the party committee, the minority must obey the majority. Persons who hold differing opinions have the right to keep their opinions and express them to the upper echelon. In their actions, however, they must comply with the resolution and not do as they see fit, not propagandize personal views and not act in accordance with personal views when organizing the resolution's implementation.

The leadership provided by the collective of the party committee lays a solid foundation for persons in charge to perform their tasks. Collective leadership must go hand in hand with putting persons in charge, with emphasizing personal responsibility, most importantly the responsibility of the commander in commanding combat operations, organizing the performance of tasks and managing the unit. The party committee must receive direct verbal reports from the commander on the tasks, directives and orders assigned by the upper level to the unit, his projections concerning combat decisions and his policies and measures for organizing implementation as well as his proposals to the party committee concerning leadership work.

After the collective of the party committee has discussed a matter and issued a resolution, the commander, acting within the scope of his official duties and authority, issues orders and directives to the unit organizing implementation and inspects and supervises implementation within the unit.

If, in the process of carrying out a new task, order or directive, new problems arise that must be solved immediately but circumstances are too urgent for the party committee to meet or if a decision has already been made by the party committee, the commander, in a display of party consciousness and personal responsibility, must take the initiative, make a decision and promptly deal with the situation in order to win victory. He must subsequently report and assume responsibility for his decision to the party committee and the upper echelon. Only in this way is it possible to avoid relying and leaning upon the collective and uphold the responsibility of the commander.

The party committee must regularly supervise and inspect joint party chapters, party chapters, cadres and party members in their compliance with the resolutions of the party and the orders of the commander. Leadership must go hand in hand with inspections and supervision, with bringing to light and promptly correcting actions that are incorrect. These are the fundamental tasks in the leadership work of the basic party committee, the aims of which are to maintain and strengthen collective leadership and allow the commander to exercise his full responsibility in managing, commanding and coordinating the unit.

Thus, collective leadership by the party committee is organically tied to the implementation of the "one person in command" system. This is the most important element in continuing to strengthen the mechanism by which the party leads the army. Implementing this element well provides a solid basis for strengthening the leadership of the party and improving the quality and fighting strength of the party's organizations within our army today.

Experience has shown that wherever the basic organization of the party knows how to establish a good, correct relationship between leadership and command, between the organization and each of its members and fulfills its function on the basis of a high sense of party consciousness and a high spirit of political responsibility, the phenomena of the party committee taking over work other than its own and the commander relying upon the party committee and not daring to make a decision are avoided. Conversely, there are also places which, due to the failure to adhere to the principles of leadership, only discuss matters in a general way, do not clearly decide matters related to intentions, policy and tasks in order to lay the groundwork for the commander to organize their implementation or discuss in too much detail jobs that lie within the scope of the commander's duties. Neither of these cases complies with the system of collective leadership and personal accountability and neither strengthens the leadership of the party committee. At the same time, neither upholds the personal responsibility of the commander. However, there are also commanders who do not fully understand the leadership role, position and task of the basic party committee, who do not know how to build upon their solid foundation, the party committee, and who, as a result, encounter many difficulties and problems in fulfilling their duties.

The problem faced is that the party committee must strictly maintain the system of party activities. It must thoroughly prepare the agenda of these activities and, in keeping with its leadership function, deeply discuss matters of prime importance and the central tasks of the unit, set forth practical policies and measures that directly stimulate each activity of the unit and clearly define the responsibility of each person, beginning with the secretary and the commander, in organizing implementation. Party committee activities must clearly be activities that provide leadership, are militant, tap the intelligence of the collective and stress consensus in understanding, views and action.

Of decisive significance in insuring solid leadership throughout the organization is the need to constantly build basic organizations of the party that are pure, solid and strong and improve their leadership ability as well as increase their fighting strength.

Building basic organizations of the party that are pure, solid and strong is the responsibility of the party committees on the various echelons, most directly the basic party committees. Much is involved in building pure, solid and strong basic organizations of the party. In the years ahead, on the basis of the realities of the situation at the basic organizations of the party within the army, it is necessary to firmly grasp and concentrate on doing the following well:

First, leadership must be provided to build a unit that is strong and solid in every respect, a unit that possesses high fighting strength and completes its tasks well, considering this to be the primary element in the leadership provided by the basic organizations of the party. The leadership effectiveness and the fighting strength of a basic organization of the party are expressed first and primarily in the results achieved by the unit in the performance of its task and in the overall strength and stability of the basic organization of the party itself. Consequently, building basic organizations

of the party that are pure, solid and strong must be closely tied to building basic units that are solid and strong in every respect and possess high fighting strength.

The basic party committee must have a firm grasp of the characteristics, the nature and the primary task of the unit during each period and establish the requirements that must be met to successfully complete this task. On this basis, it must set policies, targets and measures for working to make the unit solid and strong in every respect.

In the leadership they provide, the basic organizations of the party must, on the basis of the requirements of the basic, long-range task and the primary, immediate task of their units and the specific situation of the party organization, set requirements and specific themes for forging party members and cadres in practical ways. Each activity must be oriented toward the successful performance of the central task of the unit, with the completion of the task of the unit and each person being the measurement of the results and quality of leadership of the basic organization of the party, of each party member and cadre. The strengths, weaknesses, progress, growth and leadership ability of the party organization must be evaluated and party members must be forged through the effort to complete the task of the unit. The evaluation and classification of party members and the decision as to whether party chapters and party organizations are pure, solid and strong also must be closely tied to the results of the performance of the task of each unit and each person.

Secondly, it is necessary to build basic party committees that are solid and strong. To begin with, importance must be attached to strengthening the organization so that basic party committees are of the stipulated size under all circumstances in order to insure regular and thorough collective leadership. It is necessary to select for the party committee persons who are truly worthy, who meet all standards. Persons who do not meet all standards, who lack responsibility or are opportunists should not be allowed to infiltrate the party committee. Appointing the right persons to the position of secretary and to the standing committee is of decisive significance in improving the quality of leadership provided by a party organization. In conjunction with strengthening the organization, it is necessary to raise the leadership standards and improve the work procedures of the party committee in a manner consistent with new requirements.

One of the matters of importance is that of improving the quality of party committee activities. Experience has shown that the matters presented for discussion by the party committee must be properly prepared and correctly selected. Party committee members must display high responsibility, actively contribute opinions and possess clear political views. The person who is directing the meeting must be truly democratic, know how to focus the intelligence of the collective on the central issue in a way that reaches a clear conclusion and conduct a vote on the basis of the principle of majority rule. It is necessary to assign responsibility for and to supervise and inspect the implementation of the resolution of the party committee.

Basic party committees must also lead the effort to put party activities on a regular basis, manage and coordinate each aspect of leadership work at basic units, keep abreast of the situation on a day to day basis and promptly deal with matters that occur in exact accordance with the views and policies of the party.

Thirdly, importance must be attached to building party chapters and the corps of party members, considering this to be the key factor in building basic organizations of the party that are pure, solid and strong. To begin with, every effort must be made to successfully build solid and strong party chapters that are truly the nucleus leading their units in completing their tasks and building units that are constantly solid and strong in every respect. As is the case with party committees, party chapters must always be strengthened organizationally, particularly the party chapters of combat companies.

The salient problem that must be satisfactorily resolved at this point in time is to improve the quality of party chapter activities by not only regularly maintaining party chapter activities and insuring that these activities are, in every way, activities that lead and educate, are military activities, but also by party chapters being places that struggle to differentiate between views and thinking that are correct and incorrect, lead the performance of tasks in exact accordance with the line of the party and resolutely defend the party's line. It must be insured that each party member regularly participates in party chapter activities and accepts work assignments, particularly with regard to the party chapter's work of mobilizing the masses. It is necessary to inspect the work of party members and help them to complete their tasks. The mass organizations of the party must be strengthened so that they truly develop the collective ownership role of the masses.

Building the corps of party members, particularly the corps of party members who hold management positions, is the factor of decisive significance in building pure, solid and strong party chapters and party organizations. In building the corps of party members, we have always attached importance to both size and quality. It is very important that this corps be of appropriate size but quality is always the decisive factor. This is a pressing matter that must be resolved to insure that party chapters are stable in every situation, particularly in combat. Of course, attaching importance to size does not mean that size should be the sole concern. Of greater importance is the need to maintain quality, particularly with regard to party members who hold management positions.

To improve the quality of party members to be consistent with tasks, specific requirements must be set during each period of time based on the situation of the corps of party members and importance must be attached to forging them in the realities of work and combat. In conjunction with regularly training, educating and forging party members, it is necessary to closely manage party members in every respect. Positive steps must be taken to develop the party and bring into it outstanding persons who emerge in the process of performing tasks. There must be determination to expel persons who are not qualified to be party members from the party and vigilance against undesirable elements infiltrating the party.

Building the basic organizations of the party in exact accordance with their role and position, in exact accordance with their principles and tasks as defined in Resolution 27 of the Political Bureau is an important element in strengthening the mechanism by which the party leads the Vietnam People's Army.

With the lessons and experience that we have learned and gained in building the basic organizations of the party within the army, with the responsible guidance of the party committees on the various echelons and with the direction and assistance of the various agencies, the party organizations of our army will surely bring about a new change in the effort to build basic organizations of the party that are pure, solid and strong, are truly the nucleus in building basic units that are solid and strong in every respect, possess high fighting strength and complete each task well.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAM

ROLE OF TANK-ARMORED FORCES IN CAMPAIGNS EXAMINED

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[Article by Colonel Dinh Quang Tue: "Thoughts on Developing the Role of Tank-Armored Forces in Campaigns"]

[Excerpts] The birth and development of tank-armored forces has led to a qualitative development in warfare on ground battlefields. Developing this strong assault role is always one of the subjects of study of modern campaign art.

In the case of our armed forces, it is even more necessary to give special attention to the matter of developing the role of tank-armored forces in campaigns in a manner consistent with the realities of Vietnam. Because, we must solve this problem under the conditions of our country and our armed forces, the characteristics of which differ from those of many other countries.

Today, in the war to defend the fatherland, our tank-armored forces are much larger than they were during the war of liberation and their role has become increasingly important. Tank-armored forces, together with the infantry, are the main ground assault forces of our army. Tank-armored forces participate in small, medium and large-scale campaigns on a widespread basis from the very outset of a war. In the strategic counter-offensive along the southwestern border in 1979, the number of tanks and armored vehicles participating in the campaign was 40 times greater than the number that participated in the first campaign in the war of liberation in which tank and armored forces participated. These provide very basic conditions for tank-armored forces to further develop their role in the various types of campaigns.

However, the development of the role of tank-armored forces as well as the roles of the other modern technical branches is always tied to the actual conditions of Vietnam. At the same time, this development is related to the overall development of the world at this point in history. Therefore, of foremost importance in researching and resolving this problem are the needs to fully understand the requirements and tasks of a people's war to defend the fatherland and develop the role of tank-armored forces in a manner consistent with the conditions of our army, conditions marked by new developments in the field of modern technical equipment and weapons but many limitations and

weaknesses in terms of modern material-technical bases. It is also necessary to correctly address the matter of researching and using our experiences and selectively studying the experiences of foreign countries, especially of the fraternal countries, particularly the experience of the Soviet army.

Our experience as well as the experience of foreign countries have virtually confirmed the important role played by tank-armored forces in campaigns, particularly in offensive and counter-offensive campaigns. Today, even in warfare involving the use of weapons of great destructive power, there is still a need for tanks because there is no land weapon to replace tanks. The problem we face is to research, develop and perfect the principles, forms and methods of organization and utilization so that this powerful assault force exerts the greatest possible impact in specific campaigns.

The principles, forms and methods of the organization and utilization of tank-armored forces in campaigns during the war of liberation are very valuable but different ways of examining, raising and resolving problems in a manner consistent with new conditions are now necessary. For example, in a campaign in the present war to defend the fatherland, we cannot address problems, examine specific factors or apply measures for implementing the principles of secrecy and surprise in the use of tank-armored forces in the same way that we did in the war of national liberation. Back then, to achieve the element of surprise, tank-armored forces could be predeployed on the battlefield in absolute secrecy months and sometimes years before the start of a campaign. Today, it is difficult to achieve surprise by keeping our intentions regarding the use of tank-armored forces a secret. Rather, surprise must be achieved mainly by means of the methods of fighting employed and the factor of timing. For example, as observed by Western military scholars, the ways in which tank-armored forces are organized and used to stage deep penetrations and perform enfilade missions on the campaign level are similar in some respects and different in others from the mobile campaign group--a qualitative development in Soviet military art. If this were not the case, it would be impossible to achieve the strength afforded by new developments in tank and armored forces and further improve the quality of offensive (and counter-offensive) campaigns.

One matter that must be given special attention, must be examined, studied and resolved is that of developing the role of tank-armored forces in defensive campaigns. Because, we have very little experience in the use of tank-armored forces in this type of campaign. It is reasonable for us to only give our tank-armored forces a limited role in campaigns of this type?

The role of each force component in a campaign is dependent upon the requirements, mission, nature and characteristics of the campaign and the actual capabilities of these components. Examined on these bases, one can conclude that our tank-armored forces can and must undertake the role of an important force in defensive campaigns.

We know that, because their forces are large, the offensive campaigns of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists can exhibit the following distinguishing characteristics:

--They concentrate superior assault power and firepower on the main front and might also be superior to us on the other fronts. They simultaneously launch frontal attacks against the campaign defensive formation of the opposition and attacks on positions deep within this formation. On the main front, enemy forces, which include tank-armored forces, are usually 3 to 5 times and sometimes even as much as 9 to 10 times larger than ours.

--They combine frontal breaching operations with attacks along the flanks and against the rear by means of many different forces or combine breaching the opposition's lines with deeply penetrating the opposition's territory.

--Their offensive formation consists of many different waves and components that are capable of continuously and quickly augmenting one another.

--Tank-armored forces are generally utilized as individual regiments (or battalions) that directly support combat infantry regiments. When time permits, tank-armored forces can be employed as regiments or larger units in bold, surprise penetrations and attacks on vital targets.

To complete the mission of a defensive campaign in the face of such an enemy, our armed forces must not only fight the enemy hard on the main front, but must also defeat deep penetrations by enemy forces and attacks along our flanks, including airborne landings by the enemy along the flanks and behind our campaign formation. Our armed forces must stop and destroy enemy tank forces approaching from the rear. They must attack and occupy important targets and areas within the battlefield deployment of the campaign. Consequently, defensive campaigns consist of battles to defend battle positions and basic defense zones; offensive battles against enemy probes and components engaged in deep penetrations or attacks along our flanks and enemy components moving up from the rear; and offensive battles against enemy troops in temporary defensive positions. Defensive campaign warfare is both stationary battlefield warfare and highly mobile warfare.

With their strong firepower, high mobility and good ability to defend themselves, which give them tremendous assault power in combat, tank-armored forces can complete every mission in a defensive campaign. When used in direct defensive operations, tanks are a good anti-tank weapon. However, using these forces in offensive missions within defensive campaigns makes it possible to employ the strengths that are the mobility and assault power of tank and armored forces and makes their impact many times greater. Therefore, tank-armored forces are generally used as a concerted force, as the primary force component in counter-offensives and counter-assaults or can be the important force of a campaign, in order to, either independently or in coordination with other forces, rout enemy forces attacking along our flanks or deeply penetrating our lines or rout enemy airborne landings along the flanks or behind our campaign formation. When necessary, tank-armored forces within the overall battlefield deployment of the campaign can independently defend a zone in order to pin down the enemy or force the enemy to deploy forces in an area selected by us. Generally speaking, defeating large enemy tank-armored forces when they are on the offensive is partly the responsibility of campaign tank-armored forces. However, this is no reason to place primary emphasis on tanks fighting tanks, even though defending against

tanks is an extremely important measure in a defensive campaign. But this problem can only be successfully resolved in the way that we desire when we make use of the entire widespread system of anti-tank firepower and obstacles of each force and echelon, from the basic units to the military corps, joint military corps and the entire campaign.

From the above, we clearly see that it is entirely possible to utilize the capabilities and power of tank-armored forces in defensive campaigns. These forces, however, must be utilized in the way that is most effective. Participation in combat by tank-artillery forces will make a decisive contribution to improving the quality of defensive campaigns by giving us greater stability, activism and initiative, particularly activism and initiative, greater force mobility and a greater ability to increase our fighting strength and deal with unexpected situations throughout the entire depth of the campaign. These are capabilities that are needed in order for our defensive campaigns to defeat the offensive campaigns of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

The organization and utilization of tank-armored forces in modern campaigns, although the specific forms and measures vary from one country to the next, generally take the following lines: from the standpoint of the organization of these forces, importance is attached to strengthening the overall combat capabilities of tank-armored force so that they can become strong campaign forces in offensive campaigns, counter-offensive campaigns and defensive campaigns; from the standpoint of the forms of warfare employed, importance is attached to strengthening and improving the ability of tank-armored units to conduct mobile, independent combat operations and deep penetrations.

The organizing of mobile campaign groups within offensive (and counter-offensive) campaigns must be based on intentions, missions and the size of campaign forces, on the tank-armored forces participating in the campaign.

In view of our present circumstances, the mobile campaign group can consist of a nucleus in the form of a tank regiment or brigade and additional forces and equipment as required by the various campaigns it must undertake. These additional forces can include the following: from one battalion to one regiment of mechanized infantry (or infantry); from one to two ground artillery battalions; from one company to one battalion of anti-tank artillery; one battalion of mounted or drawn anti-aircraft artillery; from one company to a battalion of engineer forces, etc. All these additional forces must be mechanized. When going into combat, the mobile campaign group must also be reinforced by campaign artillery and the air force, especially armed helicopters, and the other forces within the campaign formation.

The mobile campaign group has the following primary missions: deeply penetrating enemy lines and inflicting casualties on the enemy; occupying or destroying targets of campaign significance, such as command posts, signal centers, artillery and missile positions, air fields, port piers, communication hubs, dominant highpoints on the terrain, ferry landings and so forth deep within and behind the enemy's campaign formation; attacking the

flanks or rear of the enemy's main forces in order to break up, divide or encircle their campaign formation (or a part of it); inflicting casualties on and stopping enemy reserves from moving up from the rear.

The combat methods and tactics employed by the mobile campaign group primarily involve attacking while moving and making use of the rapid, flexible mobility and the surprise attack capability of these forces in order to deeply penetrate enemy lines, divide the enemy formation, strike quickly, win victory quickly and prevent the enemy from reacting. In the process of deeply penetrating enemy lines, the mobile campaign group must primarily fight independently and be on the offensive. However, it is sometimes necessary for it to fight a defensive battle.

The combat operations of tank-armored forces organized as a mobile campaign group yield very large campaign results, give offensive (and counter-offensive) campaigns a new and higher quality and a high rate of development and make it possible to win major victories in terms of wiping out enemy forces, occupying targets and completing the mission of the campaign as quickly as possible while reducing our casualties and losses.

In defensive campaigns, the operations of tank-armored forces are mainly offensive operations. When complex changes occur in the situation, tank-armored forces can and must conduct defensive combat operations to promptly block enemy forces and strengthen vital defense zones being threatened by enemy tank-artillery forces.

Consequently, the organization and use of tank-armored forces in defensive campaigns are not much different than in offensive campaigns. Because, in the case of tank-armored forces, offensive operations are the primary operations conducted in defensive campaigns. The organization and staff of these forces must be sufficient to enable them to fight independently in offensive battles. Moreover, due to their strong firepower, high mobility and good ability to defend themselves, tank-armored forces can independently fight defensive battles against superior enemy forces. This is something that has been confirmed by countries that have much experience in the use of tank-armored forces, such as the Soviet Union, the United States and West Germany.

The effectiveness of tank-armored forces in campaigns is dependent upon their technical capabilities, tactics and the number of vehicles and pieces of artillery with which they are equipped. However, it mainly depends upon the campaign command and the tank-armored command knowing how to select methods of fighting and creatively apply the principles of warfare in a manner consistent with battlefield realities. This is also a traditional strength of our armed forces. In the wars of resistance against France and the United States and in the recent war to defend the fatherland, our armed forces and people won glorious victories and defeated enemies superior to us in terms of modern equipment and weapons.

From the standpoint of the use of tank-armored forces, our methods of fighting exhibit the following salient strengths:

--We make concerted use of tank-artillery forces to increase our overall strength on the main front (or in the main zone) and at decisive times in a campaign. It can be said that in practically every campaign in which tank-armored forces have participated, we have deployed these in a concerted fashion in large, key battles.

--We achieve the combined strength of the campaign's battlefield deployment and its forces in order to create a position for tank-armored forces and coordinate with and reinforce these forces. As we know, the terrain and weather conditions of our country are very complex, the organization and equipment of our tank-armored forces are not well coordinated and our enemies have possessed strong anti-tank and armored vehicle equipment and weapons. In the face of these conditions, our campaign commands have highly developed the combined strength of the entire campaign and other forces to create a position and additional forces for tank-armored forces and coordinate with and reinforce tank-armored forces. It would have been difficult for the deep penetrations and attacks along enemy flanks by tank-armored forces to achieve the impact that they did in the Tri-Thien offensive campaign (1972) without the coordination, reinforcement and support of main force troops, special operations forces, local forces and militia and guerrilla forces, without the highly developed battlefield deployment of the people's war that was established when the campaign began... The deep mobile penetrations carried out in the Ho Chi Minh campaign could not have recorded glorious achievements without the smooth coordination of special operations forces, commandoes and so forth, which occupied and held the main roads leading into Saigon.

--We maintain secrecy and surprise and are bold in using and developing upon the strength of tank-armored forces. This strongpoint of our methods of fighting has been exhibited in a very wide variety of creative ways. We have sometimes achieved the element of secrecy and surprise by keeping how we intended to use tank-armored forces a secret. Sometimes, we have achieved the element of surprise by being flexible when selecting the times, places and directions in which tank-artillery forces were used. In the offensive to attack and occupy Buon Ma Thuot City in 1975, the elements of secrecy and surprise in the use of tank-armored forces were achieved through the use of camouflage and decoy troops and specific measures involving tank-armored forces that were taken during the preparatory stage. Assembling forces from far away and moving under the cover of darkness along new roads that had been carefully camouflaged, tank-armored units made their way past the bases on the outer perimeter and struck the heart of the city from four directions. The command of the puppets' 23rd Division did not know that they were being attacked until they heard the engines of the tanks and the sound of artillery along roads. In the Hue-Da Nang campaign (1975), the salient feature of the activities of our tank-armored forces was how very bold these forces were. Seizing the very favorable opportunity resulting from the victory in the Central Highlands, a victory which forced the enemy into a strategic withdrawal and struck panic into the enemy at other places, our forces, which consisted of only one tank company, boldly moved from A Luoi past Bong Mountain and Nghe Mountain, around Mo Tau and Phu Bai and then straight into Hue. Developing upon the victory won through the occupation of the Hue Citadel, our armed forces on the Quang Nam-Da Nang battlefield concentrated on attacking Da Nang. In coordination with the two large forces attacking the

city from the west and the south, one tank company led the force attacking from the north. It boldly breached the vital defense line of the enemy at the Hai Van Pass and penetrated straight to the center of Da Nang, arriving there first, thus creating favorable conditions for the campaign to rapidly win victory.

The fighting methods that forces employ and their forms of organization are very closely related. How a force is organized, the components that make up a force and the size of a force are specific expressions of the fighting methods of this force and how we intend to use it. The purpose of organizing tank-armored forces on a scale as large as a regiment (or brigade) and in the form of a mobile campaign group is also to utilize and enable these forces to fight as a concerted force, to implement the fighting methods of breaching operations combined with deep penetrations, attacks along enemy flanks and dividing and encircling the enemy's campaign formation under current conditions. Therefore, when studying and resolving problems related to the organization and methods of fighting of tank-armored forces. We must always keep this relationship in mind. At the same time, we must always keep abreast of changes in the situation in order to develop the art of using armored forces accordingly.

The combined strength of the tank-armored branch is very large. However, it is also a modern technical branch that demands very complicated combat support, particularly technical and road support. Examined from a campaign perspective, when tank-artillery forces are to be used, full importance must be attached to making preparations for and supporting the campaign operations of these forces.

Above everything else, special importance must be attached to preparing for and supporting tank-armored force mobility in combat operations that are coordinated among the various branches and in combat operations carried out independently by this branch, particularly operations to deeply penetrate, divide, encircle or attack along the flanks of the enemy campaign formation.

Our roads pose many limitations from the standpoint of mobility and our terrain is rugged and treacherous, particularly in the mountainous forests and in the lowlands, where the terrain is crisscrossed by many rivers and streams. To deliver painful, mortal blows by means of tank-armored forces, we must improve old roads and build new roads at places not expected by the enemy, at places where the enemy thinks we cannot build roads. The realities of our combat operations have shown that, under the conditions of Vietnam, every campaign and battle in which modern technical branches are used must provide a very large amount of mobility support. And, it can be said that, without making preparation for mobility, it is virtually impossible to utilize tank-armored forces. In the Khe Sanh campaign in 1968, the Quang Tri and Central Highlands campaign in 1972 and the Central Highlands campaign in 1975, we were only able to utilize and build upon the strengths of tank-armored forces as a result of the very meticulous preparation of roads. When sending tank-armored forces down from the North to the eastern Nam Bo battlefield, we had to prepare roads that extended for more than 1,600 kilometers. The preparation of campaign roads for tank-armored forces must be carried out early, in peace time. Because, main roads from the rear to the front or from one strategic

direction to another cannot be completed in a short amount of time. We also have much experience and have been very determined and creative in being one step ahead in the preparation of strategic and campaign roads. The roads running from the North to the South along the Truong Son Mountain Range began to be prepared in 1959 so that, some 10 to 15 years later, we had a strategic and campaign mobility support base and could record remarkable feats of arms by sending tank-armored corps into practically every major campaign of our armed forces and people in the resistance against the United States for national salvation.

When beginning to make direct preparations for a campaign, we also must, on the basis of the network of strategic roads prepared in advance, take urgent, creative and positive steps to prepare secret roads before we can guarantee the use of tank-armored forces in the campaign. It can be said that if, in view of the conditions that exist on the mountainous forest battlefield in Vietnam, we were to rely solely upon the existing road network, we would not be able to make full use of or highly develop upon the strength of the modern technical branches.

In the case of the modern technical branches, the good preparation of technical support is always a factor of decisive significance. It is of even greater significance when we must use the modern technical branches under the battlefield conditions of Vietnam, where the majority of the terrain is rugged mountainous forests, rivers and streams, the quality of the road network is low and many roads must be constructed quickly. In addition, we must fight powerful enemies who possess much modern equipment and weaponry. Combat unfolds with all the violence, complexity and difficulty that combat holds. The enemy uses every available modern weapon to destroy roads and thwart the activities of tank-armored forces. According to initial statistics on the losses and mechanical failures of tanks and armored vehicles in combat and transit, the number of tanks and armored vehicles destroyed by the enemy amounts to only one-third to one-fourth the number that breaks down as a result of our poor technical support and low technical standards.

To prepare technical support in a manner consistent with the realities we face, we must be aware of all the very large difficulties and problems that we must overcome and which demand that we take well-coordinated, positive steps to prepare both material-technical bases and the personnel utilizing these bases. When our material-technical bases are severely limited, it is especially necessary to prepare the personnel utilizing these bases well. Tank and armored vehicle commanders and crews, repair cadres and soldiers must be trained and forged to meet high technical standards so that they can limit the mechanical failures and losses caused by us to the lowest possible level and promptly repair and restore equipment that breaks down so that it can continue to be used in combat. We must immediately improve the training of each vehicle crew, mechanic, supply cadre, warehouse cadre and so forth. Commanders must be trained in technical support. The experience of the war of resistance against the United States showed that, in campaigns, the quickest source of supplemental combat vehicles is broken down vehicles that have been salvaged, repaired and restored on the spot, on the battlefield. During and after each campaign, tank-armored units and mobile repair units on the various vehicles restored 72 to 89 percent of broken down vehicles in order to

maintain fighting strength. Following the Central Highlands campaign in 1975, the tank-armored regiment on the Central Highlands front immediately repaired and restored 24 of 26 vehicles so that the unit could go on and participate in the Ho Chi Minh campaign without waiting for replacement vehicles from the upper echelon.

Providing good, well coordinated technical support requires a well coordinated organization and measures on all echelons, from the ministry down to the basic units. The division of labor, responsibilities and procedures must be uniform, clearly defined and compatible with each echelon and sector. The strategic and campaign echelons must keep in close touch with units and help the lower echelons to overcome difficulties with equipment, experience and specialized technical cadres. Every effort must be made to avoid or correct situations in which preparations are not complete or suitable and the division of labor is not clearly defined, thus causing the lower echelons and basic units to bear the burden of each difficulty and problem concerning technical support that arises in the course of combat and campaigns.

7809

CSO: 4209/845

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAM

FIGHT AGAINST CRIME, SOCIAL ILLS REPORTED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 17 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by My Lam: "Supported by the People, the Criminal Police and District and Ward Security Forces Concentrated on Fighting Crime and Social Ills"]

[Text] Last month, the criminal police and the security forces of the districts and wards (of the city security forces) worked closely with the people to fight crime and social ills. They conducted investigations, set up 1,162 files on criminal subjects, and arrested 51 individuals for whom arrest warrants had been issued. By strengthening surveillance and control of gathering spots such as public areas, hotels, inns, and bus stations, city security units uncovered 1,609 various criminal subjects and transferred to the social intelligence sector 354 suspects of involvement in social ills. City security units also disbanded 145 criminal gangs and groups, arrested 438 individuals, and raided 33 centers of vice. The Go Vap security forces, in coordination with the criminal police, arrested three gang members and confiscated two weapons, seven cartridges, and two hand grenades. This gang had been wanted in Song Be for four cases of robbery and rape and its members were arrested as they were fleeing to Ho Chi Minh City. Working round the clock as a swat team to respond to any emergency call in their territory, the street security police forces have been active chiefly at night. The subward and village security forces of 18 wards and districts strengthened their household and individual registration control activities and territorial surveillance and campaigned for the people's cooperation in the protection of local security. Due to this cooperative effort, wanted criminals on the run were arrested, and economic criminals and other people doing business illegally were uncovered.

In the last month, there were 167 fewer criminal offenses and 13 fewer serious crimes than in the previous month. Some gathering points with intricate webs of crime and social ills, such as Van Lang Park, the trans-Vietnam railroad station, and the Mien Dong and Binh Trieu bus stations, underwent visible changes for the better.

9458/9716
CSO: 4209/83

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

NHA TRANG CITY TAKES STEPS TO ATTRACT OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE

Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese 10 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Dang Ngoc Nam: "Liaison Committee of Overseas Vietnamese in Nha Trang"]

[Text] A valuable as well as a lofty attribute of our Vietnamese people lies in a very close and durable family relationship that binds kinfolk together, whether they live nearby or thousands of miles away, and continually reminds family members of their roots. Just like a cinder temporarily covered by ash--the worries of daily living--but always smoldering and ready to burn again when the ash is removed, that consanguinity is apt to warm up one's mind and generate tender thoughts and feelings about one's kin, native village, and fatherland. It is the very backbone of patriotism.

In Phu Khanh Province, 17,000 households have been issued permits for receiving gift packages from overseas relatives. Most of them are from Nha Trang City (for the city alone, and counting only students going abroad before 1975, 225 are now living in 15 countries). With an average five persons per household, that amounts to one-fifteenth of the provincial population having relatives overseas (this does not include a substantial number of those who, for various reasons, have not applied for permits). For a long time now, Fatherland Front officials in Nha Trang City have devoted much attention to them because, besides being citizens like others, they have their own thoughts and aspirations which cry out for a response and guidance. And any effort tending to meet their legitimate needs would make them more enthusiastic about daily life and productive labor while creating more favorable conditions for the Front to understand better the overseas Vietnamese--a part of the nation's blood and flesh--and encourage them to stay closer to their families and fatherland. A new organization to suit the aspirations of a large section of the population has been gradually put into shape by Front officials during years of working with families having relatives abroad. Directive No 17 of the Secretariat of the CPV Central Committee, which stipulated that "appropriate organizations are needed to draw people toward enthusiastically taking part in Front activities," has acted like the warm spring sun that helps new seeds spring up, tearing up the straitjacket of soil and growing into green foliage. The directive affirmed that the Front in Nha Trang should be creative, fair, and determined to shake off the hesitations and recticences of some people.

On 19 July 1985, the Liaison Committee of Families of Overseas Vietnamese in Nha Trang was set up. The municipal administration has accorded it legal status and the Fatherland Front municipal committee in Nha Trang City has accepted it as a new component. The induction ceremony was crowded, cheerful, and lively. In attendance were more than 90 representatives of families of overseas Vietnamese in the city. The Liaison Committee's task is to assemble families of overseas Vietnamese (currently, that effort is limited, but it will be expanded subsequently); disseminate party and state positions and policies, especially those pertaining to overseas Vietnamese; stimulate families to discharge properly their duties as citizens and guide their relatives abroad to take part in building the city and nation; gather and communicate the aspirations of families of overseas Vietnamese to the Front and administration; submit suggestions to the state on building a system of regulations and policies concerning overseas compatriots; help their families in some necessary matters; create favorable conditions for overseas Vietnamese to visit the fatherland; and acquaint officials with their technical skills and, together with their families, stimulate them to contribute tangibly to building the fatherland. The executive committee of the Liaison Committee is composed of nine members, who were chosen at the meeting. Every 3 months, the Liaison Committee meets in the homes of families of overseas Vietnamese on a rotating basis to create greater closeness and friendliness.

I met with Le Gia An, standing committee member of the Nha Trang municipal committee of the Fatherland Front and chairman of the committee in charge of the Liaison Committee since its creation. Leafing rapidly through his thick notebook, he said: "Since the Liaison Committee was set up, families of overseas Vietnamese have clearly felt confident. And this came as no surprise. For a long time, troubled by inhibitions and difficulties, they had only been able to open up to a few friends, always to no avail, but now they can stand on their own two feet, able to discern what is right and wrong and what the state can and cannot do; especially, they can see with their own eyes the correct and tolerant state policy toward their kin living abroad."

I visited some families of overseas Vietnamese. True, they are very happy. They feel that, in addition to things they share in common with others, they now have their own organization to which they can lay bare their minds, ask questions, and refer for assistance and guidance as needed. And naturally, that makes them understand more clearly their responsibility toward the common task and toward relatives living abroad. The Liaison Committee helps visiting overseas Vietnamese complete the necessary administrative procedures, invites them in for talks, and organizes tours for them to understand better the municipal and provincial situation; at the same time, it gets acquainted with their technical skills and aspirations for recommendation to state organs, creating conditions for them to contribute to the nation's building. TTL, Ph.D., a specialist in industrial refrigeration working for an international organization, was back home on a visit. His father, Mr Phach, introduced him to the Liaison Committee. The provincial people's committee chairman called the refrigeration enterprise asking it to invite TTL in to help solve some technical snags. Other specialists have helped Nha Trang City and Phu Khanh Province carry out a few projects--setting up a green belt for the city by providing seeds and technology, cooperating to build enterprises to produce consumer

goods, helping the tourist sector develop rapidly, and donating drugs and medical equipment to hospitals and schools.

Returning to France from a visit to Vietnam, Nguyen Duc Niem mobilized Nha Trang natives and other overseas Vietnamese and foreigners having sympathy for Nha Trang and Phu Khanh to set up an organization called Association des Amis de Nha Trang-Phu Khanh (Association of Friends of Nha Trang-Phu Khanh). The French government has granted it legal status. The association's goal is to "create conditions for contributing to and helping with cultural and economic development and all activities benefitting children in particular and the people in general, especially in the public health field. The association will find ways to provide localities with cultural and technical documents to meet their needs and stand ready to study to assist them in economic development."

The association sent out Tran Dinh Lan, its secretary, to conduct an on-the-spot study of economic issues, solar energy, water conservancy energy, and tourism and to discuss tangible programs of action. I read an emotional letter by association chairman Nguyen Duc Niem "reporting to the Liaison Committee that the Association des Amis de Nha Trang-Phu Khanh was officially established to fulfill the lofty commitment of overseas Vietnamese to consolidating the revolution and serving the country without flinching, expanding patriotic forces and movements with true tolerance, doing any task and working with anyone without fear, finding areas of agreement to foster strength, offering effective mutual assistance, and uniting Vietnamese into a great and unbending community with close ties to the beloved fatherland, just like hundreds of vessels carrying blood back to the heart."

Also through the association, the ~~Secours~~ Secours Populaire Francais, Comite de Massy (Massy Committee of French Popular Aid), has agreed to sponsor the Hoa Hong kindergarten in Nha Trang City and has sent it the first shipment of gifts.

A central goal of the association in mobilizing overseas Vietnamese is to stimulate them to provide scientific information and new technological advances, equipment, production raw materials, and capital. Another goal is to expand its activities into other areas--sending representatives to Ho Chi Minh City to learn experiences in handling overseas gift packages so that a similar outlet can be opened in Nha Trang to spare recipients a trip to Ho Chi Minh City or Da Nang to pick them up. On 1 April 1986, the municipal people's committee authorized the Liaison Committee to acquire a spacious and beautiful villa for use as a guest house, a "heart-warming roof for overseas Vietnamese" on visit to the fatherland. Funding will come from many sources, including contributions from overseas compatriots. The Liaison Committee has taken steps to expand two-way information, invite organ officials to talk to families about the government policy toward overseas Vietnamese and about the latter's lives, and keep organs and mass organizations informed about the activities of overseas Vietnamese to help them understand better those compatriots who live and work abroad but always remain in touch with the fatherland.

Since the province does not have a similar organization, the Liaison Committee of Families of Overseas Vietnamese in Nha Trang City continues to care for

visiting overseas compatriots who were not born in the city, bringing them back to their native villages for a visit, introducing them to the Fatherland Front and local administrations, and organizing tours for them.

A full year has elapsed since the Liaison Committee was created--a year of seething, rich, and effective activities. The road ahead is full of promises.

"The reason is," Mr An slowly said while closing his notebook, "that the Liaison Committee has been working in line with party and state policies and with the people's aspirations, as a representative of the Central Committee of Overseas Vietnamese concluded in his statement to a recent meeting. In this direction, we will gradually expand our organization and activities. Next year, when you are back you will certainly see many more new things."

9213/9716

CSO: 4209/85

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE IN VISIT TO LANG SON

Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese 10 Sep 86 p 4

[Article: "Give Thought to Lang Son"]

[Text] Last August, on the occasion of the 40th celebration of Independence Day, a delegation of representatives of overseas Vietnamese organizations, including those from the Association of Vietnamese in the Federal Republic of Germany, visited Lang Son Province. During the meeting between the delegation and the provincial leadership committee, the representative of the Association of Vietnamese in the FRG stated: "To illustrate its attachment to Lang Son, the association will mobilize its members and overseas compatriots to contribute to building material bases in the province, in particular donating 2 million dong worth of technical equipment to the technical middle school in Lang Son City."

At present, our nation is going through a stage marked by peace and constant threats of war, with Lang Son on the front line of the fatherland. That the association helps Lang Son build its technical middle school reflects the admiration of overseas Vietnamese for their frontline compatriots and their love for the fatherland.

Plans for building a "middle technical school in Lang Son" are divided into two stages in 1986 and 1987.

Begun in January 1986, construction work on the main school building, which will have 16 classrooms and 3 stories, will be completed in December this year.

From July to December 1987, various shops will be built, complete with equipment--a carpentry shop, a mechanical shop, and machinery to split jade bamboo, knit wool, embroider, lace, draw, measure, and make film for cameras.

9213/9716

CSO: 4209/85

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRY, VIETNAMESE ABROAD DISCUSSED

Paris DOAN KET in French Oct 86 p 20

[Article by Le Hung: "Some Questions"]

[Text] DOAN KET has opened for several months a platform for ideas where our readers express themselves about the problems of the Vietnamese diaspora, about those of Vietnam (especially on the approach of the next communist party congress which will take place in December 1986) and the policies of the Hanoi government with respect to the "Viet kieu" (Vietnamese living abroad). It turns out that most of the contributions received have been written in the Vietnamese language. We are pleased to publish today in our French edition the following article by Mr. Le Hung.

As our reader says, here are some "questions brought up casually; perhaps they are only valid because they have been asked." If thought often begins with questions, it is only fully worthwhile in continuing with analyses, proposals and counterproposals. Consequently we hope to receive letters going beyond "questions brought up casually."

In this discussion which is now stirring all the national community--in Vietnam as well as abroad--the "important questions" must be brought up. Nevertheless, we would like especially to publish contributions involving the relations between Vietnam and the Vietnamese community settled abroad. This preference is explained:

It is, in fact, up to the Vietnamese living abroad to express themselves extensively on the questions which concern them more or less directly.

In view of the potential which the Vietnamese diaspora represents, the questions concerning it are closely connected with the "important questions" which are raised in Vietnam. Speaking concretely: The Vietnamese living abroad only constitute about 1/60 of the population living in Vietnam, but the countries where they live and work have a per capita GNP at least 60 times that of present day Vietnam; about half of the population of Ho Chi Minh City lives directly or indirectly, completely or partially from "family packages" sent by emigres; without mentioning other immeasurable factors (of a sociopolitical, scientific, technical or cultural nature...)

This preferential approach, which is necessary in itself, does not seek at all to avoid the "important questions;" it allows approaching them realistically, knowingly and therefore insures the quality of the discussion, if one does not want to reduce this platform to a mere psychodrama for therapeutic purposes.

Misfortune is good for something! The failure of the latest economic reform in Vietnam, if it reversed the course of a process of economic recovery started a few years before, has made it possible to start an unprecedented discussion on management and the operation of the party and the state. Criticisms and self-criticisms abound. Abroad the Viet kieu in the FRG are meeting in a special congress to critically examine the situation of the country and their movement; they are going to try to propose a few "remedies" for the "evils" which ravage our country. I do not desire this. But, like everyone else, I have had some concerns, some questions for some time. Perhaps the time has come to reveal them in DOAN KET?

What has struck me first in the criticisms and self-criticisms is the recognition of a great lack of democracy in the people's life and more particularly in the party, and this at almost all levels. Democratic centralism has been criticized. But in all the declarations, both of Le Duc Tho as well as of Vo Chi Cong, I have not read any specific proposals of a connection between democracy and centralism. Will the next congress study this problem?

The campaign against bureaucracy has been in full swing for several years, but apparently without great success. Why? Is the single party system somewhat involved in it? How can the PCV prevent opportunists from joining it to make a career, since its leadership role is proclaimed. Economic management is poor because it is handled by a large number of incompetent persons. This refers to the problem of being both "red and competent" (hong va chuyen). At the present time, what is the standard which must prevail? "Hong va chuyen" is it not partly responsible for the brain flight abroad? Moreover, is it not necessary to re-examine the idea of being "red?" How does the party regard intellectuals? As a social class, are the latter temporary allies or comrades which one can reliably count on?

The Role of the Medias

When we speak of democracy, we cannot silently overlook the role of the medias. What are the types of information which the people can have access to? It seems to me that as long as information continues to leak out sparingly, we cannot speak of the encouragement of democracy. I have pointed out, for example, in NHAN DAN the great silence on economic life before the laconic announcement of the "dismissal" of Tran Phuoc. Why is NHAN DAN so barren? Why does it publish almost every day the complete texts of messages of congratulation or condolence? Why does it adopt such stilted language with respect to personalities? (Example: Very often when it reports on Truong Chinh, it mentions all his positions; as if people in Vietnam still do not

know them; strictly speaking it can be done once; but when you read them six times in the same edition and three times in a single article, you can wonder if it is not a little bit too much.)

As for economic policy, can the state alone assure its management in the present situation? Can one not conceive the idea of resorting, in certain sectors, to private producers who could thus make some contributions to the country's economic recovery (perhaps "competition" between private and public will motivate the latter)? If this idea is accepted it would then be necessary to have an honest attitude toward these producers, for if the latter feel "they will be taken advantage of at the next opportunity," they will never want to cooperate.

There are a few questions thrown up pell-mell; perhaps they are only valid because they have been asked.

8490

CS0: 4219/3

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

CONSIDERING INTELLECTUALS FOR PARTY ADMISSION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Ngoc Lien: "Young Intellectuals and Admission to the Party"]

[Text] Our party constantly emphasizes intellectuals and give concern to a rank of cadres active in economics, science and technology, culture, art, education, etc. with revolutionary qualities and high professional standards. With this attitude and feeling of the party, the young intellectuals receive a socialist education and training and are deeply touched. The majority wish to stand in the ranks of the party in order to train, to operate professionally and to better contribute to the country and the people.

However, in this matter there are not a few stories worth discussing.

A postgraduate friend of mine, infatuated with science and technology, has made pleasing contributions to beneficial and effective projects and has been rated as extremely good by his scientific agency. However, he complained that although the party chapter had been sympathetic to him for 10 years, he still did not stand within the organization. His reasoning was that for him to bring the party his professional ability and scientific contributions was sufficient. He felt that everything was due to some preconception toward him by the party chapter and that "they" were not speaking straightforwardly. The party member assigned to assist him did not have sufficient reason to point out that his concept of the party members was basically correct but was insufficient and incomplete according to the standards stipulated by party statutes. He presented the case of a friend of the same age in a different agency who had "been lucky": although engaged in only superficial scientific work, he knew how to satisfy everyone and was promptly admitted to the party. He clicked his tongue and said, "I am not well-versed in anything except science so how could I hope to enter the party!" However, that was the story 3 years ago. The party chapter sent someone with a better dialogue to assist him and my friend entered the party and received the responsibility of the institute's science secretary. His friend was also assisted by the party chapter and is now much more careful with his profession than before.

This story and other similar cases are often discussed and debated by our young intellectuals. The active trend and realization is for everyone to recognize the need to compare himself with the party statutes to struggle for entirety while simultaneously avoiding ways of observing or idealizations that the basic level party chapter and organization demand that anyone entering the party be

more professionally skilled than the masses, feel that the basic level party chapter only opens the door to those who are skilled at sneaking in, or when observing these three cases that selection by the organization is not careful.

Nevertheless, in reviewing a number of young scientific cadres of the same age, we still cannot avoid anxiety when we see that the way into the party of many is still encountering rapids because the basic level party chapters in some locations still have different methods of evaluating and assisting the masses. A friend of mine was a skilled engineer in a factory but in his cadre history, the organization office had recorded: member of the petty bourgeoisie (while his older sister, a freight handler, was recorded as a member of the worker class). The party chapter said that although he was truly professionally excellent, the often oscillating political viewpoint of a petty bourgeoisie must receive sustained testing! Another friend, a member of the Tay ethnic minority who was professionally skilled, had never entered the party but had been promoted to deputy section chief. The organization noted that he had been promoted in part due to the "ethnic minority policy" and that he lacked generosity and exuberance when dealing with everyone while someone being considered by the party for admission must be loved by a majority of the masses. Only upon inquiry is it learned that he says little, reserves nearly all his time for the professional labor for which he is responsible and does not often visit the homes of every cadre in the section. Another friend was personally rated as good by a number of party members but a majority of those in the party chapter were overly harsh, noting that he often stubbornly defended his scientific ideas, and labeled him as "arrogant," etc.

Truly, the strength of the party is in its intimate, specific and daily relationship with the masses. However, every relationship has two directions. In one direction are the masses, including the young scientific cadres sincerely oriented toward the party but strictly trained and working. In the other direction is the basic level party chapter opening its arms before the masses and concerned about assisting, selecting and training those with aspirations of becoming members of the party. Increasing recognition of a renewal in methods of observing, evaluating, conversing with and training each specific member of the masses who has his own individualism, individual professional work, individual struggle conditions, etc. is an important and pressing task. In this renewal, renewing the methods of thinking about and understanding mankind, and renewing methods of renewing the evaluation of socialist intellectuals are extremely important. I think that the yardstick to measure and evaluate the revolutionary enthusiasm and political quality of individuals engaged in scientific and technical work is an ideal, reason for living and realization precisely in keeping with the party, a spirit of service to the fatherland and the people, and the results of their professional contributions considered as the political mission of each individual. It would probably be difficult to unanimously agree that a scientific cadre who had not completed the research mission of the institute could still be "rated high" thanks to his enthusiasm in trade union and self-defense efforts. Or considering a party chapter in a scientific agency as strong when more than half of the party members rarely take the trouble for study and research and are therefore professionally weak and do not set an example in scientific labor to the masses. Conversely, if a party chapter is strong politically, has good internal solidarity, develops a leadership role

among the masses, has professionally outstanding party members and scientific specialists with prestige, engages in unyielding struggle against narrow-minded conservatism, jealousy and opportunism, knows how to evaluate people in a scientific and fair spirit, and emphasizes party development, surely that party chapter is strong and creates a strong attraction for those intellectuals who have not yet entered the party. I think that is also the best and closest medium for the direction and struggle of a majority of young scientific and technical cadres at the present time in order to stand in the ranks of the party.

7300

CSO: 4209/107

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

IMPORTANCE OF WORKER PROSELYTIZING EMPHASIZED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Sep 86 pp 3, 4

[Article by Dan Tam, Director of the Advanced School of the Vietnam Confederation of Labor: "Renovate the Task of Proselytizing Workers"]

[Text] Our party is responsible for concretizing its economic line by means of economic strategies and plans. In order to ensure victory for those strategies, we believe that there must be a strategy toward people, a strategy of mass proselytizing, in which the proselytization of workers must play a central and key role. That has been affirmed by our party: "The revolution is an undertaking of the masses." Therefore, in all periods the task of proselytizing and organizing the masses also has a strategic significance." (documents of the Fifth Party Congress). Recently, in a speech at National Cadres Conference held on 10 July 1986, General Secretary Chuong Trinh emphasized that one of the three major lessons of our party was "making the people the source."

Therefore, we recommend that when holding party congresses at all levels, culminating in the national Party Congress, there must be a renovation in consciousness and action with regard to the mass proselytizing work in general and, especially, to the task of proselytizing workers.

First, there must be correct understanding and evaluation in order to develop to a high degree the role of our working class in socialist industrialization, most immediately in the initial phase of the period of transition to socialism.

In recent years, because of incorrect knowledge of the contents of industrialization in the initial phase, in which agriculture is the foremost economic front, because industrial production has experienced setbacks, and because of negative phenomena within the ranks of the workers, there have been incorrect evaluations, even distortions with regard to the nature and historical role of the Vietnamese working class and confusion with regard to nature and phenomena and between its inevitable historical role and the specific conditions for carrying out that role.

It is true that there are negative phenomena among workers and civil servants and are still rather serious. Within the ranks of workers there are some who

still think and act in a manner contrary to the nature and morality of the working class. During some years industry has declined because of failure to supply sufficient materials and raw materials and because of the consequences of bureaucratism and subsidizing with regard to economic management.

The ranks of our working class have developed and undergone many changes since the nation was unified but has not been forged in the course of large-scale industrial production, especially because management was relaxed and chaotic, and there have been negative manifestations, which is easily understood. But although the numbers are not great (15 percent of the social labor force), and although there are still negative manifestations, the role of the Vietnamese working class has been decisive with regard to the great undertaking of economic development and socialist industrialization in the following respects:

The creation of total social output, especially the key products which play a leading role in the economy (in the 1981-1985 period, 38 percent), national income (in the 1981-1985 period, 49 percent), and exports (in the 1981-1985 period, 85 percent).

The creation of the key industrial sectors (energy, machinery, chemicals, etc.), which serve as the principal material-technical bases of socialism.

Exerting a direct effect in advancing agriculture to large-scale socialist production, by means of gradually introducing machinery, fertilizer, insecticides, irrigation, plant varieties, and breeding stock into agriculture. At the same time, creating concentrated industrial crop areas which grow crops with high economic and export value (such as rubber, coffee, tea, wood, etc.).

Because of those political and economic roles, the worker proselytizing task must truly be the central, key concern in the over-all work of encouraging the masses to carry out the socialist revolution.

Second, it is necessary to strongly orient the worker proselytization task toward attaining the nation's economic-social goals.

It is necessary to overcome the tendency to, and change the custom of, motivating by exhortation and carrying out vague political proselytizing, which has become habitual in many party committee echelons and in the social organizations. At the same time, it is necessary to overcome concept that it is only necessary to have sufficient materials and raw materials to have a movement and fulfill the plan, and that there is no need for proselytizing and education.

In the present phase, worker proselytizing must concentrate on the following specific goals:

Victoriously fulfilling the economic construction and development goals of the initial phase and the 1986-1990 5-year period.

The norms regarding productivity, economizing, quality, and production costs, in order to bring about high economic effectiveness in economic construction and development.

The principles and contents of building the new economic management system, especially the right of the basic economic units to take the initiative in production and commerce, and socialist economic and commercial accounting.

The above are both principal contents for bringing into play the role of the working class and are standards for evaluating the transformations and effectiveness of the worker proselytizing task.

Third, planning the development of the working class. The time has come to end the development of the ranks of workers in a manner that includes many spontaneous factors.

That can be accomplished only if there is, in addition to the stands of the party and the economic plans of the state, a strategy and plan to develop the ranks of our country's working class.

That strategy and plan must meet both the qualitative and quantitative needs of the nation as a whole and of each sector and area and, along with building a rational economic structure, create a working class structure that is appropriate to the requirements our country's industrialization, and overcome the present irrational structure with regard to the ratios among workers, management cadres, and technical workers, between high-level workers and low-level workers, and between technical workers and repair and maintenance workers.

To do so, it is necessary to have a strategy research center that is sufficiently strong and can gain the participation of the sectors and mass organizations. In the immediate future, it is necessary to rectify the recruitment and training of workers.

Fourth, to heighten the responsibility and renovate the worker proselytizing mode of the entire proletarian dictatorship system.

As the soul and political representative of the working class, the party must regard worker proselytization as the backbone of the undertaking of the party, and have appropriate, timely measures to lead the state and organize implementation by society. It is necessary to step up party development among production workers and set deadlines by which all production teams must have party members and advance to having party cells.

As representatives of the rights of the working class, the state organs at all levels must transform the viewpoints and stands of the party into plans for building up and developing the ranks of the working class, and supplement and promulgate regulations regarding the rights of the working class, especially their rights to employment and to receive income according to their labor, and protect real wages, political democracy, labor protection, and labor conditions. It is necessary to manifest in the form of specific policies and

regulations the viewpoint of the reproduction of labor, the most important factor of social reproduction.

It is necessary to investigate, review, and make dispositions regarding instances in which governmental cadres bully, coerce, and violate the mastership right of the workers and civil servants. It is necessary to promptly promulgate a new Labor Law and a new Trade Union Law to ensure developing the role and guarantee the rights of the working class and the authority of the trade union in building socialism.

As representatives of the rights of the working class and the largest mass organization of the working class, the trade unions must undergo a strong transformation with regard to contents and work methods, and improve their capability, revolutionary combativeness, and principal function: proselytizing, educating, and organizing workers and civil servants to victoriously implement the economic-social plans and the policy of renovating economic management and, along with the state, guarantee the legitimate rights of the workers.

It is necessary to resolutely overcome manifestations of bureaucratism and red tape in trade union activities as well as the tendency to evade responsibility with regard to violations of economic benefits and violations of the democratic political rights of trade union members.

With their functions, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Vietnam Women's Federation, and the other social organizations must be conscious of their responsibility, take active steps, and coordinate with the trade union to do a good job of carrying out worker proselytization in the new phase of the revolution.

5616

CSO: 4209/113

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

READERS' FORUM SUMMARY OF IDEAS FOR NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 17 Sep 86 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Summary of Ideas Contributed to National Party Congress in the Fields of Commercial Activities and Provision of Material Supplies"]

[Text] As of 14 September 1986, the SAIGON GIAI PHONG Readers' Forum for the National Party Congress has received 42 letters from readers of all walks of life: cadres, workers, employees, students, and housewives within and outside the city and in neighboring provinces, who have contributed ideas about business activities and the provision of material supplies. Some letters were quite lengthy and some others were neatly typed. Of the 42, only 4 came from people presently in the commerce sector.

I. Commerce

Ideas contributed encompassed many fields, from the lack of a uniform set of prices for state-operated businesses and cooperatives, the crooked march of goods, and the marginal effectiveness of the business system to the reorganization of the socialist business mechanism to make it more efficient.

Mechanism Is Cumbersome, and Goods Travel a Crooked Path: Reorganization Is Needed As Soon As Possible

Fourteen letters dealt with these issues. Reader Nguyen Van Ke (276/3 Hoa Hung, Subward 23, 10th Precinct) made a comparison: "A sundry retail counter run by one or two people sells everything, while a state-operated store staffed with many employees and handling all kinds of bookkeeping documents does not offer enough for a meal."

Comrade Vu Thi Dang (80 Truong Dinh, Third Precinct, on TDY at the Southern Fabrics Co.) wrote: "Level 1, 2, and 3 corporations are all stationed on city territory, but they exercise a rigid, compartmentalized distribution of responsibilities: Level 1 corporations must transfer goods to Level 2 corporations, and the latter, in turn, transfer goods to Level 3 corporations for retail sales." The comrade recommended that Level 1 corporations be in charge of retail sales wherever they are located in order to save transportation costs, to limit construction costs for Level 2 and 3 corporations, and to reduce personnel costs. On the other hand, Level 1 corporations have the advantage of staying close to the local market and this should enable them to order commodities right from the producers.

Reader Nguyen Trong Hien (Tan Thoi Nhat Village, Hoc Mon) brought up the need to review the dual existence of the marketplace business corporation and the marketplace management committee and to determine which one is indispensable.

Reader Kim Luc (Nguyen Thien Thuat Condominium, No 032J) wrote: "A messy situation still prevails within the sectors of commerce, service, the federation of cooperatives, and the provision of material supplies, and many units duplicate one another. As soon as a new product is manufactured and becomes marketable, it attracts the competition of hundreds of units and business corporations from different branches and sectors. Do the people actually need hundreds of those organizations?" Reader Kim Luc went on and suggested: "We ought to review the functions, the usefulness, and the authority of all existing business corporations, and subsequent to that, we should create a few leading corporations, such as a domestic animal meat corporation, a sauce and condiment corporation, and a construction materials corporation. These corporations would have branches in the wards and subwards and at the retail points. The branches would operate under agents, and they may have an independent or subordinate accounting system. With this system, socialist commerce would be an intermediate element between producer and consumer and an agent for production and exploitation. By the same token, the new system would avoid instances in which the consumer has to go to a vegetable corporation to buy vehicle accessories and to an agricultural corporation to buy canned milk.

Also, according to reader Kim Luc, service sectors such as tailoring, electrical appliance repair, barber, etc. ought to serve the people directly as professional service providers, not under the auspices of a business corporation.

Suggesting a new reorganization pattern for the commerce sector in order to make it more efficient, a group of cadres specialized in Level 2 and 3 commercial planning has forwarded to the forum an organizational diagram for the commercial system in the district and ward territory. Here is how it was proposed: each district and ward will have only one synthesized commercial corporation. The latter will have five stations for purchases, retail sales, and supply (material supplies, industrial products, agricultural and food products, imports and exports, and miscellaneous products), three central retail units, and a system of retail outlets in the subwards and villages and in the city streets.

Readers Do Muoi (Subward 3, Third Precinct), Nguyen Van Tan, Nguyen Trong Hen, and Pham Van Nham (18C 3 February Street) brought up the transgression of many noncommercial organizations whose business transactions caused prices to skyrocket because of the additional intermediaries. This reader also suggested that heavy fines be given to any organization that shunts commodities from their normal flow, and that a campaign be launched to invite the masses to denounce agencies that do business unlawfully. Reader Vu Thi Dang suggested that if it is the fault of the commerce sector in causing commodities to ramble and be idle through unnecessary intermediaries and in causing transportation costs to increase, the sector itself must bear the losses and not incur them over selling prices (retail prices must be pre-determined,

allowing the commerce sector to get only a discount). Therefore, the commerce sector has to find the shortest path to bring commodities to the consumers.

Retail Prices Set by the Commerce Sector Are Too High Compared With the Enterprises' Selling Prices

Among readers' letters commenting on commercial activities, there were 12 indicating that retail prices set by the commerce sector were too high compared with the manufacturers' costs, and 8 questioning the rationality of the high income of commerce-sector employees compared with other sectors' personnel. The authors of those 20 letters were not in the commerce sector.

Readers Nguyen Xuan Thuy (25/1 Be Le Chan, First Precinct) and Nguyen Van Tam (retired cadre, Subward 15, First Precinct) submitted actual figures pertaining to the prices of bicycles, canned milk, and cigarettes. Nguyen Van Tam went further in noticing that "nobody has any qualms about businessmen making money in order to contribute to the public budget. But there should be a rationale in making money, and that should not be limitless." Readers Nguyen Xuan Thuy, Le Dan Y (Lo Gom St, Sixth Precinct), Khanh Cuong (Subward 8, Fifth Precinct), and Thuy Minh (Third Precinct) wrote: While we are educating and encouraging the people to devote their energy and labor to production, the income of an employee of the commerce sector exceeds by far the income of a worker doing direct production work or that of an economic planning cadre, or equals several times the salary of a Level 3 teacher with 20 years of seniority.

Reader Nguyen Viet Thanh (economic ombudsman of the Eighth Precinct) suggested that we must determine and control the discount ratio and the profit ratio of the commerce sector in wholesale and retail.

Commenting on the income of employees of the commerce sector, other readers felt that the legitimate income of good employees was in general not too high compared with their work efficiency. But many businesses gave pretty high bonuses based on their business income, creating large income discrepancies between units right in the commerce sector and between the commerce sector and other sectors, such as engineering, education, and health sectors, where the prevailing income is very low.

Retail Prices Must Be Uniform

Seven letters mentioned the fact that the retail prices of the same commodity differ between stores of the socialist commerce sector.

Vu Thi Dang suggested that in making prices, retail prices for the consumer must be set. The commerce sector is allowed only a pre-determined discount and cannot charge another discount percentage over the uniform retail prices.

A reader in Subward 10, Third Precinct, proposed that the setting of retail prices must be made with the coordination between the price commission and production and business units, and cannot be done haphazardly. Any production

business unit that frequently raises prices and suffers losses must be subject to organization and management review.

Some Other Issues

Besides the above general issues, there were 10 other letters commenting on other subjects.

Readers Cong Thanh (Subward 4, Fifth Precinct), Comrade Huynh Thanh Hoa (First Precinct Vietnam Fatherland Front Committee), and Comrade Nguyen Xuan Thai, residing at 101/3 Tan Tien Hamlet, Tan Xuan, Hoc Mon, contributed the following ideas: "The commerce sector must monitor production in order to support it and to manage its commodity divisions. In this context, 'management' means market management, not warehouse keeping. Canned milk is produced only by state-operated enterprises, yet it is displayed for sale only occasionally at state-operated commerce stores and cooperatives, while on the 'black market' it is always available. In the present difficult times, in many places, the commerce sector worries about nothing else but its amount of business in order to complete the plan. The sector needs to make more of an effort to ease the livelihood problems of cadres, workers, employees, and the working people."

Coal and firewood are indispensable for the lives of the urban dweller at present, but trading these commodities brings a relatively low profit margin, and that is the reason why many wards and districts are lukewarm in doing this type of business (Comrade Nguyen Thanh Tan, Fifth Precinct). Reader Nguyen Duong Thanh Ly (Subward 17, Third Precinct) recommended that kerosene distribution be assigned to gas stations to ensure quality, to reduce waste, and to use to the optimum the capabilities of those stations which presently do not have much to do.

Other readers suggested that "if state-operated commerce stores sell only soap, aluminumware, and plasticware, there is no need to build more stores," and that "production of alcohol must be limited and display of this commodity for sale in socialist commerce stores must be reduced to a minimum."

Reader Thanh Tam (Subward 21, Third Precinct) subscribed to the idea that "authority" should not be abused to jeopardize the "monopoly in purchasing and distribution." For example, if the hog breeder does not receive any supplies from the state, he has the right to sell his products to any unit or individual (including private citizens) who offers the highest price. This method would allow the survival of a private organization doing the same thing the state does: Whoever works best gets the commodity. Therefore, the business unit of the state must make the utmost effort.

Commenting on cooperative business stores, reader Hoai Thuong (Subward 12, First Precinct) and Do Thuyet reported that certain stores cheated in their buying and selling transactions, causing discrepancies in profit in wards and districts trading the same commodity and causing the state to lose taxes. Reader Hoai Thuong suggested that many commodities and services need not be obtained through cooperative business stores and the system must be reviewed.

II. Provision of Material Supplies

Being the first person among 11 people writing to contribute ideas for the National Party Congress on the provision of material supplies, reader Tran Van Khanh (19 Hung Phu, Eighth Precinct) related certain facts pertaining to the provision of material supplies at present: "Most production units would leave no stone unturned to get material supplies. Those having 'experience' about the 'black market' would make any effort to skimp on material supplies that exist only in state warehouses and to sell them at 'black market prices,' and these occurrences are being widespread to the point of becoming uncontrolled. In other words, material supplies managed by the state do not go straight to where they are needed but follow a crooked path, and at each stop-over, their prices are jacked up." Reader To Van Chung (Tan Binh), as many others did, complained about the fact that the state assigns tasks and plans without ensuring the provision of material supplies: "It is rare that the ward or district is allocated enough material supplies according to the plan and to specified quality. Therefore, any time certain supplies were allocated, they were happily received irrespective of whether or not they responded to pre-determined specifications."

Three solutions were suggested to enhance the efficiency of material supplies in support of production:

1. The system of provision of material supplies from the central government to the localities, with the emphasis placed on supporting agricultural production, must be strengthened and improved. Plans for the provision of material supplies must be scientific, practical, accurate, and able to balance the needs and allocations, as suggested by reader Nguyen Viet Thanh (economic ombudsman, Eighth Precinct) in his proposed pattern "Two Downs and One Up": By the end of the previous year, a higher echelon would review its capabilities in balancing its subordinate units' material supplies. The subordinate unit, based on input from its basic outfits, on its production capabilities, and on prevailing conditions, makes its plan and requests corresponding amounts of material supplies. Subsequently, the higher echelon reviews the proposal and draws a material supply allocation plan including standard amounts, supply agencies, and a time frame to allow the subordinate unit to sign economic contracts. Meanwhile, the state needs to issue as soon as possible specific orders to prohibit production units from taking advantage of their "initiatives in securing material supplies" to trade these supplies and disturb the normal flow of commodity circulation.
2. A real business system dealing in material supplies is proposed. Instead of a "straight distribution" of supplies, it is suggested that a unit with the functional responsibility be set up to handle material supply "business" transactions, which will deal directly with production units, buy material supplies from units possessing them, and be willing to sell to raise business capital. This system would replace the present professional dealers in material supplies (reader Tran Van Khanh).
3. Enterprises should be strictly prohibited from stockpiling material supplies that are not needed for their own production activities (reader Nguyen Hoai Bac, Sixth Precinct).

With regard to the storage of material supplies, reader Nguyen Duong Thanh Ly (Subward 17, Third Precinct) recommended that except for gas and oil to be supplied to big projects, to military units, and to airlines, all other agencies should not keep their own reserves, because the practice may cause waste. To achieve this, we must use to the optimum existing gas stations in the city, and fuel allocated to agencies and citizens on a ration basis should be sold any time at gas stations.

Some cadres and workers of the Federation of Plastics Enterprises suggested that the municipal people's committee and the banking sector coordinate their efforts in reestablishing order in the transaction of supplies, because almost a year ago, there has been a growing tendency to use cash in these transactions.

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CSO: 4209/83

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

ATTENTION PAID TO MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN PEOPLE, PARTY

Hanoi DOC LAP in Vietnamese 23 Jul 86 p 6

[Article by Dinh Khuyen: "The Party Trusts the People, the People Trust the Party"]

[Text] Many people in Ho Chi Minh City have paid attention to the fact that the iron gate of the city party committee office in recent days has been opened wide. Before then, despite the fact that there was a guardhouse outside and a control room inside with personnel on duty 24 hours a day, the gate was opened only when there were cars to be admitted, otherwise it would remain shut all the time. Many of those who wish to come and share their concerns with the city party committee, when they see such "deep recess" facilities, become reluctant to come in.

Although the executive committee of the city party organization has yet to carry out self-criticism, the above change has reflected the guiding spirit of the city committee in the present phase of political activities, which is "to correct what is wrong wherever you see it, to correct mistakes from the little ones to the large ones, and to correct right away those aspects that are directly related to the life of the people."

By now, practically all the grassroots party units at the subward, village, district, and precinct levels as well as those belonging to the various sectors and blocs directly under the city committee have completed their phase 1 self-criticism and have gathered the ideas and contributions made by the party members and by the masses as they relate to the activities of the party organizations and government at each echelon. There may be some who still wonder why the city committee has yet to call to the docket a big case of negative behavior but there is no one who is not ready to acknowledge that the efficacy of criticism and self-criticism is being experienced at the grassroots level.

Some actions have been greeted with wide approval. This was the case of the labor office, which took active measures to guarantee minimal working conditions for the women health workers after the latter's representative spoke up on their behalf in SAIGON GIAI PHONG.

The Binh Thanh Precinct committee applied disciplinary measures in the case of a subward chairman and a head of the precinct committee inspection team when they were found persecuting a staff member who was representative of the subward people's council for the last 4 years. The Eighth Precinct party committee came up with a resolution forcing those cadres who have misappropriated official cars to return money to the common coffer, etc.

But there are actions taken in almost any subward, village, precinct, or district which are considered very normal, yet are very practical. Such is the case of the simplification of procedures so that the people could go about their everyday business. Thus, the procedure for reviewing the production registrations or the applications for bank capital for the purpose of production expansion has also seen many unnecessary obstacles removed and the time it takes for going through the procedure is reduced to one-tenth of the time it used to take. Another instance is the elimination of hundreds of construction projects that were conceived only for showing purposes or are deemed unnecessary; the money saved is reserved for going after and fixing dilapidated and leaking homes for the people or for building more classrooms, so that after the summer the children would not have to go to school during the third shift.

Most particularly, during the situation where both production and the people's livelihood are encountering difficulties, each grassroots unit has looked for every measure to raise the number of consumer goods at its disposal and to maintain the cadres' and the people's livelihood at a level where it would not go down further. Many subwards are reviewing their production capacity, organizing combined production schemes with suburban villages, or organizing the collection and purchase of discarded materials so as to have more materials to work with or raw materials to support the production units. Just in the last month, besides strengthening and helping the cottage industry and handicraft units, both the collective and the family type ones, solve their problems as regard capital, raw materials, and electric supply, Precinct One has been able to start nearly 20 new production units in the various subwards through joint operations proposed to those households that have capital, equipment, or the technology; or again, a number of sellers and buyers households in the joint business cooperative stores have been shifted to production. The outlying and suburban precincts and districts have invested capital or put in animal feed and breeding stock so that hog-raising families can raise them; afterwards, the pork can be collected and purchased from the latter so as to serve the local population. Many public communication works such as road repairs or bridge construction are being carried out in the suburban districts. Following upon the line advocated by the city people's committee, which doubled the amount of subsidies given to university students and increased the food allocations for the kindergartners, the various precincts and districts are coming up with new welfare sources for the teachers who fall within the categories of those eligible. Precincts One and Six have come up with a policy to regulate the welfare fund in the production and business sector so as to help the cadres, workers, and office workers found within the administrative and service sector.

Uncounted and uncountable actions like those described above have contributed to reducing the worries of each cadre and each person in the situation of terribly fluctuating prices. Once more, the precious tradition of "the party trusting the people and the people trusting the party" which has been built and reinforced throughout the years has become a living lesson for each echelon within the party. That is the reason why in the last 11 years the living standard is experiencing more and more difficulties but the city's laboring people have through their self-awareness accepted the fact and in many areas are even engaged in a movement of revolutionary action.

The Ho Chi Minh City party organization pays a great deal of attention to the warning given by the leaders to those parties in power concerning the disease of alienation from the masses. Our agility and creativity in leading the struggle movement within the enemy ranks in the part have quickly become our style in socioeconomic management after the liberation of the city; that is why our city has become one of the pioneering localities that manage to get rid of the binding power of the centralized, bureaucratic, and subsidized economy. Although the results of production are not commensurate with our capacity, the economy of Ho Chi Minh City shows itself to be quite lively. But the most convincing factor is the fact that our city has gradually built up a mechanism whereby the collective ownership of the laboring masses is guaranteed together with realistic contents and forms. Besides those organs that are charged with such functions as the public security forces, the court, and the control organ, from the city committee down to the district and precinct committees, and from the office of the National Assembly representatives delegation and the city people's council down to the popularly elected organs at the grassroots level and the mass organizations, they all have a component in charge of receiving people and each year they solve 80-90 percent of all the complaints of the citizenry. SAIGON GIAI PHONG, the organ of the city party organization, in the last few years has received about 20,000 letters from the readers every year; the mass organizations papers and the radio and television stations also receive a comparable amount of correspondence. Besides the responsibility of those cells in charge of answering the readers, the various organs that are named in the letters all carefully read and answer the issues raised by the masses in their letters. Most particularly, the highest leading cadres in the city pay a great deal of attention to the ideas contributed by the masses and printed in the papers, carried on radio and television, and reflected through the reports of various mass organizations; they either directly or indirectly give instructions to organs under them to study the questions and answer them in precise terms. The city, for instance, does not have enough electric power but the electricity sector cannot just arbitrarily cut the power in contravention to the calendar already published. Rice and many other essentials in the lives of cadres, workers, and office workers are still scarce but at least the supply capabilities of the distribution and circulation sector are always clearly stated and publicized, and their fairness in dealing with everybody at least has brought them deep understanding from the people.

There are also cases that have accumulated in the backlog in the last 10 years and which have not been solved once and for all. There are even cases

where 1 person has sent more than 100 complaint letters to various different organs without receiving an answer. But there are also very many cases where without the power of a party organization like the one in Ho Chi Minh City one would not find the solution as has been devised. The precious tradition of "the party trusting the people and the people trusting the party," together with the democratization process which the city party organization has nurtured in the city population during the period of the struggle for independence, requires that the Ho Chi Minh City party organization go forward more vigorously in the struggle to eliminate the present centralized, bureaucratic, subsidized, and conservative mechanisms that are still with us.

1751/9835

CSO: 4209/41

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

CPV LEADER CALLS ON PEASANTS TO DO BETTER

Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese 10 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by Vu Oanh, member of CPV Central Committee, chairman of the Central Agricultural Committee, and chairman of the preparatory committee for the National Congress of the Vietnam Federation of Collective Peasants: "Collective Peasant Class Should Strive To Fulfill Its Duties in the Foremost Battlefront"]

[Text] The collective peasant class has fully understood its important role and heavy responsibility--the role and responsibility of those fighting in the nation's foremost battlefront. In the past, laboring peasants nationwide were fully at the service of the resistance; in the same vein, they now act in concert with the working class to achieve worker-peasant mastery, pin their faith on the party, enthusiastically take part in labor, and make new accomplishments and a great contribution to building and defending the socialist fatherland.

In the past 5 years, especially since Directive No 100 of the Secretariat of the Central Committee on product contracting was issued, striking progress has been noted in the agricultural battlefront. Synchronized measures to put the correct party line into effect were taken to strengthen existing and continually expanded material and technical bases, inject technical advances into production, and kindle and foster the creative and industrious nature of farm labor.

Nationwide, the collective peasant class has enthusiastically emulated to achieve intensive cultivation, exceed contract norms, fulfill economic plans in cooperatives and production collectives, improve the family economy in association with the state and collective sectors, create products for society, gradually stabilize and ameliorate living standards, and properly discharge all obligations toward the fatherland. In the past 5 years, in spite of instability caused by natural calamities, grain production has increased by about 1 million tons annually. Basically, agriculture has solved the minimum grain need for the entire society. Grain imports were down from 6 million tons during the 5-year period (1976-80) to 1 million tons during 1981-85. Compared with 1980, in 1985 hog population was up 1.8 million head; meat volume was twice as large, the buffalo and cattle herd shot up from 3.9 million to 5.1 million head and short-term cash crops increased two-fold, attaining 1.1 million hectares.

The initial advances in agriculture in recent years were made possible by joint worker-peasant mastery, contributing considerably to stabilizing socioeconomic living standards in rural areas, partly alleviating the current prices-wages-money pressures, and serving as a basis and tangible guideline for new progress in the time to come.

Nevertheless, these changes are neither widespread nor stable--low grain and food production, the hefty effects of continuous natural calamities on harvests, poor value of agricultural products, especially those destined for export, and deficiencies in the new production relationships due to inferior material and technical bases and low-skill production forces. In the rural areas, millions of laborers are affected by underemployment and low productivity and efficiency. A section of the population (about 5 to 10 percent) is still hungry and poor. Some inappropriate state policies on prices and agricultural purchasing formulas, negativism in the supply of provisions, violations of two-way contracts, snags in the flow of goods, weaknesses in management and in the ranks of cadres and party members at the basic level, the burden of administrative red tape imposed by higher echelons, and the prevailing system of state subsidies and bureaucratic centralism--all of these have taken a heavy toll of agriculture, the countryside, and peasants, restraining the latter's dynamism and their enthusiasm about labor and giving rise to an eagerness to slacken speed and revert to monoculture and self-sufficiency.

In response to the legitimate aspirations of the great majority of laboring peasants, sectors and echelons should promptly take steps to overcome these negative weaknesses, treat agriculture as a truly key battlefield according to party policies, provide agriculture with better services, and conduct equitable product exchanges with farmers. And using state plans as a guide, they should create unrestricted conditions for installations to foster labor, land resources, and weather advantages nationwide, conduct comprehensive production and integrated business by linking the former with communications, and generate wealth for the country, collectives, and families, thus making the most active contribution to socialist industrialization.

Being urged to play an important part in solving difficulties and weaknesses, curb the impact of negativism, and accelerate the advancement of agriculture toward large-scale socialist production, members of the Collective Peasant Federation should pledge, first of all, to perform well as components of collective organizations, properly fulfilling the socioeconomic norms of production collectives and cooperatives and making them stable and strong. Only then will stable and strong production collectives and cooperatives be able to liberate peasants a second time, enabling them to grow from individual laborers into collective masters. A document of the Fifth CPV National Congress says: "On the one hand, cooperatives and production collectives should do well in organizing production and business, fulfill their duties to the state, and care for the living standards of their members; on the other, they should properly forge unity and educate peasants about the need and ways to achieve collective mastery." Besides, the collective peasant class has its own association. The Vietnam Federation of Collective Peasants is a component of the Vietnam Fatherland Front. According to its statutes, "the federation, under the leadership of the CPV, assembles, unifies, and stimulates peasants to foster their right

to collective mastery, take part actively in building, consolidating, and refining socialist production relationships, step up agricultural and forestry production, and band together with the entire people to build socialism successfully and defend the socialist fatherland firmly." Emulating to make achievements to salute the Sixth CPV National Congress, federation echelons have been conducting fruitful and pragmatic activities. Using the masses to teach the masses with hard-hitting slogans, such as "State and People Work Together," "Emulate To Exceed Contract Norms," "Do Well on the Family Economy," "An Inch of Land is Worth an Inch of Gold," "All Families Should Produce for Export," "Make Adequate Deliveries of Paddy and Military Recruits to the State," and "Love Your Country, Love Your Village," grassroots organizations of the peasant federation have successfully launched a movement of revolutionary activities deep inside the rural areas. The federation has truly worked hand in hand with other mass organizations to carry out socioeconomic tasks in the localities.

Following the Party Congress, the federation will convene a congress from the basic to the upper levels to refine its organization, improve its efficiency, and renovate its work methods with a view to grasping party resolutions and launching a strong revolutionary movement among peasants to stimulate them to discharge political duties assigned by the Party Congress. The federation works mainly in districts and at the basic level and in close association with collective economic units (cooperatives and production collectives); however, it achieves common goals through its own approaches, methods, and attributes. Its cells, chapters, and grassroots organizations and those at the higher levels must be staffed with cadres who are proficient in mobilizing the masses and in economic and technical management, thus enabling the federation to work, along with other components of the Fatherland Front and under CPV leadership, to assemble the people, foster the right of all rural population strata to collective mastery, and to stimulate peasants through propaganda to comply with the regulations of the federation, agricultural cooperatives, and production collectives. Capitalizing on its strengths, the federation should tackle issues which collective economic units are compelled to neglect, such as guiding and stimulating members to help each other improve the family economy, emulate to make adequate deliveries of products to the state, pay off arrears, solve the longstanding problem of rural poverty, implement the policy of turning the countryside into a rear base, and build a new countryside marked by cleanliness, beauty, security, and order. Through its activities, the federation should promptly report its members' legitimate feelings and aspirations to superior echelons and sectors to help the party and state study, adopt, reinforce, and modify their positions and policies toward the rural areas, agriculture, and farmers in line with realities. Especially as a representative of its members' right to collective mastery--and in keeping with party and state common interests--the federation should control the performances of cooperative management boards on commodity production and distribution and fight overbearingness, embezzlement, bureaucratism, corruption, and violations of the laborers' legitimate interests, as the Draft Political Report of the Party Congress stipulated.

Guided by the forthcoming Sixth CPV Congress, the Vietnam Federation of Collective Peasants will hold its first national congress to approve its

statutes, set goals, agendas, and methods of action, and streamline its organization to increase efficiency, enabling it to fulfill its duties and, together with other constituents of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and under CPV leadership, foster the strength of national unity, overcome all difficulties and challenges, and strongly and firmly defend the Vietnamese socialist fatherland.

9213/9716

CSO: 4209/85

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

VIETNAM

ANNIVERSARY SPEECH EMPHASIZES NEED FOR RENEWED DEMOCRACY

Paris DOAN KET in French Oct 86 p 21

[Text] The national holiday corresponding to the 41st anniversary of the August Revolution was marked this year by the speech of Deputy Prime Minister Vo Chi Cong made in the name of the government and the communist party. You will observe especially that at the end of the 5-year plan for 1981-85, the annual increase in food production was 4.9 percent. Food production was 18.2 million tons in 1985 compared with 14.4 million in 1980 or an average per capita increase from 268 kg to 304 kg. However the food question, the primary objective of the 5-year plan, "is not yet settled and production remains uncertain."

The communist leader announced that the draft of the political report of the VI Party Congress was going to be subjected to broad discussion in the country. "Through the medium of the mass medias, through direct meetings, through letters, the cadres and the people have already responded favorably to the party's appeal by participating in the discussions during the congresses of party organizations on different levels." The party asserts the "revolutionary" nature of the demand for a "renewal" of "social practices. "The people also call for a purge in the party ranks and the state apparatus, they demand that the party insure democracy. It involves very justified demands which testify to the political maturity of our society," Vo Chi Chong emphasizes. "The party and the state are determined to correct the failures and mistakes in the management of the economy and society and to seek new methods supported by the people and developing the democracy of the workers."

Describing these failures and mistakes, the editorial in NHAN DAN of 2 September mentions on one hand "subjectivism and impatience," which have led the party to escape social reality and its contradictions, and on the other hand, "conservatism and inertia" which have preserved for too long a system of economic management restricting both the development of the productive forces and the power of the workers. Thus a "renewal" is imperative in all fields: renewal of thought and especially of economic thought; renewal of organization and cadres. It involves "insuring democracy by a new socio-economic management mechanism which breaks with bureaucratic centralism and the administrative allocation of resources." We must give up "directing the economy through administrative orders to do it through a system of objective laws of the first stage of transition" to socialism.

Finally, in the field of foreign relations, a passage of the speech of 2 September especially attracted the attention of observers. He said, "the interest of Vietnam and China is in peace, independence and economic and cultural development." Vietnam "wants to look forward, normalize its relations and restore friendly relations with China." It is "ready to open negotiations with China at any level, at any time and any place to settle the basic problems in the relations between the two countries, as well as problems of common interest."

8490

CS0: 4219/3

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

VIETNAM

114,000 WORKERS MOVE TO NEW ECONOMIC ZONES

Hanoi INFORMATION-DOCUMENTS in English No 111, 1 Oct 86 p 2

[Text] By August 1986, throughout the country, 242,000 people had settled in New Economic Zones, 114,000 of them of working age.

Besides those who join State-run economic units, nearly 199,000 people are attached to the collective economic sector, 88,000 of them of working age. In particular, 11,200 people have gone to industrial-drop areas in the Central Highlands.

In Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Hung, Nghe Tinh and Binh Tri Thien provinces, practical measures have been taken to encourage people to settle in New Economic Zones. State investments for capital construction have gone in priority to those in the Central Highlands.

However, over the past eight months, the targets in population and manpower redistribution have not been fully attained: only 40% with regard to people of working age; 35% concerning settlers in general. The cause lies in bad preparation, for instance in delimiting areas and determining orientations for production. There are undue delays and bad coordination in the supply of funds, food, materials and equipment to the New Economic Zones.

/9274

CSO: 4200/165

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

VIETNAM

VIOLATIONS OF MINIMUM-WAGE POLICY AIRED

Hanoi TIEU CONG NGHIEP AND THU CONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 1 Aug 86 p 7

[Article by CT: "Who Is Responsible for This?"]

[Text] According to Notice No 1,148 UBVG/TP of the Ho Chi Minh City Price Commission on 22 November 1984, the average daily wage of a mechanical worker in the city was 72.50 dong per day. However, during the first and second quarters of 1985, municipal mechanical cooperatives including Ly Thuong Kiet Cooperative (Tan Binh Precinct) were compelled to sign contracts with customers at 20 dong per day--only 26 percent of the authorized wage frame.

On 15 July 1985, realizing that excessively low contract prices badly affected the production and living standards of laborers, the Ho Chi Minh City people's committee issued Decision No 143 raising the daily wage in the mechanical sector to 105.3 dong (old dong); nevertheless, cooperatives were still forced to endure very low prices (for instance, Ly Thuong Kiet Cooperative was only able to sign at 5.5 dong per day--55 old dong--in the third and fourth quarters of 1985).

On 24 October 1985, apparently aware that the price situation was moving in a direction not favorable to production, the municipal Labor Service and Price Commission issued joint Notice No 736/LC-LD-VG/TP, clearly stipulating that the daily wage in the mechanical sector was to be 11.25 dong (new dong). In fact, in signing economic contracts for 1986, cooperatives including Ly Thuong Kiet Cooperative continued to receive low wages, the highest of which--granted as a mark of kindness--was 10.53 dong per day (0.72 dong less than the regulated rate).

Daily wages were forcibly maintained at very low levels while the prices of staple commodities have been on the rise--for instance, the price of rice sold at business prices to small-industry and handicraft cooperative members rose from 2.40 dong per kg in April 1985 to 4.50 dong in January 1986 and 8 dong in April 1986. Thus, how could cooperative members take up production with confidence and enthusiasm? Why have Ho Chi Minh City-based contracting organs been able to set their own daily wage scales at will and in defiance of the regulations of municipal managerial organs? Who was responsible for

for this matter? The concerned ministries of the price commission?
Lowering contract prices while increasing wholesale and retail prices
to make distribution more profitable and leave laborers holding the bag is
in no way a business approach beneficial to the nation. Cooperative members
in the city suggest that responsible organs clarify the matter and promptly
take remedial steps, paving the way for production growth.

9213/9835

CSO: 4209/46

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE, AND FINANCE

VIETNAM

VALUE OF GROSS HANDICRAFT PRODUCTION IN HO CHI MINH CITY

Hanoi TIEU CONG NGHE THU CONG NGHIEP [SMALL INDUSTRY AND HANDICRAFTS] in Vietnamese 4 Jul 86 p 11

[Article: "Ho Chi Minh City"]

[Text] In the last 5 months the small-industry and handicraft sector of Ho Chi Minh City realized 5,957,249,000 dong in gross production value, attaining 77.36 percent of the 6-month plan, with export products reaching 799,783,000 dong or 76.9 percent of the guiding norm and surpassing the norm-law by 27.6 percent.

As far as the plan is concerned, if one takes 83.33 percent as the norm to be reached during the first 5 months in the context of the 6-month plan in terms of fulfilling the plan, then only three units have exceeded this level: Precinct Four (99.64 percent), Chu Chi (99.04 percent), and Duyen Hai (146.30 percent). Three other districts and precincts reached the approximate target: Tan Binh (81.45 percent), Precinct Three (82.44 percent), and Phu Nhuan (80.22 percent).

As far as the export plan is concerned, if one takes the norm-law as the basis for comparison, then 16 precincts and districts have surpassed the 6-month plan (with the exception of Tan Binh and Hoc Mon) but if one takes the plan guidance norms to be the basis, then only 5 precincts and districts have gone over the plan (Precincts Three and Four, Thu Duc, Nha Be, and Duyen Hai).

Generally speaking, during May the gross production value has increased over April by a mere 4 million dong. This is because there is still a lot of tension on the various fronts: cash flow, building and raw materials, and prices. The amount owed by the banks to the various small-industry and handicraft units in the city, which came to 616 million dong at the end of April, did not show any significant improvement during May. In actuality, it has gotten even worse: Precinct One, which was owed 22 million dong, now sees the banks' debt increased to 51 million dong; and Precinct Three saw its receivables grow from 41.5 million dong to 57 million dong.

The exception being those units that are little affected by the cash flow, practically all the rest have run into difficulties where the cash flow is

concerned. Agreements signed at the beginning of the year have been fulfilled slowly because of a lack of raw materials. Even the newly signed ones are difficult to fulfill because the price of component materials is unstable and that of raw materials as a whole has gone up. Besides these problems, such difficulties as the consumption of products or the supply of electric power have also affected the production of various units.

During June, the same as in the 6-month plan of 1986, the city's small-industry and handicraft sector will run into many difficulties. This is why the projected production for June will be higher than for May only by about 60 million dong (coming to about 1,312 million dong). In computing for the first 6 months, the sector projects a realization level of 7,269,890,000 dong as the value of gross total production, representing 99.41 percent of the 6-month plan or an increase of 15.53 percent as compared with the same period last year. This will represent 5,771,612,000 dong in terms of the value handed over to the state (reaching 93.69 percent of the plan) and 978,483,000 dong in export value (94.09 percent of the guidance norms).

The three precincts and districts which will certainly fulfill the 6-month plan are: Precinct Four, Cu Chi, and Duyen Hai. Three others are capable of fulfilling the plan if they can minimize their difficulties: Tan Binh, Phu Nhuan, and Precinct Three.

1751/9835

CSO: 4209/41

AGRICULTURE

VIETNAM

PROBLEMS IN FOOD PRODUCTION DISCUSSED

Hanoi INFORMATION DOCUMENTS in English No 111, 1 Oct 86 pp 16-21

[Text] Over the past decade, and especially the past five years, great efforts have been made in Vietnam in the field of food production, and visible progress has been recorded.

Food output (rice and equivalent) increased from 11.6 million tonnes in 1975 to 13.5 million tonnes in 1976. It declined somewhat in 1977 and 1978 but recovered in 1979 and reached 14.4 million tonnes in 1980. Over the past five years it has regularly risen (1981: over 15 million tonnes; 1982: nearly 16.6 million tonnes; 1983: more than 16.9 million tonnes; 1984: more than 17.8 million tonnes; 1985: 18.2 million tonnes). These results are even better appreciated if one takes into account the food situation in the world at large and the fact that we have met with numerous difficulties: repeated natural calamities; economic sabotage and land-grabbing operations along our northern border by the enemy; serious imbalances in our material-technical infrastructure and in the supply of materials and equipment. With things viewed against this background, one will realize that we have indeed accomplished a lot. Over the past five years, on the average, the annual increase in food output has been twice the population growth rate. Although the population has increased by six million, average food availability per head of population increased from 268 kilos in 1980 to 304 kilos in 1985.

The fast increase in food production stems from the boost given to rice culture. Attention has been paid to this crop in both the scientific-technical and the socio-economic fields. The renovation of management in agriculture has led to a sweeping mass revolutionary movement. This movement has spread from rice to other crops, and to animal husbandry as well. It has also spread to other fields of production. In rice production two points must be emphasized: intensive farming is regarded as a strategic orientation aimed at boosting output; and renovation of the mechanism of management has begun with the application of the product-based contract system down to the group and the individual producer.

Compared with 1980, in 1985 the sown area increased by only 0.45%, yet output augmented by 7.6%. This was due to a 7.4% increase in yield, a fairly good rate of increase by world standards and a very good rate compared with other countries with a similar geographical location. Intensive farming essentially

means to make the most of the potentials in land and labour and of climatic, biological and other factors. It has become a mass movement. More than 260 cooperatives and production collectives (lower-level cooperatives) have recorded yearly yields of 7-10 tonnes per hectare; 43 districts have attained more than 8 tonnes per hectare; and many provinces boast an average of 7 tonnes per hectare. Along with fighting the sequels of natural calamities and with the improvement of the winter-spring and the late-autumn rice crops, the re-scheduling of crops has assumed important significance. In many provinces along the central coast, in eastern Nam Bo, in the Mekong Delta, and in the provinces of Nghe Tinh and Binh Tri Thien, many fields which used to bear the late-autumn rice crop--the main crop of the year but subject to many hazards are now sown to summer-autumn rice for intensive farming. This accounts for the fact that in many regions in 1985, in spite of natural calamities in late autumn, record yields were attained: 28.5 metric quintals per hectare (21.1 quintals in 1980).

Favoured by new factors, the production of subsidiary food crops (crops other than rice) in the North last winter increased compared with previous years. Total output of these crops averages the equivalent of 300,000 tonnes of paddy. Maize, which ranks second only to rice, was planted in 1985 over 300,000 hectares and yielded 14.9 metric quintals per hectare (266,000 hectares and 10,5 quintals in 1975).

However, there are still many unsolved problems.

While the average sown area per head of population remains rather small, there are still vast stretches of wasteland. In the past years, little has been done in the way of land clearing. The increase in sown area has been mostly due to crop multiplication and a boost in the rate of utilization of the soil. And even these factors suffer from many limitations. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, by 1985, the utilization rate of soil throughout the country was only 1.3 (1.6 in the North; 1.06 in the South). Meanwhile management of land resources is loose and each year about 200,000 more hectares are put to uses other than the planting of food crops.

Although, generally speaking, rice yields have increased fairly rapidly, the low starting-point accounts for the fact that the highest average annual yield is only 28.5 metric quintals per hectare, one of the lowest in the world. Worse still, yields are uneven and vary according to region, season and field.

The production of subsidiary foodcrops has on the whole declined. In 1975 it was only the equivalent of a little over one million tonnes of paddy. It reached its peak in 1979 with the equivalent of 2.9 million tonnes of paddy. But in 1980 it declined to 2.7 million tonnes and has continued to slide. Although some progress was made in 1985, output was still lower than in 1980. Potentials in this domain are very great, particularly in the highlands and uplands of the North, the Central Highlands, and eastern Nam Bo where vast stretches of land lend themselves to the planting of starchy tuber crops. Yet, due to insufficient concern for these crops, their proportion in total food production is small. Thus, in human diet, it is only 1 against 5.3 for rice, while in France for instance, the potato-wheat flour ratio is 1-0.7.

The fact that food availability per head of population is now 304 kilos testifies to great efforts, yet it is a very low figure, which is a bare minimum and approaches the limits of hunger. If the State were in control of the major part of marketable food, and were able to drastically reduce the rate of losses and carry out a rational distribution, the food problem might be regarded as having been solved, although rations will still be at a low level. But in fact this has not been the case. Due to various circumstances--geographical differences, social conditions, levels of production--distribution of food has been uneven: the figure of 300 kilos is attained by less than half of the provinces, and while it reaches a peak of over 500 kilos in the Mekong Delta, it is much lower in the northern highlands. Losses happen in the process of distribution, between harvest and consumption. In 1985 for instance, an increase of 1% in the rate of loss in the State sector would mean a loss of nearly 40,000 tonnes. In fact, due to inadequacies in drying, storage, packing, and transport facilities, the rate of loss averages 7-8% and in many cases even more.

This state of affairs stems from various causes, both subjective and objective. Among the former, let us cite above all the failure of most levels of authority and branches of activity to grasp the party line, according to which agriculture is the forefront of the production battle and food production is the key point. Although expenses have been cut down on some projects in order to increase investment in agriculture, and especially in food production, over the past five years the level of investment has been lower than in the previous five years (1976-80). Imported products such as chemical fertilizers and insecticides are short and supply is often delayed. In 1985 mechanization of soil preparation was carried out on only 17.7% of the sown area (23.5% in 1980). The number of large tractors in operation over the past five years is only 20% of those working in 1976-80 and the number of small tractors only 38%. Investment for support branches does not show a judicious structure and has not received adequate attention. Although water conservation is given primary importance, many projects are badly coordinated. The Red River Delta is not yet free from the danger of both flood and drought. On the whole, irrigation is ensured for only 59% of the rice area and drainage for only 30%. The requirements in rice strains for both high-lying and low-lying areas and in maize and potato strains have not been adequately met. Policies regarding the production of food grain and its collection and purchase by the State are not quite judicious, with the absurd result that, particularly concerning the cultivation of rice, the more effort is made for self-financing by the producer the less profit he derives. Relations of production in agriculture are yet to be perfected, particularly with regard to the product-based contract system, too much being left to the control of the farmer in certain cases and too little to the cooperative.

The above are the main reasons for the failure to attain the targets set for food production by the Fifth Party Congress. Achievements have failed to match the possibilities and whatever has been achieved is still imbalanced, unstable, and unsteady.

The target for 1990 is for food availability per head of population to be 340-350 kilos per year. This modest objective for a population then expected

to number about 68 million calls for a yearly increase in food output of 0.96-1.2 million tonnes over a period of five years (1986-90). According to statistical data of the past eleven years, the highest yearly increase attained during that period was 1,9182 million tonnes (in 1976 over 1975), and the second highest 1.5176 million tonnes (in 1982 over 1981). But the average yearly increase obtained during the past two five-year plans falls short of that required for the coming five years by a long way. Thus truly great efforts are needed if the above target for 1990 is to be reached.

/9274

CSO: 4200/165

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

VIETNAM

FACTORY HEAD CALLS FOR POLICY ON MACHINERY PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Le Tung Hieu, Director of Motor Parts Factory No 2: "There Must Be a Policy Toward Machinery Production"]

[Text] People responsible for managing production still must find the solution to a difficult problem: how to stabilize and increase production, and how to bring about higher incomes for the cadres and workers.

In the production of machinery to serve agriculture and fishing, such as Motor Parts Factory No 2 (VINAPPRO), when relating to the pre-production, production, and post-production factors that problem is even more difficult. All three aspects are constrained by the obligation-based work, so one difficulty after another arises.

First, prior to production the foremost factors are materials and equipment. The production plans are always facing us, while materials, including electricity, are almost always in short supply. The actual production situation forces us to have to "track down" materials practically all the time. Meanwhile, we have to "stand in line" to wait for many types of materials. Production according to plan often is all but stymied because we cannot take the initiative in obtaining materials. We have had to feverishly "track down" such scarce materials as alloy blades and CO2 gas. At times the mass production of products must cease only because of the lack of a certain kind of material, such as a type of rotor blade.

Since we are not willing to do nothing, in order to maintain the production schedule, we must rely on ourselves a great deal. Thus too much time is lost "chasing after", materials.

We hope that on the basis of the new mechanism the problems regarding materials will be resolved. There must be a policy of encouraging the export-import units to form alliances with the factories in importing materials and equipment and in exchanging goods. We very much need to borrow foreign exchange so that we can take the initiative in producing machinery and repairing equipment with higher quality. That can be accomplished only when the state has confidence in us and boldly allow the basic units to assume responsibility in production and commerce.

Second, in production there are two major problems: the prices of products and the incomes of workers. The incomes of workers and civil servants are primarily from basic salaries and in part from profits. But because the approved price of a product, such as a D6 machine, lies within the "obligatory" price guideline, the income from profits doesn't amount to much.

The present price situation in the heavy industry sector (which requires a higher level on the part of cadres), and with such as income level, it is truly difficult to mobilize productivity and creativity. It is also necessary to bring up the matter of allowances and other benefits for "Ho Chi Minh City residents working in the Bien Hoa industrial zone under management of the central echelon," because they must constantly suffer disadvantages, which creates and unfavorable psychology for management.

Therefore, when setting forth policies to increase productivity and lower production costs it is necessary to immediately think of related matters: increasing incomes, stabilizing living conditions, and guaranteeing the rights of the workers.

There is also no explicit system regarding the mobilization of gray matter and labor to invest in researching and manufacturing new products.

In addition, our machinery and equipment are manufactured in many different countries. When they break down, most of them cannot be repaired on the spot, so we don't know what to do. That situation is rather widespread in many other factories.

Third, after they are produced most of our principal products must be marketed by an intermediate marketing unit on an obligatory basis. Therefore, a machine such as our D6 machine may pass through several "middlemen" before reaching the consumer. Thus we are not directly responsible to the peasants and fishermen. The flow of technical information, the requirements regarding taste, and the relevant improved production, are very difficult to achieve. Guidance of and responsibility for repairing and maintaining machinery have not been clearly stipulated. Occasionally the "ultimate purchaser" brings a machine to our factory to be repaired.

At present, in the production of machinery and spare parts for agriculture and fishing, in addition to the problems that must be resolved, it is necessary to relate the producers to the peasants and the fishermen.

From the point of view of a basic unit, we have the following opinion to contribute to the party and state:

Domestic production should be stimulated by giving priority in the importation of materials, or by selling them in a timely manner and to the correct recipients. We must limit, and gradually end, the importation of complete engines which can be produced domestically. There must be a policy of "protecting" domestic machinery products which are capable of satisfying consumer needs. To ensure that products attain high quality, the state must give priority to importing certain components in the production of which our

country cannot attain the desired technical quality or produce with economic effectiveness.

The state must have a policy of giving priority to the production of spare parts, including those to serve agriculture and fishing, for that is the only way to maintain draft power.

To improve distribution and marketing there must be an appropriate price policy, depending on the specific conditions of each province, and prices and modes of exchange must be openly posted so that the consumers can be informed. At present, because materials are too scarce and are not distributed at fixed prices, and there are many "middlemen," sometimes the consumers must buy them at prices many times greater than the base price.

Permission must be given to form two-party alliances between the producers and the agricultural and fishing areas to produce export goods and earn foreign exchange to obtain materials for production.

There should be policies to give preferential treatment to and encourage the cadres, workers, and civil servants who work in the key economic sector with regard to science and technology and to serving production.

5616

CSO: 4209/113

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

VIETNAM

BRIEFS

WHITE CEMENT PRODUCTION IN HAI PHONG--A chain of production of white cement has been commissioned in Hai Phong, with an output of 500 tons per year.

[Text] [Hanoi INFORMATION-DOCUMENTS in English No 111, 1 Oct 86 p 16]
/9274

CSO: 4200/165

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

VIETNAM

LOADING, UNLOADING ACTIVITIES IN QUANG NINH PORT IMPROVED

Hanoi GIAO THONG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 17 Jul 86 p 4

[Article: "Quang Ninh Port Increases Revenue, Pays 5.5 Million Dong in Interest"]

[Text] In 1986, more than 200,000 tons of goods of various kinds, including mining equipment and other bulky items, will be loaded and unloaded in Quang Ninh Port.

In the past, during lean years when disbursements exceeded receipts, the state was compelled to make up for losses with new capital input. In the past several years, however, due to an effort to work more vigorously, ameliorate loading and unloading activities, strengthen commodity storage, and gradually switch to a new business approach, Quang Ninh Port has been able to strike a balance between revenues and expenditures and pay interest to the state. In the first 6 months of 1986, by increasing revenues and limiting expenditures, the port paid 5.5 million dong in interest to the budget.

The port has achieved striking progress in increasing revenues and ensuring navigational safety for seagoing ships and in collecting tolls. In the first 5 months of 1986, it ensured absolute safety for 178 ship entries and exits, including 123 passages of foreign vessels, many of which were from 10,000 to 20,000 tons. Most active in providing safe passages were four pilots--Pham Ba Tam, Nguyen Van Tiem, Nguyen Dinh Trung, and Nguyen Hai Quy--and the port affairs section.

Also to boost revenues and reduce expenditures, profit-and-loss accounting was tested, right at the beginning of the year, at the subshop level, allowing production units to draw up plans for wage and production norms. Norms on fuel use were set for each category of land and coastal equipment. Units with good management track records are eligible for a Class A bonus; B-rated units are granted a reward equal to 80 percent of a Class A bonus. Through that approach, the land transportation section has made conspicuous headway, not only fulfilling the norms of fuel thriftiness but also making automobile repairs on its own; its repair shop has been upgraded from maintenance and small-repair status to that of medium-level repair of tugboat engines and barges, and in 5 months, the shop repaired 118 means of transportation, cutting expenditures by some 4.5 million dong from last year. The port

has strictly guided loading and unloading activities, shortening the stevedoring schedule by 33 days. Delays amounted to only 2 days. As a result, wages and bonuses have increased.

With that comprehensive effort, as of 20 June Quang Ninh as loaded and unloaded more than 100,000 tons of goods, attaining 70 percent of financial norms for 1986 and sharply increasing the income of cadres, workers, and civil servants over 1985.

9213/9835

CSO: 4209/46

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

VIETNAM

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK SEEN IN NEED OF IMPROVEMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 18 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Dang Van Than, Director of the Post and Telecommunications General Department: "Improving Communications Capacity and Quality"]

[Text] During the past 5 years, the posts and telecommunications sector has continuously completed the plan, higher each year than the year before, and created an appreciable utilization value. This is a beneficial effect of the process of electrically transmitting information on all aspects of daily life and social activity, and especially in serving the supervision of the party and state, key projects and economic zones, flood and storm prevention and control, security and national defense, etc.

During the past 5 years (1981-1985), the post and telecommunications sector has made efforts to implement the Resolution of the Fourth National Party Congress of Delegates, "Strive to reform and exploit the potential of the present communications network and build additional material and technical bases in order to strengthen the capacity and raise the quality of post and telecommunications." The sector, beginning with the position of the party and the mission situation, has set forth positions for developing and strengthening the network and concentrating on handling the major unresolved problems. Under conditions of limited capital, accounting for only .5 to .7 percent of the total capital of the national economy each year, the sector has organized and exploited the current communications network, actively mobilized an appreciable volume of long-stored equipment for introduction to network service, etc. A number of old automatic telephone systems in the south that were not being used to full capacity were placed in service in Hanoi and Haiphong with good results; and economic association activities were expanded in conjunction with the use of the capital, including the foreign exchange, equipment and material of a number of sectors and local areas, to develop the communications network.

The sector has successfully constructed and effectively introduced a number of important projects such as the Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City-Minh Hai telephone trunk line, Hoa Sen [Lotus] stations 1 and 2, and the Hanoi-Haiphong and Hanoi-northwest trunk lines with coaxial and symmetrical cables.

The standards of post and telecommunications cadres and workers during the past 5 years have also unceasingly risen with an active effect on the network. Of a total of 42,000 personnel, more than a fifth have educational levels of middle school, college or above, 12 percent of the workers have grade 5 standards and above, and 36 percent are workers below grade 5.

Communications capacity, especially that of electrical communications, has risen fairly rapidly. By the end of 1985, the interprovincial communications network had nearly 100 electrical communications channels, four times the number 10 years before. During 1976, only 20 provinces and cities but now all 40 provinces and cities have communications with the central government. International communications capacity has increased by many times. The internal province communications networks have also developed to an appreciable degree. During 1976, there were only 200 districts but now more than 400 districts and towns have telegraph and telephone communications with the province. Seven key districts of the state have direct communications with the central government, and 1,413 villages throughout the country have electrical communications. The 6,825 postal administration offices in 1976 rose by 1985 to 8,422. There is a total of 210,000 kilometers of postal routes, including 73,000 kilometers in the rural area. In supervision of network construction and development, the sector thoroughly understands the two strategic missions of building and protecting the fatherland, with emphasis on the guideline, "Build the economy in coordination with strengthening the national defense."

The social communications requirements steadily increase and present network capacity can only answer the essential communications requirements of the party, administrations at all levels and those of an urgent nature. Communications serving sectors and economic supervision are still extremely limited. There are not enough to answer the postal administration and telegraph requirements of the people. The quality of network service is still low. Telegraph and telephone outages still occur. Slow receipt of letters and telegrams and lost packages sent by the people through post and telecommunications have decreased significantly but have not ended.

In the technical and vocational management aspects, the sector has not yet done truly well, communications control is still not firm, and many unresolved problems and troubles of the network and difficulties and obstacles of the basic units are still being handled slowly. Management, maintenance and operations have not yet matched network development. Many technical management systems have not yet achieved high results.

The present course of the post and telecommunications sector is to continually strengthen, exploit and thoroughly utilize every current communications potential while simultaneously emphasizing synchronized and priority development and further modernization of the communications network, to create a fundamental change in technical equipment, and to develop and raise the capacity of the communications industry. Continue to improve production organization, streamline the management mechanism, better perform the management function of the state and the concentrated and unified management of the sector, ensure the business and production autonomy of the basic unit, and train and build the cadre and worker ranks to raise the capacity of the network and communications product quality to increasingly better answer the communications requirements of the party, state, sectors and people.

First of all, the post and telecommunications sector must continually promote increased communications quality by thoroughly exploiting every potential, strengthening, transforming and developing in a priority manner the post and

telecommunications network and further expanding service. The sector must widely apply technical innovations and improvements with an effect of raising network capacity and communications quality, continue to improve production organization along a course of increasing the effectiveness of concentrated and unified production operations, reducing junctions and closely connecting technology with exploitation. The sector must also continuously build and train the cadre and worker ranks, organize scientific labor, and teach a refined and courteous attitude to the cadres and workers, especially telephone operators. Streamline the system of quality inspection and implement a system of material incentive or economic compensation when quality is violated.

The post and telecommunications sector will carry out many synchronized methods and organize emulation movements to create a composite strength and ensure increasingly better communications quality, especially emulation movements for achievement to welcome the Sixth Congress of the party and to achieve and surpass the 1986 plan.

7300

CSO: 4209/107

LABOR

VIETNAM

REGULATIONS ON OVERTIME PAY EXPLAINED

Hanoi GIAO THONG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 17 Jul 86 p 8

[Article by Tran Thanh Liem, Department of Labor and Wages, Ministry of Communications and Transportation: "Regulations on Nighttime, Overtime Pay"]

[Text] [Question] Please tell us about the current system of nighttime and overtime pay in the sectors of the production, business, and administration? Vu Van Dao, Nam Dinh Port, Ha Nam Ninh.

[Answer] On 20 November 1985, the Ministry of Labor issued Directive No 22/LDTT on granting nighttime and overtime pay to workers and civil servants. To ensure standard implementation throughout the economy, the ministry sent out on 21 February 1986 Official Letter No 341/LDTT with the following guidelines:

1. The system of nighttime and overtime pay applies to both production and administrative sectors uniformly, except for particular cases:

a. Workers directly engaged in production and business according to fixed schedules are entitled to nighttime and overtime pay if they cannot take compensatory time off.

b. Compensatory rest is mostly required of cadres and civil servants in the technical, vocational, and administrative fields, working nighttime and overtime. But if they cannot take it, their unit chiefs should look into individual cases and make pertinent decisions.

c. Workers and civil servants directly engaged in production and working on means of transportation including truck drivers, assistant truck drivers, locomotive shift workers, tramway workers, crews of river- and sea-going transportation ships, small-vehicle drivers, messhall cooks and waiters, day nursery personnel, gate-keepers, economic security guards, etc., in general, those working according to a flexible schedule, are not eligible for overtime pay on weekdays, except for night work (if this is the case).

Workers and civil servants working additional shifts, except for those assigned to mandatory shift work, may draw overtime pay.

Overtime pay for weekend and holiday work is regulated as follows:

1. Leading organ and enterprise cadres are not entitled to overtime pay on weekdays. However, if they work overtime on weekdays and holidays, they are entitled to compensatory time off or overtime pay according to common regulations.

2. Computation of nighttime and overtime pay:

a. For those earning wages on a time-length basis:

Besides regular wages based on the number of mandatory work hours in their sector, those working nighttime and overtime on weekdays, weekends, and holidays are entitled to a compensation equal to:

(1) 100 percent of wages, which are paid according to grades and functions, plus other allowances (if this is the case) for overtime work comparable to work during mandatory hours.

(2) 50 percent of wages, which are paid according to grades or functions, for overtime on weekdays (with no other allowances) or which are or equal to 100 percent of wages for weekend and holiday work.

(3) 30 percent of wages, which are paid according to grades or functions, for nighttime work (with no other allowances) if that additional work coincides with a night shift.

b. For those earning wages on the basis of product:

Overtime work (as requested by the director) on weekdays, weekends, or holidays should be paid according to the unit-wages by which regular wages are computed.

In addition, there will be:

(1) an allowance equal to 50 percent of wages, which are paid according to grades or functions (with no other allowances) for overtime work on weekdays, or equal to 100 percent of wages for overtime work on weekends or holidays.

(2) an allowance equal to 30 percent of wages, which are paid according to grades or functions, for overtime work (with no other allowances) that coincides with a night shift.

3. In units following the daily pay system, overtime workers on holidays, whether they are paid according to time lengths or to product deliveries, are entitled to a payment equal to 100 percent of their wages, which are paid according to grades or functions, plus other allowances (if this is the case).

9213/9835

CSO: 4209/46

LABOR

VIETNAM

SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION IN HO CHI MINH IN 1985

Hanoi TIEU CONG NGHIEP THU CONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese 1 Aug 86 p 7

[Article: "Ho Chi Minh City Holds Preliminary Review of Transformation in 1985"]

[Text] The Ho Chi Minh City Federation of Small Industry and Handicraft Cooperatives has just held a preliminary review of the socialist transformation of small industry and handicrafts in 1985. Nguyen Nguyen Sinh, deputy director of the central federation, attended the meeting.

A report at the conference states that, as of 1985, there were in the city 600 cooperatives and 2,177 production teams with 125,440 laborers. By the end of that year, the cooperativization rate attained 77.2 percent--a 16 percent increase from 1984. Urban precincts averaged 75.3 percent, with 76.7 percent for the Fifth Precinct and 94.6 percent for Tan Binh Precinct. Suburban districts exceeded 85 percent, topped by Hoc Mon with 99.1 percent. Key economic sectors have mindfully regrouped along economic and technical lines--cloth weaving, 100 percent; jute spinning, 85 percent; glassware, 90 percent; wood processing, 79.1 percent; and papermaking, 79.5 percent.

Five sector cooperative federations have been set up in the city, encompassing jade blinds, rattan and bamboo, rush mats, lacquerware, embroidered rugs, and wool knitting, with nearly 300 production installations and 25,507 laborers, 99.6 percent of whom belong to collectives. In 1985, sector federations supplied production installations with 60 percent of provisions without state assistance. Export value reached 9.765,000 ruble-dollars--a 127.89 percent increase over 1984.

Steps were taken to strengthen the collective economy in terms of ownership, management, and distribution and to improve its managerial structure. There were in the city 313 front-rank cooperatives and 142 medium-class cooperatives. Weak cooperatives accounted for only 10.8 percent. There were 79 high-level cooperatives (15.6 percent), 294 middle-level cooperatives (58.33 percent), and 131 low-level cooperatives (25.99 percent). The collective economic sector has delivered more and more products to the state and has made a continuous effort to upgrade its equipment and apply technical advances.

However, the socialist transformation of municipal small industry and handicrafts in 1985 was limited and flawed. The majority of cooperatives

which were promoted to a higher level during the year were heavily inclined to show off and produce as many goods as possible instead of behaving as true collective economic entities. In some production teams and cooperatives, old-time owner-worker relationships still persisted. Planning for production rearrangement between the city and its precincts and districts was improperly conducted. So was the division of responsibilities paving the way for association between state and collective units, except for the weaving sector. In guiding the transformation process, officials were interested in the speed factor, giving rise to administrative coercion and noncompliance with the principles of "democracy, voluntary participation, and mutual profitability." The internal management of cooperatives and production teams was considerably weak. The revenue of some sectors and crafts was not stable. Living standards of laborers were replete with difficulties. The collective economic potential was not properly fostered and scientific and technical investment has received inadequate attention. Most machinery and equipment were too old. Due to irrational price policies, new investment capabilities were on a very small scale.

Speaking at the meeting, the vice chairmen of the people's committee in charge of small industry and handicrafts and the directors of federations of cooperatives in the precincts and districts pointed out the irrational aspects of official positions and policies toward the small-industry and handicraft production sectors--assigning ambiguous functions and tasks to federations of cooperatives, setting up instable organizations at the precinct and district levels, and lacking a satisfactory state policy toward the collective production sector, thus leading to a situation in which living standards in a high-level cooperative are lower than those in a middle-level cooperative, living standards in a middle-level cooperative are lower than those in a lower-level cooperative, and living standards in a lower-level cooperative are lower than those in a cooperative team. In other words, socialist transformation has not achieved its basic goal. The effort to bring handicraft workers into collective production was mainly designed not only to liberate them from being exploited but also and mostly to raise their living standards, create a more advanced production formula, and increase labor productivity.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

VIETNAM

OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON ETHNIC POLICY IN CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Dieu Thi Hoa of the State Nationalities Commission: "The Ethnic Policy in Cultural-Artistic Activities"]

[Text] From an over-all point of view, with regard to the ethnic policy in the cultural sphere we have made many all-out efforts, but in a spirit of "frankness, truthfulness, and speaking straightforwardly and honestly," it may be said that we haven't accomplished much in two respects: gathering, editing, reorganizing, and introducing the traditional cultural heritage and meeting the cultural needs of the ethnic minority people. If one has the occasion to visit the hamlets and villages in the high-altitude border areas, such as Mu Cang Chai (Hoang Lien Son), Muong Te (Lai Chau), Song Ma (Son La), Meo Vac (Ha Tuyen), Tra Co and Ma Loi (Thuan hai), etc., one would see that there are too few movie showings. In some places the people see only one movie every 10 years. Some have never seen a cultural performance and practically all published materials are in Vietnamese, so few people can enjoy them. Many very valuable cultural-artistic treasures have not been exploited.

Therefore, participation by cadres who are members of local ethnic minority groups in cultural-artistic activities and the regulations and policies toward cadres engaged in cultural-artistic activities in the various areas who are encountering many difficulties must be dealt with urgently.

The matter of ethnic minority cadres who are members of the "cultural army" must be included in the quarterly plans of all echelons, from the central level down to the basic level. In order to have a complete corps of cadres, an indispensable aspect is creating sources. Some cadres come of age in the course of actual work; some cadres both engage in cultural activities and continue to undergo training; some cadres must be trained from the beginning, until they are capable of undertaking the initial tasks; some cadres must undergo short-term, urgent training in all respects; and other cadres must be trained systematically, basically, and on an along-range basis. Especially, some cadres must have talents so that they can later become outstanding performers in the sphere of cultural-artistic activities.

We place our hopes only students in schools and in state-supported boarding schools, and the cultural sector is still waiting for them to voluntarily seek permission to join its ranks, and does not truly take the initiative in training people to meet its requirements.

Experience shows that young people who are members of ethnic minority groups and live in distant, remote, high-altitude areas are often dominated by their psychology and circumstances, are afraid of crowded places such as schools, and fear being forced into circumstances which differ from those to which they are accustomed. Therefore, in many schools such students gradually drop out. The same is true with regard to the cultural-artistic schools. Only if schools in Dac Lac are taught by Rhade teachers and know how to "teach and soothe" will the students remain in school and be content in their study.

The Dac To Work-Study Youth Labor School in Gia Lai-Kon Tum, an Heroic Unit, in the course of training includes literary, sports, and artistic activities in its study and training curricula so that after they leave the school and return to their hamlets and villages the students can fulfill one of the following functions: production unit head, cultural unit head, or sports-physical education unit head. They can direct a mass cultural performance. That also suggests a method for doing things: taking the initiative in coordinating with the units with many ethnic components by means of which to create a corps of culture-art cadres.

In addition to a corps of culture-art cadres, which we must have, within the ethnic minority peoples there is a corps of artists who are very respected by the ethnic groups, have deep understanding of traditional culture, and know how to apply those values for their people permanently, closely, and attractively. All ethnic groups have such artists and are close to the working masses.

Because of the needs of economic-cultural development, some ethnic minority people in low-altitude areas have volunteered to engage in cultural activities in remote, high-altitude areas and in border areas with many difficulties and hardships.

Ethnic minority cultural cadres must be obtained from many sources. The problem of ethnic minority cadres must be resolved in many ways: the creation of ethnic minority sources, and forms and measures for training and organizing the artists and organizing and mobilizing minority cadres and ethnic minority cadres who have higher economic-social levels, to support the distant, remote areas.

But attention must be paid to resolving the problem of policies and regulations in the spirit of "creating conditions" for economic-social development in the ethnic minority areas in the high-altitude and border areas with many difficulties, which is also very important, and sometimes very basic, matter. At present, an urgent problem with regard to the policy toward ethnic minority cultural cadres is the policy and regulations regarding the selection of students (selecting talented students to attend the culture-art schools). We have reached agreement with the Ministry of Higher and

Vocational Education with regard to that matter, as manifested in regulations regarding the selection of students by area and ethnic minority group. But urgent, short-term training, urgent supplementary training, etc., are the responsibility of the cultural sector and the localities, after seeking the opinion of the competent echelon. Those forms of study must pay attention to specific activities in the course of the students' study. An example is the special program of Nguyen Ai Quoc School No 1 for ethnic minority students in 32 high-altitude districts and cities and 176 villages along the northern border.

With regard to the compensation system toward ethnic minority cadres who are active in the localities, the present regulations call for regional allowances and other allowances, depending on the general situation, but because of the characteristics of cultural-artistic activities there must be provisions to facilitate that work. In that regard, the Ministry of Culture must continue to carry out studies and make recommendations. Its basis is that because the cultural level of the ethnic minority groups is not high, and the self-subsistence family economy is still heavily dependent on nature, state allowances must be sufficient for their work activities and lives, and they must be supported in such a way as to create people with a new culture and a new way of life.

It must also make recommendations regarding ethnic minority people who come from other places to serve in the spheres of movie projection, mobile information units, and bookmobiles. Especially, bringing films to such areas is related to the question of whether they should be shown commercially or only as a public service, to regulations regarding the transporting of machinery, to the requirement of providing appropriate equipment, and to regulations regarding the cadres and members of mobile movie projection teams.

With regard to artists who make contributions to cultural-artistic activities at the local levels, there must be appropriate compensation.

A matter with a distinctive nature in cultural-artistic activities with regard to each ethnic minority area is bilingualism, the use of Vietnamese, and the use of ethnic minority languages. Under the present conditions, the ethnic minority people in remote high-altitude areas are still restricted with regard to contact with Vietnamese, and most of the ethnic minority people do not know the other ethnic minority languages. But the requirements of cultural intercourse are steadily increasing. The explanation of films, the translation and publication of cultural-artistic works, teaching in schools, and inspirational propaganda in increasingly greater quantity and with high quality reaches only part of the ethnic minority people. Because of the requirements of that actual situation, in cultural-artistic activities it is necessary to study regulations regarding the following films: explaining films in ethnic minority languages, translating cultural-artistic workers, carrying out propaganda in each ethnic minority group in the ethnic language, and educating ethnic minority students in both the ethnic language and Vietnamese.

People who are engaged in cultural work and master ethnic minority languages should receive the same benefits as those who know foreign languages because learning ethnic minority languages require a long period of contact and persistent study. It is necessary to pay attention to studying the written languages of all ethnic minority groups with such languages, and to publishing bilingual publications or works translated into or from the ethnic minority languages.

POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

VIETNAM

POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION BEHIND SCHEDULE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Sep 86 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Entire Nation Sends 114,000 Laborers To Build New Economic Zones; Preparation of Population Redistribution Areas Slow"]

[Text] By the end of August 1986, local areas throughout the country had sent 242,000 people, including nearly 114,000 laborers, to build new economic zones.

Besides the number of laborers sent to state-operated business facilities, the number sent to the collective economic area reached nearly 199,000 people with more than 88,000 laborers. The central highlands provinces alone accepted an additional 11,204 laborers for concentrated industrial crop zones.

The provinces of Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Hung, Nghe Tinh and Binh Tri Thien had many specific methods for encouraging cadres and people to move to new land zones.

The state concentrated a major portion of capital construction capital on the new economic zones in the central highlands.

Nevertheless, the level of labor and population redistribution during the past 8 months has been too low compared with the plan: 40 percent in labor and 35 percent in population. The major reason has been that area preparation is not yet good; some places bringing in people have not yet defined the area or established a production course. The supply of capital, grain, material supplies and raw materials to new economic-population points has been slow and unsynchronized, also adversely affecting the redistribution rate.

The labor and population redistribution mission during the last 3 months of the year is still extremely large and local areas and sectors must concentrate every effort to promptly overcome difficulties with the purpose of completing the nationwide population redistribution mission of 1986.

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POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

VIETNAM

LAM DONG NEW ECONOMIC ZONE PROSPERS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Sep 86 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Lam Dong New Land"]

[Text] Since 1976, more than 21,000 people from nearly all the districts of rural Hanoi have gone to build the new economic zone in Duc Trong District of Lam Dong Province.

After 10 years in this area of fertile land, the people of Hanoi have established 16 agricultural cooperatives, 3 state farms, enterprises for machine repair, brick and tile production, wood processing, milling, and animal feed processing, and merchandise, food and beverage, and grain stores.

The area cleared is 5,060 hectares, including 1,976 hectares that are fairly well perfected and introduced to production. The products acquired from this new land zone now consist of 25,000 tons of grain, 2,500 tons of peanuts and beans of all varieties, and hundreds of tons of pork, and more than 1,000 head of buffaloes and cattle are being raised. The industrial crop plots are beginning to produce, each year nearly 20 tons of coffee, 45 tons of fine-leaf tea, etc., and more than 15,000 cubic meters of timber, more than 700 tons of pine resin, and nearly 13,000 stere of firewood have been exploited and processed, and scores of hectares of forest have been planted. Sixty percent of the families have incomes many times higher than in their old homes. The past school year had 258 cadres and teachers in 15 schools from supplementary education to general secondary schools with 160 classes and the number of students rose to 4,600. The new economic zone has a 60-bed general hospital and many public health clinics.

An economic-population zone of Hanoi has risen on the land of Duc Trong.

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CHRONOLOGY

VIETNAM

CHRONOLOGY FOR 15 JUNE-14 JULY 1986

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Aug 86 p 32

[Text]

(15 June — 14 July)

JUNE

17. *Hanoi*: Mr Carl Erhard Lindahl, Swedish Ambassador to Vietnam, signs on behalf of the Swedish Government an agreement on financial aid to the Olof Palme Children's Hospital (Hanoi) and the Uong Bi polyclinic during the period from June 1986 to June 1989.

18 — 24. A delegation of the Esperanto Movement for Peace (MEM), led by its General Secretary Clement Tholet, a Belgian journalist, visits Vietnam on the occasion of the International Year of Peace.

19. *Phnom Penh*: The Vietnam People's Army delegation, led by General Van Tien Dung, Political Bureau member of the CPV CC, Minister of National Defence, attends the 35th celebration of the traditional day of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Army.

20. The Delegation of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare of the Republic of India, headed by Minister Moshina Kidwai, visits Vietnam and signs agreed minutes on health cooperation between Vietnam and India.

— *Hanoi*: The Vietnam Journalists' Association holds a meeting to celebrate the Vietnam press day (21 June 1925 — 21 June 1986).

21 — 23. The Delegation of the Iraqi Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP), led by Samir Muhammad Abdul Wahhab, member of the Regional Command of the ABSP and Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, pays a friendship visit to Vietnam.

23 — 24. *Jakarta*: Holding of the 8th round of meeting of expert teams of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of Indonesia on the delimitation of the continental shelf of the two countries.

24 — 30. *Hanoi*: Holding of the 11th session of the SRV Seventh National Assembly (see article in this issue).

24 June — 4 July. A delegation of the Central Council of Trade Unions of Albania, led by its Secretary Shinasi Zenelaj, pays an official friendship visit to Vietnam.

25. Vietnam News Agency rejects the allegation of the spokesman of the Thai Army slanderously charging Vietnamese troops of intrusion into, and shelling Thai territory.

— Completion of the second oil well (No. 28) on Bach Ho (White Tiger) block.

26. *Hanoi*: Establishment of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with the Libyan people.

26 June — 2 July. UN Deputy Secretary General R. Armad, special representative of the UN Secretary General, visits Vietnam.

27. *Hanoi*: Holding of a grand meeting to celebrate the 35th anniversary of the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (28 June 1951 — 28 June 1986).

29 June — 2 July. *Warsaw*. The Delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam, headed by Chu Huy Man, Political Bureau member of the CPV CC, Vice-President of the State Council, attends the 10th Congress of the Polish United Worker's Party.

JULY

1. A delegation of Soviet legal workers, led by Dr L.S. Khaldeev, Director of the All-Union Institute for Professional Upgrading of Legal Workers, visits Vietnam.

2. A delegation of the Esperanto Movement for Peace (MEM), led by its General Secretary Clement Tholet, a Belgian journalist, visits Vietnam on the occasion of the International Year of Peace.

6. Two Vietnamese items of ceramics are awarded diplomas at the 4th International Exhibition on Fine Art Handicrafts held in Erfurt (GDR).

7. *Prague*: Signing of a protocol and a plan for scientific and technological cooperation between Vietnam and Czechoslovakia in the 1986 — 1987 period.

8. Opening of a bus service between Hanoi and Xiengkhouang (Laos) via Nam Can on a distance of 495 km.

— A delegation of the Mongolia — Vietnam Friendship Association, led by its Chairman J. Zhamyan, member of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, visits Vietnam.

10. General Secretary of the CPV CC Le Duan passes away (See articles in this issue).

14. The CPV CC holds a special session to elect Truong-Chinh, Political Bureau member and President of the State Council, to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee.

14. *Hanoi*: The Vietnam Party and Government Delegation, headed by Truong-Chinh, General Secretary of the CPV CC, President of the State Council, holds talks with the Soviet Party and Government Delegation, headed by Nikolai Ryzhkov, Politburo member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

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END